This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers
this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium.
This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision
principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a
choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these
principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and
draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The
book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria
in ideal normal-form games. In synthesizing decision theory and
game theory in a powerful way this book will be of particular
interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and
game theory as well as economists and other social scientists.
General
Imprint: |
Cambridge UniversityPress
|
Country of origin: |
United Kingdom |
Series: |
Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory |
Release date: |
July 2007 |
First published: |
May 2007 |
Authors: |
Paul Weirich
|
Dimensions: |
228 x 151 x 14mm (L x W x T) |
Format: |
Paperback - Trade
|
Pages: |
252 |
ISBN-13: |
978-0-521-03802-7 |
Categories: |
Books >
Science & Mathematics >
Mathematics >
Optimization >
Game theory
Promotions
|
LSN: |
0-521-03802-2 |
Barcode: |
9780521038027 |
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