We live in an age of impotence. Stuck between global war and global finance, between identity and capital, we seem to be incapable of producing that radical change that is so desperately needed. Is there still a way to disentangle ourselves from a global order that shapes our politics as well as our imagination? In his most systematic book to date, renowned Italian theorist Franco Berardi Bifo tackles this question through a solid yet visionary analysis of the three fundamental concepts of Possibility, Potency, and Power. Overcoming any temptation of giving in to despair or nostalgia, Berardi proposes the notion of Futurability as a way to remind us that even within the darkness of our current crisis, still lies dormant the horizon of possibility.

Dieses Buch zeigt die ideen- und wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Entwicklung des Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffs vom Mittelalter bis zum 20. Jhd. auf. Dabei geht Sebastian Simmert vertieft auf die epistemische Bedeutung der Wahrscheinlichkeit als qualitative Bestimmung von Wissen ein. Hierbei untersucht er die Bedingungen der Moeglichkeit quantitativer Wahrscheinlichkeit. Im Zentrum steht die UEberlegung, dass die elementare Ebene qualitativer Wahrscheinlichkeiten keine Gleichwahrscheinlichkeiten zulasst. Denn sie baut auf einer zweiwertigen Logik auf. Mit dieser Pramisse werden die Grenzen des durch Wahrscheinlichkeiten Aussagbaren aufgezeigt; unter anderem, dass die Anwendung des Gesetzes der grossen Zahl keine empirischen Aussagen rechtfertigt.

This volume, published on the fiftieth anniversary of Wittgenstein's death, brings together thirteen of Crispin Wright's most influential essays on Wittgenstein's later philosophies of language and mind, many hard to obtain, including the first publication of his Whitehead Lectures given at Harvard in 1996.

Organized into four groups, the essays focus on issues about following a rule and the objectivity of meaning; on Saul Kripke's contribution to the interpretation of Wittgenstein; on privacy and self-knowledge; and on aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics. Wright uses the cutting edge of Wittgenstein's thought to expose and undermine the common assumptions in platonistic views of mathematical and logical objectivity and Cartesian ideas about self-knowledge. The great question remains: How to react to the demise of these assumptions? In response, the essays develop a concerted, evolving approach to the possibilities--and limitations--of constructive philosophies of mathematics and mind. Their collection constitutes a major statement by one of Britain's most important philosophers--and will provide an indispensable tool both for students of Wittgenstein and for scholars working more generally in the metaphysics of mind and language.

Das biomedizinische Verstandnis der modernen (Schul-)Medizin darf als Resultat einer seit uber 160 Jahren andauernden Ver-Naturwissenschaftlichung der Medizin verstanden werden. Infolgedessen resumiert Petra Lenz eine "Krise der Medizin", die sich im Vertrauensverlust der Menschen in das Medizinsystem zeigt. Es wird gezeigt, dass der theoretische Krankheitsbegriff als sinnspezifischer Faktenbegriff der Naturwissenschaften nicht als Hoffnungstrager fur Medizin und Gesundheitspolitik infrage kommt, sondern erst durch ihn medizinethische und gesundheitspolitische Herausforderungen entstehen.

In this illuminating guide to the criteria of rational theorizing, Michael Shepanski identifies, defends and applies W. V. Quine's epistemic norms - the norms that best explain Quine's decisions to accept some theories and not others. Parts I and II set out the doctrines of this epistemology, demonstrating their potential for philosophical application. The third part is a case study in which Shepanski develops a theory of the propositional attitudes by the method of formulating inferences to behaviour. Finally, he presents critiques of popular alternative views, including foundationalism, the centrality of knowledge and Quine's own epistemological naturalism. By reassessing Quine's normative epistemology, Shepanski advances our understanding of Quine's philosophy whilst providing a guide for our own theorizing.

These propositions may seem mild, yet, if accepted, they would absolutely revolutionize human life.'

