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Being Realistic about Reasons (Hardcover) Loot Price: R1,577
Discovery Miles 15 770
Being Realistic about Reasons (Hardcover): T. M. Scanlon

Being Realistic about Reasons (Hardcover)

T. M. Scanlon

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Loot Price R1,577 Discovery Miles 15 770 | Repayment Terms: R148 pm x 12*

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T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism-the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief. Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflective equilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.

General

Imprint: Oxford UniversityPress
Country of origin: United Kingdom
Release date: 2014
First published: March 2014
Authors: T. M. Scanlon (Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity)
Dimensions: 224 x 145 x 13mm (L x W x T)
Format: Hardcover
Pages: 144
ISBN-13: 978-0-19-967848-8
Categories: Books > Language & Literature > Language & linguistics > Philosophy of language
Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Epistemology, theory of knowledge
Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Philosophy of mind
Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Ethics & moral philosophy > General
Books > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Epistemology, theory of knowledge
Books > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Ethics & moral philosophy > General
Books > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Philosophy of mind
LSN: 0-19-967848-0
Barcode: 9780199678488

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