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The type identity theory, according to which types of mental state
are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for
some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many
philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were
marshalled against it, finding in the type identity theory both
resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics
and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between
developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. This
volume brings together leading philosophers of mind, whose essays
challenge in new ways the standard objections to type identity
theory, such as the multiple realizability objection and the modal
argument. Other essays show how cognitive science and neuroscience
are lending new support to type identity theory and still others
provide, extend and improve traditional arguments concerning the
theory's explanatory power.
This book presents a novel and comprehensive theory of
consciousness. The initial chapter distinguishes six main forms of
consciousness and sketches an account of each one. Later chapters
focus on phenomenal consciousness, consciousness of, and
introspective consciousness. In discussing phenomenal
consciousness, Hill develops the representational theory of mind in
new directions, arguing that all awareness involves
representations, even awareness of qualitative states like pain. He
then uses this view to undercut dualistic accounts of qualitative
states. Other topics include visual awareness, visual appearances,
emotional qualia, and meta-cognitive processing. This important
work will interest a wide readership of students and scholars in
philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC
BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford
Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and
selected open access locations. Christopher S. Hill argues that
perceptual experience constitutively involves representations of
worldly items, and that the relevant form of representation can be
explained in broadly biological terms. He then maintains that the
representational contents of perceptual experiences are perceptual
appearances, interpreted as relational, viewpoint-dependent
properties of external objects. There is also a complementary
explanation of how the objects that possess these properties are
represented. Hill maintains that perceptual phenomenology can be
explained reductively in terms of the representational contents of
experiences, and uses this doctrine to undercut the traditional
arguments for dualism. This treatment of perceptual phenomenology
is expanded to encompass cognitive phenomenology, the phenomenology
of moods and emotions, and the phenomenology of pain. Hill also
offers accounts of the various forms of consciousness that
perceptual experiences can possess. One aim is to argue that
phenomenology is metaphysically independent of these forms of
consciousness, and another is to de-mystify the form known as
phenomenal consciousness. The book concludes by discussing the
relations of various kinds that perceptual experiences bear to
higher-level cognitive states, including relations of format,
content, and justification or support.
The type identity theory, according to which types of mental state
are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for
some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many
philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were
marshalled against it, finding in the type identity theory both
resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics
and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between
developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. This
volume brings together leading philosophers of mind, whose essays
challenge in new ways the standard objections to type identity
theory, such as the multiple realizability objection and the modal
argument. Other essays show how cognitive science and neuroscience
are lending new support to type identity theory and still others
provide, extend and improve traditional arguments concerning the
theory's explanatory power.
This book presents a novel and comprehensive theory of
consciousness. The initial chapter distinguishes six main forms of
consciousness and sketches an account of each one. Later chapters
focus on phenomenal consciousness, consciousness of, and
introspective consciousness. In discussing phenomenal
consciousness, Hill develops the representational theory of mind in
new directions, arguing that all awareness involves
representations, even awareness of qualitative states like pain. He
then uses this view to undercut dualistic accounts of qualitative
states. Other topics include visual awareness, visual appearances,
emotional qualia, and meta-cognitive processing. This important
work will interest a wide readership of students and scholars in
philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
There is an important family of semantic notions that are applied to thoughts and to the conceptual constituents of thoughts--as when one says that the thought that the Universe is expanding is true. Christopher Hill presents a theory of the content of such notions. That theory is largely deflationary in spirit. It represents a broad range of semantic notions free from substantive metaphysical and empirical presuppositions. He also explains the relationship of mirroring or semantic correspondence linking thoughts to reality.
There is an important family of semantic notions that are applied to thoughts and to the conceptual constituents of thoughts--as when one says that the thought that the Universe is expanding is true. Christopher Hill presents a theory of the content of such notions. That theory is largely deflationary in spirit. It represents a broad range of semantic notions free from substantive metaphysical and empirical presuppositions. He also explains the relationship of mirroring or semantic correspondence linking thoughts to reality.
This is a book about sensory states and their apparent
characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and
epistemological questions and presents an argument for type
materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the
neural states with which they are correlated. According to type
materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and
members of related biological species; silicon-based androids
cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival
theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism,
functionalism), and explores a number of important issues: the
forms and limits of introspective awareness of sensations, the
semantic properties of sensory concepts, knowledge of other minds,
and unity of consciousness. The book is a significant contribution
to the philosophy of mind, and has much to say to psychologists and
cognitive scientists.
This is a book about sensory states and their apparent
characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and
epistemological questions and presents an argument for type
materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the
neural states with which they are correlated. According to type
materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and
members of related biological species; silicon-based androids
cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival
theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism,
functionalism), and explores a number of important issues: the
forms and limits of introspective awareness of sensations, the
semantic properties of sensory concepts, knowledge of other minds,
and unity of consciousness. The book is a significant contribution
to the philosophy of mind, and has much to say to psychologists and
cognitive scientists.
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