Unlike many other countries, the United States has few
constitutional guarantees of social welfare rights such as income,
housing, or healthcare. In part this is because many Americans
believe that the courts cannot possibly enforce such guarantees.
However, recent innovations in constitutional design in other
countries suggest that such rights can be judicially enforced--not
by increasing the power of the courts but by decreasing it. In
"Weak Courts, Strong Rights," Mark Tushnet uses a comparative legal
perspective to show how creating weaker forms of judicial review
may actually allow for stronger social welfare rights under
American constitutional law.
Under "strong-form" judicial review, as in the United States,
judicial interpretations of the constitution are binding on other
branches of government. In contrast, "weak-form" review allows the
legislature and executive to reject constitutional rulings by the
judiciary--as long as they do so publicly. Tushnet describes how
weak-form review works in Great Britain and Canada and discusses
the extent to which legislatures can be expected to enforce
constitutional norms on their own. With that background, he turns
to social welfare rights, explaining the connection between the
"state action" or "horizontal effect" doctrine and the enforcement
of social welfare rights. Tushnet then draws together the analysis
of weak-form review and that of social welfare rights, explaining
how weak-form review could be used to enforce those rights. He
demonstrates that there is a clear judicial path--not an
insurmountable judicial hurdle--to better enforcement of
constitutional social welfare rights.
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