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The Measure of Mind - Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution (Paperback)
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The Measure of Mind - Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution (Paperback)
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The Measure of Mind provides a sustained critique of a widely held
representationalist view of propositional attitudes and their role
in the production of thought and behaviour. On this view, having a
propositional attitude is a matter of having an explicit
representation that plays a particular causal/computational role in
the production of thought and behaviour. Robert J. Matthews argues
that this view does not enjoy the theoretical or the empirical
support that proponents claim for it; moreover, it misconstrues the
role of propositional attitude attributions in cognitive scientific
theorizing. He then goes on to develop an alternative
measurement-theoretic account of propositional attitudes and the
sentences by which we attribute them. On this account, the
sentences by which we attribute propositional attitudes function
semantically like the sentences by which we attribute a quantity of
some physical magnitude (e.g., having a mass of 80 kilos). That is,
in much the same way that we specify a quantity of some physical
magnitude by means of its numerical representative on a measurement
scale, we specify propositional attitudes by means of their
representatives in a linguistically-defined measurement space.
Matthews argues that, unlike the representationalist view, his
account of propositional attitudes draws a clear distinction
between propositional attitudes and our natural language
representations of them, and does not presume that salient
properties of the latter can simply be read back onto the former.
On his view, propositional attitudes turn out to be causally
efficacious aptitudes for thought and behaviour, and not mental
entities of some sort. In defending this approach, Matthews
provides a plausible account both of the standard philosophical
puzzles about propositional attitudes, and of the role of
propositional attitude attributions in cognitive scientific
theorizing.
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