Wittgenstein's Account of Truth (Paperback)

Wittgenstein's Account of Truth challenges the view that semantic antirealists attribute to Wittgenstein: that we cannot meaningfully call verification-transcendent statements "true." Ellenbogen argues that Wittgenstein would not have held that we should revise our practice of treating certain statements as true or false, but instead would have held that we should revise our view of what it means to call a statement true. According to the dictum "meaning is use, " what makes it correct to call a statement "true" is not its correspondence with how things are, but our criterion for determining its truth. What it means for us to call a statement "true" is that we currently judge it true, knowing that we may some day revise the criteria whereby we do so.

General

Imprint:	State University of New York Press
Country of origin:	United States
Series:	SUNY series in Philosophy
Release date:	2003
First published:	February 2003
Authors:	Sara Ellenbogen
Dimensions:	229 x 152 x 25mm (L x W x T)
Format:	Paperback - Trade
Pages:	164
ISBN-13:	978-0-7914-5626-2
Categories:	Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Epistemology, theory of knowledge Books > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Epistemology, theory of knowledge
LSN:	0-7914-5626-9
Barcode:	9780791456262

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