Tris' request for a leave that interrupted his clinical c1erkships, so that he could undertake his graduate studies in Austin. The field, not just Tris, owes Jim Knight a hearty "thank you" for his decision to approve Tris' request, which was unusual, to say the least, in the conservative world ofmedical education at the time. Whenhereturned toTulane to complete his medical degree, Tris undertook withRichardZanerthe translationofAlfred Schutz'sandThomas Luckmann's 6 The Structures of the Life-World. Tris did this work while on his clinical rotations, including obstetrics and gynecology. In between delivering babies, most of whom were delivered by medical students at New Orleans' Charity Hospital, he worked on this translation. Tris once told me that, as a medical student, he had delivered scores ofbabies alone. Ican see him sitting with a patient in the labor area or maybe in the hall, attending to her, monitoring her progress in labor and the fetus' status, and translating from German, which is his first language, as well as thatofhis children. As this translation indicates, Tris believes in texts and scholarship about texts in a way that is decidedly not post-modem. This is also plain to anyone who has read his work. Forexample, the two editions of The Foundations of Bioethies, whateverelse one might thinkofthem, are monuments ofscholar- ship in the historiesofphilosophy, medicine, theology, and ideas generally, not to mention excellent primers on Texana. These books are packed with re- ferences and footnotes.

Today's news is full of stories about suicide machines, critical life-and-death decisions, who owns a person's life, death with dignity, prolonging painful life, and euthanasia as a justifiable release for terminally ill patients. And this year, California voters will be faced with a real life-and-death decision: the Euthanasia Initiative. Other states are expected to follow suit soon.
Can euthanasia be accepted as a reasonable choice? Or must a patient's pain and suffering be prolonged in order to preserve life, without regard to the quality of that life? Are there viable alternatives? Can a patient in fact live out his or her days in relative comfort, with love and support from family, friends, and health care workers?
A mind-opening new book from Humana Press, Euthanasia Is Not the Answer shows how terminally ill patients, especially those with cancer or AIDS, can live in comfort and dignity until death. The proper use of modern pain medications can ease the pain that drives them to despair and the request for euthanasia. And dedicated hospice care can allow them a meaningful life to the end.
Written with intelligence, deep understanding based on the author's pioneering experience in hospice care--and, above all, sensitivity and respect--Euthanasia Is Not the Answer explores these alternatives, using case reports and powerful medical and socioeconomic analysis that soundly argue Dr. Cundiff's case.
This important book adds new dimensions to our society's concern for the pain and suffering of the dying, clarifying the key issues associated with euthanasia and hospice, putting them into a new perspective, and showing that an approach based on easing pain and providing kind, caring support--rather than heroic high-tech medicine--is what is really needed for the terminally ill.
Death with dignity can be a reality...without drastic measures

This book summarizes the efforts and results of the first international Ifgene conference on presuppositions in science and expectations in society with respect to genetic engineering which was held at the Goetheanum, Dornach, Switzerland, October 2-5, 1996. The Goetheanum provided a unique opportunity to gather people from diverse disciplines who have opposing attitudes on modern science and technology. It is due to this venue, among other things, that the participants were able to develop an open, power-free dialogue and could focus more on judgement-forming than a polarizing debate. This Ifgene conference could not have happened without the financial support from many private individuals and the following organisations listed in no particular order: Fetzer Foundation; Stichting Triodos; Evidenzgesellschaft; Mahle Stiftung GmbH; Gemeinnlitzige Treuhandstelle e. Y. Bochum; Initiative gegen 'Bioethik'; Verband fur anthroposophische Heilpadagogik - CHi Verband flir anthroposophische Heilpadagogik, Sozialtherapie und Sozialarbeit e. Y. - D; Stichting ter bevordering van de Heilpaeda- gogie; Iona Stichting; Antroposofische Vereniging in Nederland; Stichting Klaverblad; Swissair & Crossair; The Rudolf Steiner Association; The Welcome Association; Anthro- posophische Gesellschaft in Deutschland; Helixor Heilmittel GmbH & Co; Goethea- num Dornach; Verein flir anthroposophisches Heilwesen e. Y. - D; The Oakdale Trust; Unilever Nederland BV; NV Verenigde Bedrijven Nutricia; Migros-Genossenschafts- Bund; Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuur en Visserij; CIBA; Stichting Elise Mathilde Fonds; Anthroposophic Society Australia; Therexsys; COOP Schweiz and selected speakers (G. Stotzky - USA, H. A. de Boer - NL, J. Girard-Bascou - F, P. G.