With these words Bertrand Russell introduces what is indeed a revolutionary book. Taking as his starting-point the irrationality of the world, he offers by contrast something 'wildly paradoxical and subversive' - a belief that reason should determine human actions. Today, besieged as we are by the numbing onslaught of twenty-first-century capitalism, Russell's defence of scepticism and independence of mind is as timely as ever. In clear, engaging prose, he guides us through the key philosophical issues that affect our daily lives - freedom, happiness, emotions, ethics and beliefs - and offers no-nonsense advice.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction: On the Value of Scepticism 2. Dreams and Facts 3. Is Science Superstitious? 4. Can Men Be Rational? 5. Philosophy in the Twentieth Century 6. Machines and the Emotions 7. Behavourism and Values 8. Eastern and Western Ideals of Happiness 9. The Harm that Good Men Do 10. The Recrudescence of Puritanism 11. The Need for Political Scepticism 12. Free Thought and Official Propaganda 13. Freedom in Society 14. Freedom Versus Authority in Education 15. Psychology and Politics 16. The Danger of Creed Wars 17. Some Prospects: Cheerful and Otherwise

This book centers on two dominant trends within contemporary epistemology: first, the dissatisfaction with the project of analyzing knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions and, second, the surging popularity of virtue-theoretic approaches to knowledge. Church argues that the Gettier Problem, the primary reason for abandoning the reductive analysis project, cannot viably be solved, and that prominent approaches to virtue epistemology fail to solve the Gettier Problem precisely along the lines his diagnosis predicts. Such an outcome motivates Church to explore a better way forward: non-reductive virtue epistemology. In so doing, he makes room for virtue epistemologies that are not only able to endure what he sees as inevitable developments in 21st-century epistemology, but also able to contribute positively to debates and discussions across the discipline and beyond.

This volume is the first English resource to shed light on the philosophy of Joseph Petzoldt (1862-1929), the main pupil of Ernst Mach and founder of the Gesellschaft fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie, later the association of Berlin logical positivists. A central figure in the early debate on the theory of relativity, his work was praised by Einstein himself. Tracing the development of Petzoldt's ideas, starting from his early acceptance of materialism and Kantian agnosticism, Chiara Russo Krauss presents a comprehensive reconstruction of his philosophy in the context of the German milieu. She examines his attempt to develop a new philosophy following Gustav Fechner and the empiriocriticism of Richard Avenarius and Ernst Mach. In the final chapter, she sets out how Petzoldt proposed relativistic positivism as the official interpretation of Einstein's relativity. By illuminating key elements of Petzoldt's work, this is a valuable case study for students and scholars of philosophy of science and late 19th-century and early 20th-century philosophy. It reveals the complex interplay of two different tendencies of the time: neo-Kantianism and its struggle to overcome the notion of thing-in-itself, as well as the need for an epistemological foundation for the new advances of science.

Spanning the period between Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge in 1929 and the first version of Philosophical Investigations in 1936, Piotr Dehnel explores the middle stage in Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical development and identifies the major issues which engrossed him, including phenomenology, philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of language. Contrary to the dominant perspective, Dehnel argues that this period was intrinsically different from the early and late stages and should not be viewed as a mere transitional phase. The distinctiveness of Wittgenstein's middle work can be seen in his philosophical thinking as it unfolds in a non-linear trajectory: thoughts do not follow upon each other, ideas do not appear sequentially one by one, and insights do not form a straight chain. Dehnel portrays the diffused and multifarious quality of Wittgenstein's middle thinking, enabling readers to form a more comprehensive view of his entire philosophy and acquire a better grasp of his conceptual trajectory, complete with the intricacies and challenges that it poses.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1961.

Irreverent and electrifying, when A. J. Ayer’s epoch-making work was published in 1936 it shook the foundations of British philosophy, and made its author notorious. He argues that if you cannot prove a statement by scientific methods, or by experience, it is literally meaningless. In this sense, everything else – morals, aesthetics, religion, philosphy itself – becomes nonsensical. For example, to say that murder is wrong is a meaningless statement – you are simply saying that you do not like it. Ayer’s shocking argument, known as Logical Positivism, was a direct challenge to orthodox morality. Yet it became a classic text, revitalizing British philosophy and setting it on an entirely new course.

Along with Why I Am Not a Christian, this essay must rank as the most articulate example of Russell's famed atheism. It is also one of the most notorious. Used as evidence in a 1940 court case in which Russell was declared unfit to teach college-level philosophy, What I Believe was to become one of his most defining works. The ideas contained within were and are controversial, contentious and - to the religious - downright blasphemous. A remarkable work, it remains the best concise introduction to Russell's thought.

