Orginally published in 1991. From the foreword: "Although the United States did not enter World War II until the end of 1941, US citizens fought and died in the war long before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Among them were the pilots of the Eagle Squadrons, three fighter squadrons of Britain's Royal Air Force manned by young US flyers risking their lives in another nation's war. In this book, Colonel Philip D. Caine, US Air Force, tells how the Eagle Squadrons were formed, describes their RAF experiences, and evaluates their contribution to Britain's defense. Unlike other accounts, Eagles of the RAF is not simply a paean to the pilots as special heroes and "aces," though many performed heroically and some sacrificed their lives. Drawing almost exclusively on interviews with more than thirty-five surviving Eagles, on their letters and memoirs, and on official records of the squadrons, Caine shows who these men were and what drove them to endure the burdens of joining a foreign air force. We see them adjusting to life in a new country as they train, fly patrol and escort missions, and sit on alert in dispersal huts or in airplane cockpits. We see their routine suddenly shattered by the momentary chaos and exhilaration of aerial combat. The Eagles' story is a unique chapter in American military history; it deserves to be told as it really happened-not as romanticized by Hollywood or nostalgic recollection. Beyond reliably telling the story, Colonel Caine reveals much about why people enter the military, how military life satisfies or disappoints their preconceptions, and how at least some of them reacted to the realities of combat."

The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) has produced this edited volume, Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, that delves deeply into everything mentioned above and more. In a time when the threat is growing, this is a timely effort. CCO has gathered an impressive cadre of authors to illuminate the important aspects of transnational crime and other illicit networks. They describe the clear and present danger and the magnitude of the challenge of converging and connecting illicit networks; the ways and means used by transnational criminal networks and how illicit networks actually operate and interact; how the proliferation, convergence, and horizontal diversification of illicit networks challenge state sovereignty; and how different national and international organizations are fighting back. A deeper understanding of the problem will allow us to then develop a more comprehensive, more effective, and more enduring solution.

Full color publication with photographs. A first of its kind, this book-of, by, and for the noncommissioned officer and petty officer-is a comprehensive explanation of the enlisted leader across the U.S. Armed Services. It complements The Armed Forces Officer, the latest edition of which was published by NDU Press in 2007, as well as the Services' NCO/PO manuals and handbooks. Written by a team of Active, Reserve, and retired senior enlisted leaders from all Service branches, this book defines and describes how NCOs/POs fit into an organization, centers them in the Profession of Arms, explains their dual roles of complementing the officer and enabling the force, and exposes their international engagement. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey writes in his foreword to the book, "We know noncommissioned officers and petty officers to have exceptional competence, professional character, and soldierly grit-they are exemplars of our Profession of Arms." Aspirational and fulfilling, this book helps prepare young men and women who strive to become NCOs/POs, re-inspires serving enlisted leaders, and stimulates reflection by those who have retired from or left active service. It also gives those who have never worn the uniform a better understanding of who these exceptional men and women are, and why they are properly known as the "Backbone of the Armed Forces."

From the foreword: "Established during World War II to advise the President on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council is essential to an understanding of the current work of the Chairman and the Joint Staff. A history of their activities, both in war and peacetime, also provides important insights into the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history of their activities be kept for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies is self-apparent. Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1991 follows in the tradition of volumes previously prepared by the Joint History Office dealing with JCS involvement in national policy, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Adopting a broader view than earlier volumes, it surveys the JCS role and contributions from the early days of orld War II through the end of the Cold War. Written from a combination of primary and secondary sources, it is a fresh work of scholarship, looking at the problems of this era and their military implications. The main prism is that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but in laying out the JCS perspective, it deals also with the wider impact of key decisions and the ensuing policies."

The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) has produced this edited volume, Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, that delves deeply into everything mentioned above and more. In a time when the threat is growing, this is a timely effort. CCO has gathered an impressive cadre of authors to illuminate the important aspects of transnational crime and other illicit networks. They describe the clear and present danger and the magnitude of the challenge of converging and connecting illicit networks; the ways and means used by transnational criminal networks and how illicit networks actually operate and interact; how the proliferation, convergence, and horizontal diversification of illicit networks challenge state sovereignty; and how different national and international organizations are fighting back. A deeper understanding of the problem will allow us to then develop a more comprehensive, more effective, and more enduring solution.