The National Institute on Aging (NIA) has historically been concerned with the protection of human subjects. In July 1977, the NIA sponsored a meeting to update and supplement guide lines for protecting those participating in Federal research pro jects. Although the basic guidelines had been in effect since 1966, it had been neglected to include the elderly as a vulnerable population. In November 1981, the NIA organized a conference on the ethical and legal issues related to informed consent in senile dementia cases. The present volume offers the latest and best thinking on Alzheimer's Dementia to have emerged from the dialog that was first embarked upon at the NIA meeting. Indeed, the issues and concerns it treats now seem even more relevant than they appeared historically because of the vastly greater awareness in the community of the entire spectrum of problems Alzheimer's disease confronts us all with. Our interest and concern is both humanitarian and self serving. Clearly older people must be protected from in appropriate research and careful attention must be paid to the circumstances under which research is conducted on those older persons who have given anything less than full consent. It is equally necessary, however, for the research enterprise to be protected so that today's elderly and those of the future can benefit from the fruits of research."

Some conferences produce proceedings, others an inspiration to labor, which finally leads to a published work. Such has been the case with regard to this volume. In 1984, the Center for Ethics, Medicine, and Public Issues held a conference with the title 'When are Competent Patients Incompetent?' with the support of the Texas Committee for the Humanities, a state-based program of the National Endowment for the Humanities. Assistance was provided by both Baylor College of Medicine and the Institute of Religion. This conference evoked a con siderable interest in examining further the moral status of competency determinations in the clinical setting. This interest is realized in this volume, which now affords us an opportunity to thank all those individ uals who made the conference possible, only some of whom are acknowledged in this Preface. In particular, we wish to express our gratitude to Baruch A. Brody, Rebecca Dresser, the Honorable Jerome Jones, H. Steven Moffic, Margery W. Shaw, Eleanor Tinsley, and Albert Van HeIden. The volume took its shape through the labors of Earl Shelp and Mary Ann Gardell Cutter, who inspired the further evolution of the papers presented at the conference and attracted contributions from individuals who had not attended. Earl Shelp and Mary Ann Gardell Cutter have produced a volume following extensive reflection and dialogue; they were ably assisted in the final preparation of the manu script by Thomas J. Bole III and George Khushf, to whom special thanks are due."

In When Medicine Went Mad, one of the nation's leading bioethicists-and an extraordinary panel of experts and concentration camp survivors-examine problems first raised by Nazi medical experimentation that remain difficult and relevant even today. The importance of these issues to contemporary bioethical disputes-particularly in the thorny areas of medical genetics, human experimentation, and euthanasia-are explored in detail and with sensitivity.

This Festschrift is presented to Professor Hans Jonas on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday, as affirmation of the contributors' respect and admiration. As a volume in the series 'Philosophy and Medicine' the contributions not only reflect certain interests and pursuits of the scholar to whom it is dedi cated, but also serve to bring to convergence the interests of the contributors in the history of humanity and medicine, the theory of organism, medicine in the service of the patient's autonomy, and the metaphysical, i.e., phenome nological foundations of medicine. Notwithstanding the nature of such personal gifts as the authors' contributions (which, with the exception of the late Hannah Arendt's, appear here for the first time), the essays also transcend the personal and serve to elaborate specific themes and theses disclosed in the numerous writings of Hans Jonas. The editor owes a personal debt of gratitude to many, including Hannah Arendt, who offered their assistance during the preparation of the volume."