Table of Contents

PREFACE TO THE ROUTLEDGE CLASSICS EDITION, PREFACE, 1. NATURE AND MAN, 2. THE GOOD LIFE, 3. MORAL RULES, 4. SALVATION: INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL, 5. SCIENCE AND HAPPINESS, INDEX

Alessandra Tanesini demonstrates that feminist thought has a lot to offer to the study of Wittgenstein's philosophical work, and that -at the same time-that work can inspire feminist reflection in new directions.

In "Wittgenstein: A Feminist Interpretation, "Tanesini offers a highly original interpretation of several themes in Wittgenstein's philosophy. She argues that when we look at his work through feminist eyes we discover that he is not primarily concerned with providing solutions to technical problems in the philosophy of mind, mathematics, and language. Instead, his remarks on these topics are intended to offer insights about human finitude, the loneliness of the modern autonomous self, and our relations to other human beings. Thus, the modern conception of the individual emerges as the critical target of Wittgenstein's philosophical work, both early and late.

This conception has also been one of the dominant concerns of contemporary feminist philosophy. In this book, Wittgenstein's insights are deployed to further feminist debates on issues such as identity, difference, the masculine character of the modern self.

Over the past one and a half decades, the scope of experimental philosophy (x-phi) has expanded significantly. Experimental research programmes now cover almost all areas of philosophy, including epistemology, the philosophy of language, action theory, and the free will debate, to name just a few. This volume introduces the reader to these new developments in an accessible and systematic way. It explains how x-phi differs from traditional views of philosophy, investigates in depth how it uses empirical evidence to support philosophical conclusions of various kinds, and introduces the reader to both the most widely discussed experimental studies and the latest advancements in the field. As a critical study, it also examines the various criticisms that x-phi has received over the years and seeks, tentatively, to adjudicate them.

In the last half-century Ludwig Wittgenstein's relevance beyond analytic philosophy, to continental philosophy, to cultural studies, and to the arts has been widely acknowledged. Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was published in 1922 - the annus mirabilis of modernism - alongside Joyce's Ulysses, Eliot's The Waste Land, Mansfield's The Garden Party and Woolf's Jacob's Room. Bertolt Brecht's first play to be produced, Drums in the Night, was first staged in 1922, as was Jean Cocteau's Antigone, with settings by Pablo Picasso and music by Arthur Honegger. In different ways, all these modernist landmarks dealt with the crisis of representation and the demise of eternal metaphysical and ethical truths. Wittgenstein's Tractatus can be read as defining, expressing and reacting to this crisis. In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein adopted a novel philosophical attitude, sensitive to the ordinary uses of language as well as to the unnoticed dogmas they may betray. If the gist of modernism is self-reflection and attention to the way form expresses content, then Wittgenstein's later ideas - in their fragmented form as well as their "ear-opening" contents - deliver it most precisely. Understanding Wittgenstein, Understanding Modernism shows Wittgenstein's work, both early and late, to be closely linked to the modernist Geist that prevailed during his lifetime. Yet it would be wrong to argue that Wittgenstein was a modernist tout court. For Wittgenstein, as well as for modernist art, understanding is not gained by such straightforward statements. It needs time, hesitation, a variety of articulations, the refusal of tempting solutions, and perhaps even a sense of defeat. It is such a vision of the linkage between Wittgenstein and modernism that guides the present volume.

Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of pragmatism, is a hugely important and influential thinker in the history of American philosophy. His philosophical interests were broad and he made significant contributions in several different areas of thought. Moreover, his contributions are intimately connected and his philosophy designed to form a coherent and systematic whole.
Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed is a clear and thorough account of Peirce's life and thought, his major works and ideas, providing an ideal guide to this important and complex thinker. The book introduces all the key concepts and themes in Peirce's thought, exploring his contributions to logic, pragmatism, truth, semiotics and metaphysics and demonstrating how his ideas developed into a coherent system of thought. Geared towards the specific requirements of students who need to reach a sound understanding of Peirce's ideas, the book serves as a clear and concise introduction to his philosophy. This is the idea companion to study of this most influential and challenging of thinkers.>

While its tone is playful and frivolous, this book poses tough questions over the nature of religion and belief.

Religion provides comfortable responses to the questions that have always beset humankind - why are we here, what is the point of being alive, how ought we to behave? Russell snatches that comfort away, leaving us instead with other, more troublesome alternatives: responsibility, autonomy, self-awareness. He tells us that the time to live is now, the place to live is here, and the way to be happy is to ensure others are happy.