The second half of the 20th century featured a strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. That competition avoided World War III in part because during the 1950s, scholars like Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter analyzed the fundamental nature of nuclear deterrence. Decades of arms control negotiations reinforced these early notions of stability and created a mutual understanding that allowed U.S.-Soviet competition to proceed without armed conflict. The first half of the 21st century will be dominated by the relationship between the United States and China. That relationship is likely to contain elements of both cooperation and competition. Territorial disputes such as those over Taiwan and the South China Sea will be an important feature of this competition, but both are traditional disputes, and traditional solutions suggest themselves. A more difficult set of issues relates to U.S.-Chinese competition and cooperation in three domains in which real strategic harm can be inflicted in the current era: nuclear, space, and cyber. Just as a clearer understanding of the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence maintained adequate stability during the Cold War, a clearer understanding of the characteristics of these three domains can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. That is what this book is about. David Gompert and Phillip Saunders assess the prospect of U.S.- Chinese competition in these domains and develop three related analytic findings upon which their recommendations are built. The first is that in each domain, the offense is dominant. The second is that each side will be highly vulnerable to a strike from the other side. And the third is that the retaliating side will still be able to do unacceptable damage to the initiating party. Therefore, the authors make an important recommendation: that the United States propose a comprehensive approach based on mutual restraint whereby it and China can mitigate their growing strategic vulnerabilities. Unlike the Cold War, this mutual restraint regime may not take the form of binding treaties. But patterns of understanding and restraint may be enough to maintain stability. Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press.

The U.S. Government has recently issued seven major studies that together put forth a comprehensive blueprint for major global changes in U.S. national security strategy, defense plans, and diplomacy. These seven studies are brought together in this illuminating book, which portrays their individual contents and complex interrelationships and evaluates their strengths and shortfalls. It argues that while these studies are well-written, cogently argued, and articulate many valuable innovations for the Department of Defense, Department of State, and other government agencies, all of them leave lingering, controversial issues that require further thinking and analysis as future U.S. national security policy evolves in a changing and dangerous world. For all readers, this book offers a quick, readable way to grasp and critique the many changes now sweeping over the new U.S. approach to global security affairs.

Full color publication with photographs. A first of its kind, this book-of, by, and for the noncommissioned officer and petty officer-is a comprehensive explanation of the enlisted leader across the U.S. Armed Services. It complements The Armed Forces Officer, the latest edition of which was published by NDU Press in 2007, as well as the Services' NCO/PO manuals and handbooks. Written by a team of Active, Reserve, and retired senior enlisted leaders from all Service branches, this book defines and describes how NCOs/POs fit into an organization, centers them in the Profession of Arms, explains their dual roles of complementing the officer and enabling the force, and exposes their international engagement. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey writes in his foreword to the book, "We know noncommissioned officers and petty officers to have exceptional competence, professional character, and soldierly grit-they are exemplars of our Profession of Arms." Aspirational and fulfilling, this book helps prepare young men and women who strive to become NCOs/POs, re-inspires serving enlisted leaders, and stimulates reflection by those who have retired from or left active service. It also gives those who have never worn the uniform a better understanding of who these exceptional men and women are, and why they are properly known as the "Backbone of the Armed Forces."

Published by the National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs. From the foreword by Hans Binnendijk: "The first half of the 21st century will be dominated by the relationship between the United States and China. That relationship is likely to contain elements of both cooperation and competition. Territorial disputes such as those over Taiwan and the South China Sea will be an important feature of this competition, but both are traditional disputes, and traditional solutions suggest themselves. A more difficult set of issues relates to U.S.-Chinese competition and cooperation in three domains in which real strategic harm can be inflicted in the current era: nuclear, space, and cyber. Just as a clearer understanding of the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence maintained adequate stability during the Cold War, a clearer understanding of the characteristics of these three domains can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. That is what this book is about. David Gompert and Phillip Saunders assess the prospect of U.S.- Chinese competition in these domains and develop three related analytic findings upon which their recommendations are built. The first is that in each domain, the offense is dominant. The second is that each side will be highly vulnerable to a strike from the other side. And the third is that the retaliating side will still be able to do unacceptable damage to the initiating party. Therefore, the authors make an important recommendation: that the United States propose a comprehensive approach based on mutual restraint whereby it and China can mitigate their growing strategic vulnerabilities. Unlike the Cold War, this mutual restraint regime may not take the form of binding treaties. But patterns of understanding and restraint may be enough to maintain stability."