This volume inaugurates a series concerning philosophy and medicine. There are few, if any, areas of social concern so pervasive as medicine and yet as underexamined by philosophy. But the claim to precedence of the Proceedings of the First Trans-Disciplinary Symposium on Philos ophy and Medicine must be qualified. Claims to be "first" are notorious in the history of scientific as well as humanistic investigation and the claim that the First Trans-Disciplinary Symposium on Philosophy and Medicine has no precedent is not meant to be put in bald form. The editors clearly do not maintain that philosophers and physicians have not heretofore discussed matters of mutual concern, nor that individual philosophers and physicians have never taken up problems and concepts in medicine which are themselves at the boundary or interface of these two disciplines - concepts like "matter," "disease," "psyche. " Surely there have been books published on the logic and philosophy of medi 1 cine. But the formalization of issues and concepts in medicine has not received, at least in this century, sustained interest by professional phi losophers. Groups of philosophers have not engaged medicine in order to explicate its philosophical presuppositions and to sort out the various concepts which appear in medicine. The scope of such an effort takes the philosopher beyond problems and issues which today are subsumed under the rubric "medical ethics."

The roles of both the consumer and the health advocate professional have become increasingly significant in to day's climate of "rationed" health care. It seems clear that the timely exchange of ideas among seasoned health care advocates is necessary if we are to deal with the complex problems of a technologically advanced so ciety seeking to ration its heath care in a truly humane way. Toward such a timely exchange, the first Confer ence on Advocacy in Health Care was organized by the Health Advocacy Program of Sarah Lawrence College and recently held. Advocacy in Health Care: The Power of a Silent Constituency is the proceedings of the conference and will, we believe, greatly extend our efforts to share both the problems and solutions that effective patient advocacy entails. Never before has the issue of advocating for special population groups by combining the resources of consumers and professionals been the exclusive focus of one volume. This book discusses the power of such an alignment and describes specific organizational techniques that have been effective in bringing about changes in the delivery system. The final section of the book, "Questions, Com ments and Answers," presents a selection of topics of special interest that surfaced during the open disc- vii viii Preface sion at the last conference session. The comments were forthright in their criticism of public policy, and the vigor of the argument underscored the vitality of the co alition between professionals and consumers."

Interest in theories of virtue and the place of virtues in the moral life con- tinues to grow. Nicolai Hartmann [7], George F. Thomas [20], G. E. M. Anscombe [1], and G. H. von Wright [21], for example, called to our atten- tion decades ago that virtue had become a neglected topic in modem ethics. The challenge implicit in these sorts of reminders to rediscover the contribu- tion that the notion of virtue can make to moral reasoning, moral character, and moral judgment has not gone unattended. Arthur Dyck [3] , P. T. Geach [5], Josef Pieper (16], David Hamed [6], and, most notably, Stanley Hauerwas [8-11], in the theological community, have analyzed or utilized in their work virtue-based theories of morality. Philosophical probings have come from Lawrance Becker [2], Philippa Foot [4], Edmund Pincoffs [17], James Wallace [22], and most notably, Alasdair MacIntyre [12-14]. Draw- ing upon and revising mainly ancient and medieval sources, these and other commentators have ignited what appears to be the beginning of a sustained examination of virtue.

The expense of critical care and emergency medicine, along with widespread expectations for good care when the need arises, pose hard moral and political problems. How should we spend our tax d'ollars, and who should get help? The purpose of this volume is to reflect upon our choices. The authors whose papers appear herein identify major difficulties and offer various solutions to them. Four topics are discussed throughout the volume: First, encounters between patients and health professionals in critical situations in general, and where scarcity makes rationing necessary; second, allocation and social policy, including how much to spend on preventive, chronic or critical care medicine, or for medicine in general compared to other important social projects; third, conflicts between or ranking of important goals and values; and fourth, conceptual issues affecting the choices we make. Since these topics are raised by the authors in almost every essay, we did not divide the papers into separate sections within the volume. Warren Reich begins the volume with a parable illustrating a key problem for contemporary medicine and two very different approaches to its solution. His story begins with the "delivery" of three indigent, critically ill, foreign patients to the emergency room of a large American private hospital. Although the hospital is legally bound to care for these patients, providing long term, high cost care for them and others soon becomes a major financial strain.

This book attempts to answer the question how health care can be incorporated into a comprehensive theory of justice, while realising an acceptable balance between efficiency, justice and care. It seems to be that we can have any two but not all three. Essentially, the central question addressed by this book is the following: how best to square the proverbial welfare circle.

