This work examines British thinking about nuclear weapons in the
period up to about 1970, looking at the subject through the eyes of
the Royal Navy, in the belief that this can offer new insights in
this field. The author argues that the Navy was always sceptical
about nuclear weapons, both on practical grounds and because of
wartime and pre-war experiences. He suggests that this scepticism
can teach us a good deal about military technological innovation in
general. Both the defensive and offensive implications of nuclear
weapons are considered, using recently declassified documents to
show that broken-backed warfare - the 1950s idea that a war between
the East and West could continue after a nuclear exchange - had
considerably greater intellectual and practical foundations than
has previously been acknowledged. Examining naval involvement in
the British nuclear weapons programme in detail, this work argues
that the Navy's interest in a share of the strategic deterrent role
has often been considerably overstated.
General
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