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University's (NDU's) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University's (NDU's) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University's (NDU's) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community.

The Center for Transatlantic Security Studies (CTSS) serves as a national and international focal point and resource center for multidisciplinary research on issues relating to transatlantic security. The Center provides recommendations to senior U.S. and international government and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials, publishes its research, and conducts a broad range of outreach activities to inform the broader U.S. national and transatlantic security community.

The contributors to this book emphasize a mix of heritage and history as the primary leitmotif for contemporary border rivalries and dynamics. Whether the region's 11 states want it or not, their bordered identity is falling into ever sharper definition-if only because of pressure from extraregional states. Chapters are organized by country to elicit a broad range of thought and approach as much as for the specific areas or nation-states examined in each chapter. This book aims to provide new ways of looking at the reality and illusion of bordered Southeast Asia.Edited by James Clad, Sean M. McDonald, and Bruce Vaughn, with contributions from: Zachary Abuza, Richard P. Cronin, David Lee, Rhoda Margesson, Dick K. Nanto, Patricia O'Brien, David Rosenberg, Carlyle A. Thayer, Michael Wood.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University's (NDU's) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community.

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University's (NDU's) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community.

Mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles offer an excellent case study for investigating the current debate over the Pentagon's approach to developing and fielding irregular warfare capabilities. MRAPs first gained prominence for their ability to protect U.S. forces from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and because the Pentagon did not deploy them en masse to Iraq until almost five years of fighting had passed. More recently, following extraordinary efforts to field more than 10,000 MRAPs quickly, the program has been criticized as wasteful and unnecessary. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates often cites the slow fielding of MRAPs as a prime example of the Pentagon's institutional resistance to investments in irregular warfare capabilities. Some irregular warfare requirements traditionally bedevil the United States-such as human intelligence-but quickly producing and fielding vehicles is something the country has done well often in the past. Moreover, the Pentagon assessed MRAPs as 400 percent more effective at protecting U.S. troops than other vehicles, and Congress was eager to pay for them. Thus, the slow fielding of the MRAPs certainly seems like prima facie evidence for the Secretary's claim that the Pentagon does not do a good job of providing irregular warfare capabilities. Yet some analysts now argue that MRAPs are not really useful for irregular warfare and are prohibitively expensive. By the time the vehicles finally flowed into the combat zone, the need for them had diminished because the insurgency and the IED problem in Iraq were on the decline. Now the Pentagon's planned procurement of MRAPs is being slashed, Congress is demanding more accountability for controlling their costs, and the MRAP program is being accused of sidetracking important future acquisition programs such as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and the Future Combat System. As General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), asserted, "It is the wrong vehicle, too late, to fit a threat we were actually managing." Thus, MRAP proponents, who think their delayed fielding was unconscionable, and detractors, who consider them a misguided, emotional response to casualties, both view the MRAP saga as an acquisition disaster. For incoming senior officials who are vowing acquisition reform, the MRAP experience seems to strengthen their cause. The controversial MRAPs raise two questions. First, does the MRAP experience support Secretary Gates' contention that the Pentagon is not sufficiently able to field irregular warfare capabilities? To resolve this issue, we have to determine whether MRAPs actually are a valid irregular warfare requirement, and if so, whether the Pentagon should have been better prepared to provide the kind of force protection armored vehicles like the MRAP provides. Second, what factors best explain the MRAP failure, whether that failure is determined to be the delayed fielding of MRAPs or the fact that they were fielded at all? More specifically, is the acquisition system to blame, as is commonly supposed? We conclude that MRAPs are a valid irregular warfare requirement and that the Pentagon should have been better prepared to field them, albeit not on the scale demanded by events in Iraq. We also argue that the proximate cause of the failure to quickly field MRAPs is not the Pentagon's acquisition system but rather the requirements process, reinforced by more fundamental organizational factors. These findings suggest that achieving Secretary Gates' objective of improving irregular warfare capabilities will require more extensive reforms than many realize.