Theologians and theologically educated participants in discussions of bioethics have been placed on the defensive during recent years. The dominance of religious perspectives and theological voices that marked the emergence and establishment of "bioethics" in the late 1960s and 1970s has eroded steadily as philosophers, lawyers, and others have relativized their role and influ ence, at best, or dismissed it entirely, at worst. The secularization of bioethics, which has occurred for a variety of reasons, has prompted some prominent writers to reflect on what has been lost. Daniel Callahan, for example writes, " . . . whatever the ultimate truth status of religious perspectives, they have provided a way of looking at the world and understanding one's own life that has a fecundity and uniqueness not matched by philosophy, law, or political theory. Those of us who have lost our reli gious faith may be glad that we have discovered what we take to be the reality of things, but we can still recognize that we have also lost something of great value as well: the faith, vision, insights, and experience of whole peoples and traditions who, no less than we unbelievers, struggled to make sense of things. That those goods are part of a garment we no longer want to wear does not make their loss anything other than still a loss; and it is not a neglible one" ([2], p. 2).

The place of drugs in American society is a problem more apt to evoke diatribe than dialog. With the support of the Na tional Science Foundation's program on Ethics and Values in Science and Technology, and the National Endowment for the Humanities' program on Science, Technology, and Human Values, * The Hastings Center was able to sponsor such dialog as part of a major research into the ethics of drug use that spanned two years. We assembled a Research Group from leaders in the scientific, medical, legal, and policy com munities, leavened with experts in applied ethics, and brought them together several times a year to discuss the moral, legal and social issues posed by nontherapeutic drug use. At times we also called on other experts when we needed certain issues clarified. We did not try to reach a consensus, yet several broad areas of agreement emerged: That our society's response to nontherapeutic drug use has been irrational and inconsistent; that our attempts at control have been clumsy and ill-informed; that many complex moral values are entwined in the debate and cannot be reduced to a simple conflict between individual liberty and state paternalism. Of course each paper should be read as the statement of that particular author or authors. The views expressed in this book do not necessarily represent the views of The Hastings Center, the National Science Foundation, or the National En dowment for the Humanities."

My 'discovery' of the Polish School of philosophy of medicine stemmed from my studies in the genesis of Ludwik Fleck's epistemology. These studies, and my interest in the scientific roots of Fleck's epistemology were a nearly 'natural' result of my own biography: like Fleck I had been trained, an had worked as an immunologist, and had later switched to studies in the social history of medicine and biology. Moreover, it so happened that Fleck's book, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact -the description of a science as it is, not as it should be -was the first epistemological study in which I found echos of my experience in the laboratory. My interest in Fleck was also highlightened by the fact that in his works, and, as I discovered later, in the works of his predecessors of the Polish School of philosophy of medicine, was formulated the problem that had stimulated my interest in the history of medicine and biology, and is still central to my present investigations: the relationships between biological knowledge and clinical practice. The writing of the book was made possible through to the help of many colleagues and friends. The unfailing support for my research, whatever its subject might be, from my colleagues from Unit 158 of INSERM and in particular from its head Patrice Pinell, has made my study of the Polish School possible.

From the tone of the report by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Re search, one might conclude that the whole-brain-oriented definition of death is now firmly established as an enduring element of public policy. In that report, Defining Death: Medical, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death, the President's Commission forwarded a uni form determination of death act, which laid heavy accent on the signifi cance of the brain stem in determining whether an individual is alive or dead: An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards ( 1], p. 2). The plausibility of these criteria is undermined as soon as one confronts the question of the level of treatment that ought to be provided to human bodies that have permanently lost consciousness but whose brain stems are still functioning."

The meaning and application of the principle of beneficence to issues in health care is rarely clear or certain. Although the principle is frequently employed to justify a variety of actions and inactions, very little has been done from a conceptual point of view to test its relevance to these behaviors or to explore its relationship to other moral principles that also might be called upon to guide or justify conduct. Perhaps more than any other, the principle of benef icence seems particularly appropriate to contexts of health care in which two or more parties interact from positions of relative strength and weakness, advantage and need, to pursue some perceived goal. It is among those moral principles that Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress selected in their textbook on bioethics as applicable to biomedicine in general and relevant to a range of specific issues ( 1], pp. 135-167). More narrowly, The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behav ioral Research identified beneficence as among those moral principles that have particular relevance to the conduct of research involving humans (2). Thus, the principle of beneficence is seen as pertinent to the routine delivery of health care, the discovery of new therapies, and the rationale of public policies related to health care."

