The exposure of two senior republicans as informers for British
intelligence in 2005 led to a popular perception that the IRA had
'lost' the intelligence war and was pressurised into peace. In this
first in-depth study across the entire conflict, Thomas Leahy
re-evaluates the successes and failures of Britain's intelligence
activities against the IRA, from the use of agents and informers to
special-forces, surveillance and electronic intelligence. Using new
interview material alongside memoirs and Irish and UK archival
materials, he suggests that the IRA was not forced into peace by
British intelligence. His work sheds new light on key questions in
intelligence and security studies. How does British intelligence
operate against paramilitaries? Is it effective? When should
governments 'talk to terrorists'? And does regional variation
explain the outcome of intelligence conflicts? This is a major
contribution to the history of the conflict and of why peace
emerged in Northern Ireland.
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