Getting what you want - even if you are the boss - isn't always easy. Almost every organization, big or small, works among a network of competing interests. Whether it's governments pushing through policies, companies trying to increase profits, or even families deciding where to move house, rarely can decisions be made in isolation from competing interests both within the organization and outside it. In this accessible and straightforward account, Hans de Bruijn and Ernst ten Heuvelhof cast light on multi-stakeholder decision-making. Using plain language, they reveal the nuts and bolts of decision-making within the numerous dilemmas and tensions at work. Drawing on a diverse range of illustrative examples throughout, their perceptive analysis examines how different interests can either support or block change, and the strategies available for managing a variety of stakeholders. The second edition of Management in Networks incorporates a wider spread of international cases, a new chapter giving an overview of different network types, and a new chapter looking at digital governance and the impact of big data on networks. This insightful text is invaluable reading for students of management and organizational studies, plus practitioners - or actors - operating in a range of contexts.

This in-depth book explains how institutional changes such as the privatization and liberalization of network industries, for example transport, energy or telecommunications, can frequently be disappointing. The expected benefits such as lower prices, innovation and better services fail to materialize, often because the number of competitors is low. The authors demonstrate how strategic actor behaviour of one or more of the firms involved can help explain these disappointing results. This book elucidates the concept of 'strategic behaviour' and portrays it in real-life examples to aid our understanding of this important phenomenon in terms of policy and organizational decision-making. It clearly demonstrates the adverse effects strategic behaviour can exert on the quality of infrastructure provision after liberalization. The theoretical sections are backed by empirical examples from throughout the world. The unique multidisciplinary approach will ensure a broad readership among students, researchers and policy-makers with an interest in the economics, politics and management of infrastructure and network industries.

* End: pro?t and loss account. As a result, there will be a stage at which the parties have developed relations and prospects of gain, while there are still a number of problems that are dif?cult to solve and that fail to evoke consensus. Each party will then draw up a pro?t and loss account. On the positive side of the balance are the relations developed and the gains collected, on the negative side there are the losses and the unsolved problems. For particular parties, who have no interest in the problem, the latter side is uninteresting; for others, who have an interest in a particular solution of this problem, it represents a form of loss. * Pro?t and loss balance positive for a critical mass: speed. The speed of the process will increase if the pro?t and loss account shows a positive balance for a critical mass of parties. They wish to collect their gains and therefore to make ?nal decisions. At this point there will be an important psychological mec- nism: parties tend to anticipate on collecting their gains, which increases their urge to speed up the process. It is clear from the above, however, that the end of a process is dif?cult to predict.

* End: pro?t and loss account. As a result, there will be a stage at which the parties have developed relations and prospects of gain, while there are still a number of problems that are dif?cult to solve and that fail to evoke consensus. Each party will then draw up a pro?t and loss account. On the positive side of the balance are the relations developed and the gains collected, on the negative side there are the losses and the unsolved problems. For particular parties, who have no interest in the problem, the latter side is uninteresting; for others, who have an interest in a particular solution of this problem, it represents a form of loss. * Pro?t and loss balance positive for a critical mass: speed. The speed of the process will increase if the pro?t and loss account shows a positive balance for a critical mass of parties. They wish to collect their gains and therefore to make ?nal decisions. At this point there will be an important psychological mec- nism: parties tend to anticipate on collecting their gains, which increases their urge to speed up the process. It is clear from the above, however, that the end of a process is dif?cult to predict.

Getting what you want - even if you are the boss - isn't always easy. Almost every organization, big or small, works among a network of competing interests. Whether it's governments pushing through policies, companies trying to increase profits, or even families deciding where to move house, rarely can decisions be made in isolation from competing interests both within the organization and outside it. In this accessible and straightforward account, Hans de Bruijn and Ernst ten Heuvelhof cast light on multi-stakeholder decision-making. Using plain language, they reveal the nuts and bolts of decision-making within the numerous dilemmas and tensions at work. Drawing on a diverse range of illustrative examples throughout, their perceptive analysis examines how different interests can either support or block change, and the strategies available for managing a variety of stakeholders. The second edition of Management in Networks incorporates a wider spread of international cases, a new chapter giving an overview of different network types, and a new chapter looking at digital governance and the impact of big data on networks. This insightful text is invaluable reading for students of management and organizational studies, plus practitioners - or actors - operating in a range of contexts.

This book deals with the practice of enforcement. It focuses on the position of enforcement professionals: inspectors attempting to induce inspectees to adopt norm-compliant behaviour. What strategies do inspectees use to evade rules and enforcement? How do inspectors respond? What are 'counter-strategies? In addition to this game between inspectors and inspectees, there is the game between inspectors, managers and politicians. What influence do politicians and managers have on inspectors and what patterns do we see developing in this relationship? The book also covers a number of themes surrounding enforcement: zero tolerance, information-sharing between inspectors, regulation in network-based sectors and the meaning of several types of risks in risk analyses. The book discusses the reality of professionals rather than policy and policy plans. It is highly suitable for those who want to understand the reality of enforcement, such as policy makers, inspectors, regulators, enforcement organizations and educational institutions, but also for those facing an enforcing government.