The Direction of Medical Ethics The direction bioethics, and specifically medical ethics, will take in the next few years will be crucial. It is an emerging specialty that has attempted a great deal, that has many differing agendas, and that has its own identity crisis. Is it a subspecialty of clinical medicine? Is it a medical reform movement? Is it a consumer pro tection movement? Is it a branch of professional ethics? Is it a ra tionale for legal decisions and agency regulations? Is it something physicians and ethical theorists do constructively together? Or is it a morally concentrated attack on high technology, with the prac titioners of scientific medicine and the medical ethicists in an adversarial role? Is it a conservative endeavor, exhibiting a Frankenstein syn drome in Medical Genetics ("this time, they have gone too far"), or a Clockwork Orange syndrome in Psychotherapy ("we have met hods to make you talk-walk-cry-kill")? Or does it suffer the afflic tion of overdependency on the informal fallacy of the Slippery Slope ("one step down this hill and we will never be able to stop") that remains an informal fallacy no matter how frequently it's used? Is it a restricted endeavor of analytic philosophy: what is the meaning of "disease," how is "justice" used in the allocation of medical resources, what constitutes "informed" or "consent?" Is it applied ethics, leading in clinical practice to some recommenda tion for therapeutic or preventive action? This incomplete list of questions indicates just how complex,"

Not long ago, a colleague chided me for using the term "the biological revolution. " Like many others, I have employed it as an umbrella term to refer to the seemingly vast, rapidly-moving, and fre quently bewildering developments of contemporary biomedicine: psy chosurgery, genetic counseling and engineering, artificial heart-lung machines, organ transplants-and on and on. The real "biological revo lution," he pointed out, began back in the nineteenth century in Europe. For it was then that death rates and infant mortality began to decline, the germ theory of disease was firmly established, Darwin took his famous trip on the Beagle, and Gregor Mendel stumbled on to some fundamental principles of heredity. My friend, I think, was both right and wrong. The biological revolution did have its roots in the nineteenth century; that is when it first began to unfold. Yet, like many intellectual and scientific upheav als, its force was not felt for decades. Indeed, it seems fair to say that it was not until after the Second World War that the full force of the earlier discoveries in biology and medicine began to have a major impact, an impact that was all the more heightened by the rapid bi omedical developments after the war."

The fate of seriously ill newborns has captured the atten tion of the public, of national and state legislators, and of powerful interest groups. For the most part, the debate has been cast in the narrowest possible terms: "discrimination against the handicapped"; "physician authority"; "family autonomy." We believe that something much more profound is happening: the debate over the care of sick and dying babies appears to be both a manifestation of great changes in our feelings about infants, children, and families, and a reflection of deep and abiding attitudes toward the newborn, the handi capped, and perhaps other humans who are "less than" nor mal, rational adults. How could we cast some light on those feelings and attitudes that seemed to determine silently the course of the public debate? We chose to enlist the humanities-the dis players and critics of our cultural forms. Rather than closing down the public discussion, we wanted to open it up, to illuminate it with the light of history, religion, philosophy, literature, jurisprudence, and humanistically oriented sociol ogy. This book is a first effort to place the hotly contested Baby Doe debate into a broader cultural context."

The growth of knowledge and its effects on the practice of medicine have been issues of philosophical and ethical interest for several decades and will remain so for many years to come. The outline of the present volume was conceived nearly three years ago. In 1987, a conference on this theme was held in Maastricht, the Netherlands, on the occasion of the founding of the European Society for Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care (ESPMH). Most of the chapters of this book are derived from papers presented at that meeting, and for the purpose of editing the book Stuart Spicker, Ph. D. , joined two founding members of ESPMH, Henk ten Have and Gerrit Kimsma. The three of them successfully brought together a number of interesting contribu tions to the theme, and ESPMH is grateful and proud to have initiated the production of this volume. The Society intends that annual meetings be held in different European countries on a rotating basis and to publish volumes related to these meetings whenever feasible. In 1988, the second conference was held in Aarhus, Denmark on "Values in Medical Decision Making and Resource Allocation in Health Care". In 1989, a meeting was held in Czestochowa, Poland, on "European Traditions in Philosophy of Medicine. From Brentano to Bieganski". It is hoped that these conferences and the books to be derived from them, will initiate a new European tradition, lasting well into the 21 st century! P. J.

