From the tone of the report by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Re search, one might conclude that the whole-brain-oriented definition of death is now firmly established as an enduring element of public policy. In that report, Defining Death: Medical, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death, the President's Commission forwarded a uni form determination of death act, which laid heavy accent on the signifi cance of the brain stem in determining whether an individual is alive or dead: An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards ( 1], p. 2). The plausibility of these criteria is undermined as soon as one confronts the question of the level of treatment that ought to be provided to human bodies that have permanently lost consciousness but whose brain stems are still functioning."

This Festschrift is presented to Professor Hans Jonas on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday, as affirmation of the contributors' respect and admiration. As a volume in the series 'Philosophy and Medicine' the contributions not only reflect certain interests and pursuits of the scholar to whom it is dedi cated, but also serve to bring to convergence the interests of the contributors in the history of humanity and medicine, the theory of organism, medicine in the service of the patient's autonomy, and the metaphysical, i.e., phenome nological foundations of medicine. Notwithstanding the nature of such personal gifts as the authors' contributions (which, with the exception of the late Hannah Arendt's, appear here for the first time), the essays also transcend the personal and serve to elaborate specific themes and theses disclosed in the numerous writings of Hans Jonas. The editor owes a personal debt of gratitude to many, including Hannah Arendt, who offered their assistance during the preparation of the volume."

The meaning and application of the principle of beneficence to issues in health care is rarely clear or certain. Although the principle is frequently employed to justify a variety of actions and inactions, very little has been done from a conceptual point of view to test its relevance to these behaviors or to explore its relationship to other moral principles that also might be called upon to guide or justify conduct. Perhaps more than any other, the principle of benef icence seems particularly appropriate to contexts of health care in which two or more parties interact from positions of relative strength and weakness, advantage and need, to pursue some perceived goal. It is among those moral principles that Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress selected in their textbook on bioethics as applicable to biomedicine in general and relevant to a range of specific issues ( 1], pp. 135-167). More narrowly, The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behav ioral Research identified beneficence as among those moral principles that have particular relevance to the conduct of research involving humans (2). Thus, the principle of beneficence is seen as pertinent to the routine delivery of health care, the discovery of new therapies, and the rationale of public policies related to health care."

The Direction of Medical Ethics The direction bioethics, and specifically medical ethics, will take in the next few years will be crucial. It is an emerging specialty that has attempted a great deal, that has many differing agendas, and that has its own identity crisis. Is it a subspecialty of clinical medicine? Is it a medical reform movement? Is it a consumer pro tection movement? Is it a branch of professional ethics? Is it a ra tionale for legal decisions and agency regulations? Is it something physicians and ethical theorists do constructively together? Or is it a morally concentrated attack on high technology, with the prac titioners of scientific medicine and the medical ethicists in an adversarial role? Is it a conservative endeavor, exhibiting a Frankenstein syn drome in Medical Genetics ("this time, they have gone too far"), or a Clockwork Orange syndrome in Psychotherapy ("we have met hods to make you talk-walk-cry-kill")? Or does it suffer the afflic tion of overdependency on the informal fallacy of the Slippery Slope ("one step down this hill and we will never be able to stop") that remains an informal fallacy no matter how frequently it's used? Is it a restricted endeavor of analytic philosophy: what is the meaning of "disease," how is "justice" used in the allocation of medical resources, what constitutes "informed" or "consent?" Is it applied ethics, leading in clinical practice to some recommenda tion for therapeutic or preventive action? This incomplete list of questions indicates just how complex,"

My 'discovery' of the Polish School of philosophy of medicine stemmed from my studies in the genesis of Ludwik Fleck's epistemology. These studies, and my interest in the scientific roots of Fleck's epistemology were a nearly 'natural' result of my own biography: like Fleck I had been trained, an had worked as an immunologist, and had later switched to studies in the social history of medicine and biology. Moreover, it so happened that Fleck's book, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact -the description of a science as it is, not as it should be -was the first epistemological study in which I found echos of my experience in the laboratory. My interest in Fleck was also highlightened by the fact that in his works, and, as I discovered later, in the works of his predecessors of the Polish School of philosophy of medicine, was formulated the problem that had stimulated my interest in the history of medicine and biology, and is still central to my present investigations: the relationships between biological knowledge and clinical practice. The writing of the book was made possible through to the help of many colleagues and friends. The unfailing support for my research, whatever its subject might be, from my colleagues from Unit 158 of INSERM and in particular from its head Patrice Pinell, has made my study of the Polish School possible.

