This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers
this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium.
This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision
principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a
choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these
principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and
draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The
book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria
in ideal normal-form games. In synthesizing decision theory and
game theory in a powerful way this book will be of particular
interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and
game theory as well as economists and other social scientists.
General
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