Table of Contents

Preface to the Routledge Classics Edition -- Editor’s Introduction -- Preface by Bertrand Russell -- 1 Why I am not a Christian -- 2 Has Religion Made Useful Contributions to Civilisation? -- 3 Do We Survive Death? -- 4 Seems, Madam? Nay, it is -- 5 On Catholic and Protestant Sceptics -- 6 Life in the Middle Ages -- 7 The Fate of Thomas Paine -- 8 Nice People -- 9 The New Generation -- 10 Our Sexual Ethics -- 11 Freedom and the Colleges -- 12 The Existence of God—a Debate Between Bertrand Russell and Father F. C. Copleston, SJ -- 13 Can Religion Cure Our Troubles? -- 14 Religion and Morals -- Appendix: How Bertrand Russell was Prevented from Teaching at the College of the City of New York -- Index.

Reading McDowell: On Mind and World brings together an exceptional list of contributors to analyse and discuss McDowell's challenging and influential book, one of the most influential contributions to contemporary philosophy in recent years. In it McDowell discusses issues in epistemology, philosophy of mind and ethics as well as surveying the broader remit of philosophy. Reading McDowell clarifies some of these themes and provides further material for debate across philosophy of mind, ethics, philosophy of language and epistemology.
The internationally renowned contributors include: Richard Bernstein, Gregory McCulloch, Hilary Putnam, Charles Taylor, Crispin Wright, Jay Bernstein, Rudiger, Bubner, Robert Pippin, Charles Lamour, Axel Honneth, Barry Stround, Robert Brandom and Michael Williams. In conclusion, John McDowell responds to all the contributions.
This critical contribution to analytic philosophy is likely to shape philosophical debate for years to come. It will be of interest to professional philosophers, as well as students of contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind and ethics.

Throughout his career, Keith Hossack has made outstanding contributions to the theory of knowledge, metaphysics and the philosophy of mathematics. This collection of previously unpublished papers begins with a focus on Hossack's conception of the nature of knowledge, his metaphysics of facts and his account of the relations between knowledge, agents and facts. Attention moves to Hossack's philosophy of mind and the nature of consciousness, before turning to the notion of necessity and its interaction with a priori knowledge. Hossack's views on the nature of proof, logical truth, conditionals and generality are discussed in depth. In the final chapters, questions about the identity of mathematical objects and our knowledge of them take centre stage, together with questions about the necessity and generality of mathematical and logical truths. Knowledge, Number and Reality represents some of the most vibrant discussions taking place in analytic philosophy today.

As the foundation of our rationality, logic has traditionally been considered fixed, stable and constant. This conception of the discipline has been challenged recently by the plurality of logics and in this book, Pavel Arazim extends the debate to offer a new view of logic as dynamic and without a definite, specific shape. The Problem of Plurality of Logics examines the origins of our standard view of logic alongside Kant's theories, the holistic view, the issue of logic's pragmatic significance and Robert Brandom's logical expressivism. Arazim then draws on proof-theoretical approaches to present a convincing argument for a dynamic version of logical inferentialism, which opens space for a new freedom to modify our own logic. He explores the scope, possibilities and limits of this freedom in order to highlight the future paths logic could take, as a motivation for further research. Marking a departure from logical monism and also from the recent doctrine of logical pluralism in its various forms, this book addresses current debates concerning the expressive role of logic and contributes to a lively area of discussion in analytic philosophy.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1961.

Comparing is one of the most essential practices, in our everyday life as well as in science and humanities. In this in-depth philosophical analysis of the structure, practice and ethics of comparative procedures, Hartmut von Sass expands on the significance of comparison. Elucidating the ramified structure of comparing, von Sass suggests a typology of comparisons before introducing the notion of comparative injustice and the limits of comparisons. He elaborates on comparing as practice by relating comparing to three relative practices - orienting, describing, and expressing oneself - to unfold some of the most important chapters of what might be called comparativism. This approach allows von Sass to clarify the idea of the incomparable, distinguish between different versions of incomparability and shed light on important ethical aspects of comparisons today. Confronting the claim that we are living in an age of comparisons, his book is an important contribution to ideas surrounding all-encompassing measurements and scalability and their critique.

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1952.