Humans are lovers, and yet a good deal of pedagogical theory, Christian or otherwise, assumes an anthropology at odds with human nature, fixed in a model of humans as "thinking things". Turning to Augustine, or at least Augustine in conversation with Aquinas, Martin Heidegger, the overlooked Jesuit thinker Bernard Lonergan, and the important contemporary Charles Taylor, this book provides a normative vision for Christian higher education. A phenomenological reappropriation of human subjectivity reveals an authentic order to love, even when damaged by sin, and loves, made authentic by grace, allow the intellectually, morally, and religiously converted person to attain an integral unity. Properly understanding the integral relation between love and the fullness of human life overcomes the split between intellectual and moral formation, allowing transformed subjects -authentic lovers - to live, seek, and work towards the values of a certain kind of cosmopolitanism. Christian universities exist to make cosmopolitans, properly understood, namely, those persons capable of living authentically. In other words, this text gives a full-orbed account of human flourishing, rooted in a phenomenological account of the human as basis for the mission of the university.

Description: While many of the Reformers considered natural law unproblematic, many Protestants consider natural law a ""Catholic thing,"" and not persuasive. Natural law, it is thought, competes with the Gospel, overlooks the centrality of Christ, posits a domain of pure nature, and overlooks the noetic effects of sin. This ""Protestant Prejudice,"" however strong, overlooks developments in contemporary natural law quite capable and willing to incorporate the usual objections into natural law. While the natural law itself is universal and invariant, theories about the natural law vary widely. The Protestant Prejudice may respond to natural law understood from within the modes of common sense and classical metaphysics, but largely overlooks contemporary natural law beginning from the first-person account of subjectivity and practical reason. Consequently, the sophisticated thought of John Paul II, Martin Rhonheimer, Germain Grisez, and John Finnis is overlooked. Further, the work of Bernard Lonergan allows for a natural law admitting of noetic sin, eagerly incorporating grace, community, the limits of history, a real but limited autonomy, and the centrality of Christ in a natural law that is both graced and natural.

Humans are lovers, and yet a good deal of pedagogical theory, Christian or otherwise, assumes an anthropology at odds with human nature, fixed in a model of humans as "thinking things." Turning to Augustine, or at least Augustine in conversation with Aquinas, Martin Heidegger, the overlooked Jesuit thinker Bernard Lonergan, and the important contemporary Charles Taylor, this book provides a normative vision for Christian higher education. A phenomenological reappropriation of human subjectivity reveals an authentic order to love, even when damaged by sin, and loves, made authentic by grace, allow the intellectually, morally, and religiously converted person to attain an integral unity. Properly understanding the integral relation between love and the fullness of human life overcomes the split between intellectual and moral formation, allowing transformed subjects--authentic lovers--to live, seek, and work towards the values of a certain kind of cosmopolitanism. Christian universities exist to make cosmopolitans, properly understood, namely, those persons capable of living authentically. In other words, this text gives a full-orbed account of human flourishing, rooted in a phenomenological account of the human as basis for the mission of the university.

The modern hope of attaining purely rational and objective knowledge has faltered, to the joy of some and worry of others. Philosophy's attempt to see reality with a god's-eye view is increasingly viewed as unlikely or undesirable, but what fills the vacuum now that the modern project is in jeopardy? Through a Glass Darkly examines the thought of Richard Rorty and Bernard Lonergan on the posibility of knowledge without a god's-eye view. Rorty, one of the most influential contemporary thinkers, exposes the utter contingency of all philosophical solutions and intuitions. Without the pretensions of objective knowledge, Rorty hopes for a liberal order rooted in hope and solidarity rather than fruitless longings for truth. Constantly asking us to pay attention to what we actually do when we attempt to know, Lonergan discovers in the fragility of consciousness a modest but invariant foundation for human knowledge. Unlike naive forms of realism, Lonergan's answer to Rorty's skepticism reveals Rorty's incomplete escape from Cartesian Anxiety. Lonergan's turn to the subject more radically breaks the lure of certainty and reveals Lonergan, not Rorty, as the integral postmodern thinker.

If natural law arguments struggle to gain traction in contemporary moral and political discourse, could it be because we moderns do not share the understanding of nature on which that language was developed? Building on the work of important thinkers of the last half-century, including Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, John Finnis, and Bernard Lonergan, the essays in Concepts of Nature compare and contrast classical, medieval, and modern conceptions of nature in order to better understand how and why the concept of nature no longer seems to provide a limit or standard for human action. These essays also evaluate whether a rearticulation of pre-modern ideas (or perhaps a reconciliation or reconstitution on modern terms) is desirable and/or possible. Edited by R. J. Snell and Steven F. McGuire, this book will be of interest to intellectual historians, political theorists, theologians, and philosophers.

If natural law arguments struggle to gain traction in contemporary moral and political discourse, could it be because we moderns do not share the understanding of nature on which that language was developed? Building on the work of important thinkers of the last half-century, including Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, John Finnis, and Bernard Lonergan, the essays in Concepts of Nature compare and contrast classical, medieval, and modern conceptions of nature in order to better understand how and why the concept of nature no longer seems to provide a limit or standard for human action. These essays also evaluate whether a rearticulation of pre-modern ideas (or perhaps a reconciliation or reconstitution on modern terms) is desirable and/or possible. Edited by R. J. Snell and Steven F. McGuire, this book will be of interest to intellectual historians, political theorists, theologians, and philosophers.

In Subjectivity, sixteen leading scholars examine the turn to the subject in modern philosophy and consider its historical antecedents in ancient and medieval thought. Some critics of modernity reject the turn to the subject as a specifically modern error, arguing that it logically leads to nihilism and moral relativism by divorcing the human mind from objective reality. Yet, some important thinkers of the last half-century--including Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, John Finnis, and Bernard Lonergan--consider a subjective starting point and claim to find a similar position in ancient and medieval thought. If correct, their positions suggest that one can adopt the subjective turn and remain true to the tradition. This is a timely question. The common good of our polity encounters a situation in which many believe that there is no objective reality to which human minds and wills ought to conform, a conclusion that suggests we can define and construct reality. In light of this, the notion of a natural or objective reality to which human beings ought to conform becomes particularly vital. Should we, then, adopt the modern turn to subjectivity and argue for objective truth and moral order on its basis, or reject the subjective turn as part of the problem and return to an earlier approach that grounds these things in nature or some other external reality? Critics of modern subjectivity argue that the modern turn to subjectivity must be abandoned because it is the very source of the nominalism that threatens to undermine liberal democracy. Others argue, however, that subjectivity itself logically leads to the recognition of an objective reality beyond the mind of the individual. Edited by R. J. Snell and Steven F. McGuire, this collection will be of particular interest to intellectual historians, political philosophers, theologians, and philosophers.