When we understand that something is a pot, is it because of one
property that all pots share? This seems unlikely, but without this
common essence, it is difficult to see how we could teach someone
to use the word "pot" or to see something as "a" pot. The Buddhist
apoha theory tries to resolve this dilemma, first, by rejecting
properties such as "potness" and, then, by claiming that the
element uniting all pots is their very difference from all
non-pots. In other words, when we seek out a pot, we select an
object that is not a non-pot, and we repeat this practice with all
other items and expressions.
Writing from the vantage points of history, philosophy, and
cognitive science, the contributors to this volume clarify the
nominalist apoha theory and explore the relationship between apoha
and the scientific study of human cognition. They engage throughout
in a lively debate over the theory's legitimacy. Classical Indian
philosophers challenged the apoha theory's legitimacy, believing
instead in the existence of enduring essences. Seeking to settle
this controversy, essays explore whether apoha offers new and
workable solutions to problems in the scientific study of human
cognition. They show that the work of generations of Indian
philosophers can add much toward the resolution of persistent
conundrums in analytic philosophy and cognitive science.
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