Hard Lessons reviews the Iraq reconstruction experience from
mid-2002 through the fall of 2008. Like SIGIR's previous lessons
learned reports, this study is not an audit. Rather, it arises from
our congressional mandate to provide "advice and recommendations on
policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness" in
programs created for Iraq's relief and reconstruction. The report
presents a chronological history of the reconstruction program,
threading together a number of themes including: the enormous
challenges that security problems posed for rebuilding efforts the
dramatic and frequently reactive course-changes in reconstruction
strategy the turbulence engendered by continual personnel turnover
at every level the waste caused by inadequate contracting and
program management practices the poor integration of interagency
efforts caused by weak unity of command and inconsistent unity of
effort. The text of this report-through vignette, interview, and
factual detail-explicates these themes by, in turn, laying out the
blinkered and disjointed prewar planning for postwar Iraq; the
CPA's large and ultimately too ambitious expansion of the
reconstruction program; the security-driven reprogrammings required
by the exploding insurgency; the strongly resourced response of the
surge; and the rise of Iraq's role in its own reconstruction. Hard
Lessons answers some important questions about the U.S. relief and
reconstruction program in Iraq: Did the program meet the goals it
set for itself? Was the program grossly burdened by waste and
fraud? Why did reconstruction efforts so often fail to meet their
mark? The research for Hard Lessons comprised interviews with
hundreds of individuals and the review of thousands of documents.
SIGIR reached out to virtually every major player in the Iraq
reconstruction experience and almost all agreed to be interviewed
or provide useful responses. Among others, Secretaries Powell,
Rumsfeld, Gates, and Rice; USAID Administrator Natsios and Deputy
Administrator Kunder; Deputy Secretaries Wolfowitz, England,
Armitage and Negroponte; Under Secretary Feith; Ambassadors Bremer,
Khalilzad, Crocker, Jeffrey, Satterfield, Speckhard, Taylor, and
Saloom; and Generals Garner, Abizaid, McKiernan, Strock, Eaton,
Sanchez, Casey, Petraeus, Odierno, Chiarelli, Dempsey, and McCoy
were all interviewed by SIGIR or gave helpful information or
advice. We also interviewed Iraqi leaders, including former Prime
Ministers Allawi and Ja'afari, Deputy Prime Ministers Chalabi and
Salih, Ambassador Sumaida'ie, Judge Radhi, and Minister Baban.
Equally important to the study, SIGIR staff interviewed hundreds of
military members, government officials, and civilian contractors
who carried out the "brick and mortar" work of Iraq's relief and
reconstruction. The report also draws on the body of SIGIR audits,
inspections, and investigations, as well as reports from other
investigative bodies.
General
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