A manifesto for change in an era when change is the name of the game.

In Practically Radical, William C. Taylor offers radical ideas and practical advice to help you fix what's wrong with your organization, launch new initiatives with the best chance to succeed, and rethink the logic of leadership itself. Exploring how twenty-five for-profit companies and nonprofit organizations--including IBM, Zappos, Swatch, the Girl Scouts, and Interpol--made remarkable strides in tough circumstances, Practically Radical raises (and answers) the make-or-break questions facing today's leaders in every field:

Do you see opportunities the competition doesn't see? The most successful organizations embrace one-of-a-kind ideas in a world filled with "me-too" thinking.

Do you have new ideas about where to look for new ideas? Routine practices in one field can be revolutionary when they migrate to another.

Are you the most of anything? In business today, the middle of the road is the road to ruin.

Are you getting the best contributions from the most people? Change is not a game best played by loners.

Business as usual is a bust . . .

In industry after industry, organizations that were once dismissed as upstarts, wildcards--mavericks--are making serious waves and growing fast. From high-profile innovators such as HBO and Google to funky sandwich shop chains, the truly imaginative and unconventional businesses are changing the way things are done--providing new approaches, strategies, and outlooks, as well as better ways to compete, lead, and succeed in the twenty-first century.

The first book to document this change, "Mavericks at Work" is business "edutainment" for a smart, ambitious readership, profiling some of the most exciting--and often eccentric--CEOs in the United States, while detailing their remarkable strategies for success

This scarce antiquarian book is included in our special Legacy Reprint Series. In the interest of creating a more extensive selection of rare historical book reprints, we have chosen to reproduce this title even though it may possibly have occasional imperfections such as missing and blurred pages, missing text, poor pictures, markings, dark backgrounds and other reproduction issues beyond our control. Because this work is culturally important, we have made it available as a part of our commitment to protecting, preserving and promoting the world's literature.

This scarce antiquarian book is included in our special Legacy Reprint Series. In the interest of creating a more extensive selection of rare historical book reprints, we have chosen to reproduce this title even though it may possibly have occasional imperfections such as missing and blurred pages, missing text, poor pictures, markings, dark backgrounds and other reproduction issues beyond our control. Because this work is culturally important, we have made it available as a part of our commitment to protecting, preserving and promoting the world's literature.

The precursor to this monograph "The US Army and Security Force Assistance: Assessing the Need for an Institutionalized Advisory Capability" utilized three criteria: importance of advisory operations, frequency of advisory operations, and difficulty developing advisory capability to determine if the US Army needs and institutionalized advisory capability. Based on analysis of past advisory experiences, current US Army doctrine, and anticipated future requirements the study concluded that advisory operations will be a frequent and essential element of future operations and that advisory capabilities are difficult to develop when needed. Based on this conclusion the study determined that the US Army does require an institutionalized advisory capability. Based on this assessed need, the next step, and the purpose of this paper, is to answer the applied question of what characteristics the US Army requires in an institutionalized advisory capability. This paper provides a review of the current discourse within the defense community concerning advisory requirements to help frame the problem and possible solution sets in order to identify key considerations for analysis. The study then utilizes the seven domains of DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities to determine capability requirements. The study bases the analysis of each domain on a wide range of considerations including doctrine, ongoing and past advisory experiences, US Army force management considerations, and input from the ongoing discourse within the defense community on stability and advisory operations. This study does not provide a specific force structure solution, but rather identifies the characteristics the US Army requires in an institutionalized advisory capability. The most significant domain in this analysis is the organizational domain. The tradeoffs required to create a large standing advisory capability are not acceptable in the context of the a

The US Army had difficulty initiating and conducting advisory operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom due to the lack of an institutionalized advisory capability. The need to create an advisory capability after the requirement developed, resulted in a three-year delay in Iraqi Security Force development, which threatened mission success in Iraq. This experience shows that the US Army should consider developing an institutionalized advisory capability. Opponents of this idea view the advisory operation in Iraq as an anomaly and believe that the US Army must remain primarily focused on conventional capabilities. Advocates view the advisory operation in Iraq as an indicator of future requirements and believe that the US Army must have an organization that addresses the challenges of advisory operations. This study utilizes three criteria: importance advisory operations, difficulty developing advisory capability, and frequency of advisory operations to determine if the US Army needs an institutionalized advisory capability. The criteria evaluation utilizes current US Army doctrine and analysis of past advisory operation experiences in Greece, Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador, and Iraq. The analysis shows that US Army doctrine anticipates a frequent and important role for advisory capability in future operations. Analysis of past advisory experiences supports this assessment and identified challenges with developing advisory capability. Based on the anticipated frequent and essential role of advisory operations and the associated developmental difficulties, the US Army should develop an institutionalized advisory capability.

This scarce antiquarian book is included in our special Legacy Reprint Series. In the interest of creating a more extensive selection of rare historical book reprints, we have chosen to reproduce this title even though it may possibly have occasional imperfections such as missing and blurred pages, missing text, poor pictures, markings, dark backgrounds and other reproduction issues beyond our control. Because this work is culturally important, we have made it available as a part of our commitment to protecting, preserving and promoting the world's literature.