Philosophers have usually argued that the right way to explain
people's actions is in terms of their beliefs and intentions rather
than in terms of objective facts. Rowland Stout takes the opposite
line in his account of action. Appeal to teleology is widely
regarded with suspicion, but Dr Stout argues that there are things
in nature, namely actions, which can be teleologically explained:
they happen because they serve some end. Moreover, this
teleological explanation is externalist: it cites facts about the
world, not beliefs and intentions which only represent the world.
Such externalism about the explanation of action is a natural
partner to externalism about knowledge and about reference, but has
hardly ever been considered seriously before. One dramatic
consequence of such a position is that it opens up the possibility
of a behaviourist account of beliefs and intentions.
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