Ethical Problems and Genetics Practice provides a rich, case-based account of the ethical issues arising in the genetics clinic and laboratory. By analysing a wide range of evocative and often arresting cases from practice, Michael Parker provides a compelling insight into the complex moral world of the contemporary genetics professional and the challenges they face in the care of patients and their families. This book is essential reading for anyone interested in the ethical issues arising in everyday genetics practice. Ethical Problems and Genetics Practice is also a sustained engagement with the relationships between bioethics and social science. In proposing and exemplifying a new approach to bioethics, it makes a significant contribution to debates on methods and interdisciplinarity and will therefore also appeal to all those concerned with theoretical and methodological approaches to bioethics and social science.

In the 1960's marked changes occurred throughout the world in philosophies and policies related to man's role in life. These changes, prompted predominantly by extensive increases in knowledge and popula tion density, have produced increased pleasures as well as problems. The rising number of people and improved methods of communication and transportation have caused more relationships among people, with their pleasures, competitions, jealousies, conflicts of interest, oppressions, and crimes. Large assortments of drugs have been developed and are easily obtained. There are drugs to speed us up, slow us down, make us sleep, change our perspectives on life, promote propagation of life or prevent it, prolong life or terminate it, and modify the course of life in many ways. Also, numerous mechanical devices have been developed that influence the propagation of life, the termination of life, and the manner in which we live. Many people have changed their overall goals in life, and in par ticular have experienced major changes in attitudes and policies applying to sexual activity, marriage, birth control, abortion, welfare, children, old people, criminals, economics, social status, careers, education, euthanasia, and suicide. There also has been marked enlightenment concerning the effect of the chemical and physical status of the brain upon normal and abnormal thinking and behavior."

The encounter between patient and physician may be characterized as the focus of medicine. As such, the patient-physician relationship, or more accurately the conduct of patients and physicians, has been the subject of considerable comment, inquiry, and debate throughout the centuries. The issues and concerns discussed, apart from those more specifically related to medical theory and therapy, range from matters of etiquette to profound questions of philosophical and moral interest. This discourse is impressive with respect both to its duration and content. Contemporary scholars and laypeople have made their contribution to these long-standing discussions. In addition, they have actively addressed those distinctively modern issues that have arisen as a result of increased medical knowledge, improved technology, and changing cultural and moral expectation. The concept of the patient-physician rela tionship that supposedly provides a framework for the conduct of patients and physicians seemingly has taken on a life of its own, inviolable, and subject to norms particular to it. The essays in this volume elucidate the nature of the patient-physician relationship, its character, and moral norms appropriate to it. The purpose of the collection is to enhance our understanding of that context, which many consider to be the focus of the entire medical enterprise. The con tributors have not engaged in apologetics, polemics, homiletics, or em piricism."

'Reprogen-Ethics and the Future of Gender' brings together three tightly related topics, which have so far been dealt separately in bioethics: assisted reproduction, enhancing and gender. Part one in this book targets present policies and legislature of assisted reproduction. Part two focuses on current views of the ethics of PGD and enhancing. Part three tackles the future of gender. Part four deals with artificial wombs and ectogenesis. The aim of this book is to provide a joint perspective in order to get the big picture. Contributors include Matti Hayry, Tuija Takala, Soren Holm, David Heyd, Daniel Callahan, Harriet Bradley, Ekaterina Balabanova and others. Some chapters in this book will significantly contribute to the current discussion of the topics at stake; other chapters will start a discussion on issues that have not yet been discussed. 'Reprogen-Ethics and the Future of Gender' will certainly appeal to readers who are interested in any of the intersecting topics of assisted reproduction, genetic enhancing and gender; bioethicists, sociologists, genetic counsellors, gynaecologists, legislators, and students of the relevant disciplines.