This book presents an interdisciplinary collection of expert analyses and views of existing verification systems. It provides guidelines and advice for the improvement of those systems as well as for new challenges in the field.

In this book, leading experts in international negotiations present formal models of conflict resolution and international negotiations. It examines how the abstract concept of formal models can be made more understandable to those not trained to work with them, what can be done to encourage the use of formal methods in the real world, and ways in which politicians and diplomats can apply formal methods to the problems they are currently facing.

International agreements, such as those governing arms control or the environment, virtually always require some degree of verification of information, in order that compliance can be established. To ensure that the verification process can be regarded as efficient, effective and impartial, it is important to have a mathematical model of it. One can be derived by applying methods from statistics and the theory of non-cooperative games, developed in part by John Nash, who received a Nobel prize in 1994 for his work. The methods permit the development of rational verification strategies, as well as such fundamental concepts as guaranteed probability of detection, timeliness of inspections and the deterrence of illegal activity. In this 1996 book, the required theory is introduced gradually in the context of specific real-world examples. The only prerequisites are simple calculus and statistics, so the book should be accessible to a broad range of scientists and non-scientists, in industrial, academic or governmental environments.

Containing the Atom, the product of three years of research by the members of the Processes of International Negotiations (PIN) network, is a comprehensive study of the theory and practice of international nuclear negotiations. Well-known experts in the field test eleven cases of international nuclear negotations covering: strategic arms control; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Nuclear Weapons Free Zones; Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Review Conference; Nuclear Materials removed from the defense weapons programs; Nuclear diplomacy with North Korea; Nuclear risks in the Barents region; Nuclear safety; French-Japanese nuclear negotiations; and the nuclear plant perspective on negotiations. Each case study analyzes the actors, strategies, processes, structures, and outcomes and weighs the impact of the negotiations on security, energy, trade, and the environment.

The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) has had risk as a research topic on its agenda right from its inception in 1972. Risk has played a - jor role in the Energy Program, with research being carried out both in-house and in cooperationwith other internationalinstitutions like the InternationalAtomic - ergy Agency (IAEA) and national research centers. Research areas were primarily the evaluationof all possible risks within one categoryof energysupply like nuclear ?ssion or fusion or fossil fuels and, even more important, the comparisonof risks of different energy-supplystrategies. Later on an independent program was started which still exists today under the name Risk and Vulnerability. There is a large amount of literature on risks to which IIASA's research programs have contributed signi?cantly over the years, and there is, of course, an abundance of published work on international negotiations, part of which is a result of the work of the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program. There are, however, so far no studies on the combination of these two strands. Therefore, and as research on both topics is housed at IIASA, we are happy that our PIN Program has undertaken the dif?cult and important task of analyzing what the editors of this book have called negotiated risks.

This book presents the results of an international workshop on Modelling and Analysis of Arms Control Problems held in Spitzingsee near Munich in October 1985 under the joint sponsorship of NATO's Scientific Affairs Division and the Volkswagen Foundation. The idea for this workshop evolved in 1983, as a consequence of discussions in the annual Systems Science Seminar at the Computer Science Department of the Federal Armed Forces University ~1unich on the topic of Quantitative Assessment in Arms Control 1) * There was wide agreement among the contribu tors to that seminar and its participants that those efforts to assess the potential contributions of systems and decision sciences, as well as systems analysis and"mathematical modelling, to arms control issues should be ex panded and a forum should be provided for this activity. It was further agreed that such a forum should include political scientists and policy analysts working in the area of arms control.

This book originates in a series of contributions to the 1983 Systems Science Seminar at the Computer Science Department of the German Armed Forces University Munich. Under the topic "Quantita tive Approaches to Arms Control" that seminar attempted to review the present state-of-the-art of systems analysis and numerate meth ods in arms control. To this end, the editors invited a number of experts from Europe, the United St tes and Canada to share and dis cuss their views and assessments with the faculty and upper class computer science students of the university as well as numerous guests from the defence community and the interested public. In three parts, this book presents a selection of partly re vised and somewhat extended versions of the seminar presentations followed, in most cases, by brief summaries of the transcripts of the respective discussions. In addition to an introduction by the editors, part I contains six papers on the present state and prob lems of arms control with emphasis on START (Strategic Arms Re duction Talks), INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces negotia tions), and MBFR (Mutually Balanced Force Reduction talks). The seven contributions to part II are devoted to mathematical models of arms competition and quantitative approaches to force balance assessment of both, the static and dynamic variety. Part III pre sents five papers which address technical and operational aspects and legal implications of arms control negotiations and verifica tion."

The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) has had risk as a research topic on its agenda right from its inception in 1972. Risk has played a - jor role in the Energy Program, with research being carried out both in-house and in cooperationwith other internationalinstitutions like the InternationalAtomic - ergy Agency (IAEA) and national research centers. Research areas were primarily the evaluationof all possible risks within one categoryof energysupply like nuclear ?ssion or fusion or fossil fuels and, even more important, the comparisonof risks of different energy-supplystrategies. Later on an independent program was started which still exists today under the name Risk and Vulnerability. There is a large amount of literature on risks to which IIASA's research programs have contributed signi?cantly over the years, and there is, of course, an abundance of published work on international negotiations, part of which is a result of the work of the Processes of International Negotiation (PIN) Program. There are, however, so far no studies on the combination of these two strands. Therefore, and as research on both topics is housed at IIASA, we are happy that our PIN Program has undertaken the dif?cult and important task of analyzing what the editors of this book have called negotiated risks.

In this book, leading experts in international negotiations present formal models of conflict resolution and international negotiations. It examines how the abstract concept of formal models can be made more understandable to those not trained to work with them, what can be done to encourage the use of formal methods in the real world, and ways in which politicians and diplomats can apply formal methods to the problems they are currently facing.

International agreements, such as those governing arms control or the environment, virtually always require some degree of verification of information, in order that compliance can be established. To ensure that the verification process can be regarded as efficient, effective and impartial, it is important to have a mathematical model of it. One can be derived by applying methods from statistics and the theory of non-cooperative games, developed in part by John Nash, who received a Nobel prize in 1994 for his work. The methods permit the development of rational verification strategies, as well as such fundamental concepts as guaranteed probability of detection, timeliness of inspections and the deterrence of illegal activity. In this 1996 book, the required theory is introduced gradually in the context of specific real-world examples. The only prerequisites are simple calculus and statistics, so the book should be accessible to a broad range of scientists and non-scientists, in industrial, academic or governmental environments.