The fate of seriously ill newborns has captured the atten tion of the public, of national and state legislators, and of powerful interest groups. For the most part, the debate has been cast in the narrowest possible terms: "discrimination against the handicapped"; "physician authority"; "family autonomy." We believe that something much more profound is happening: the debate over the care of sick and dying babies appears to be both a manifestation of great changes in our feelings about infants, children, and families, and a reflection of deep and abiding attitudes toward the newborn, the handi capped, and perhaps other humans who are "less than" nor mal, rational adults. How could we cast some light on those feelings and attitudes that seemed to determine silently the course of the public debate? We chose to enlist the humanities-the dis players and critics of our cultural forms. Rather than closing down the public discussion, we wanted to open it up, to illuminate it with the light of history, religion, philosophy, literature, jurisprudence, and humanistically oriented sociol ogy. This book is a first effort to place the hotly contested Baby Doe debate into a broader cultural context."

In the 1960's marked changes occurred throughout the world in philosophies and policies related to man's role in life. These changes, prompted predominantly by extensive increases in knowledge and popula tion density, have produced increased pleasures as well as problems. The rising number of people and improved methods of communication and transportation have caused more relationships among people, with their pleasures, competitions, jealousies, conflicts of interest, oppressions, and crimes. Large assortments of drugs have been developed and are easily obtained. There are drugs to speed us up, slow us down, make us sleep, change our perspectives on life, promote propagation of life or prevent it, prolong life or terminate it, and modify the course of life in many ways. Also, numerous mechanical devices have been developed that influence the propagation of life, the termination of life, and the manner in which we live. Many people have changed their overall goals in life, and in par ticular have experienced major changes in attitudes and policies applying to sexual activity, marriage, birth control, abortion, welfare, children, old people, criminals, economics, social status, careers, education, euthanasia, and suicide. There also has been marked enlightenment concerning the effect of the chemical and physical status of the brain upon normal and abnormal thinking and behavior."

Ethical Problems and Genetics Practice provides a rich, case-based account of the ethical issues arising in the genetics clinic and laboratory. By analysing a wide range of evocative and often arresting cases from practice, Michael Parker provides a compelling insight into the complex moral world of the contemporary genetics professional and the challenges they face in the care of patients and their families. This book is essential reading for anyone interested in the ethical issues arising in everyday genetics practice. Ethical Problems and Genetics Practice is also a sustained engagement with the relationships between bioethics and social science. In proposing and exemplifying a new approach to bioethics, it makes a significant contribution to debates on methods and interdisciplinarity and will therefore also appeal to all those concerned with theoretical and methodological approaches to bioethics and social science.

The place of drugs in American society is a problem more apt to evoke diatribe than dialog. With the support of the Na tional Science Foundation's program on Ethics and Values in Science and Technology, and the National Endowment for the Humanities' program on Science, Technology, and Human Values, * The Hastings Center was able to sponsor such dialog as part of a major research into the ethics of drug use that spanned two years. We assembled a Research Group from leaders in the scientific, medical, legal, and policy com munities, leavened with experts in applied ethics, and brought them together several times a year to discuss the moral, legal and social issues posed by nontherapeutic drug use. At times we also called on other experts when we needed certain issues clarified. We did not try to reach a consensus, yet several broad areas of agreement emerged: That our society's response to nontherapeutic drug use has been irrational and inconsistent; that our attempts at control have been clumsy and ill-informed; that many complex moral values are entwined in the debate and cannot be reduced to a simple conflict between individual liberty and state paternalism. Of course each paper should be read as the statement of that particular author or authors. The views expressed in this book do not necessarily represent the views of The Hastings Center, the National Science Foundation, or the National En dowment for the Humanities."

The encounter between patient and physician may be characterized as the focus of medicine. As such, the patient-physician relationship, or more accurately the conduct of patients and physicians, has been the subject of considerable comment, inquiry, and debate throughout the centuries. The issues and concerns discussed, apart from those more specifically related to medical theory and therapy, range from matters of etiquette to profound questions of philosophical and moral interest. This discourse is impressive with respect both to its duration and content. Contemporary scholars and laypeople have made their contribution to these long-standing discussions. In addition, they have actively addressed those distinctively modern issues that have arisen as a result of increased medical knowledge, improved technology, and changing cultural and moral expectation. The concept of the patient-physician rela tionship that supposedly provides a framework for the conduct of patients and physicians seemingly has taken on a life of its own, inviolable, and subject to norms particular to it. The essays in this volume elucidate the nature of the patient-physician relationship, its character, and moral norms appropriate to it. The purpose of the collection is to enhance our understanding of that context, which many consider to be the focus of the entire medical enterprise. The con tributors have not engaged in apologetics, polemics, homiletics, or em piricism."

The expense of critical care and emergency medicine, along with widespread expectations for good care when the need arises, pose hard moral and political problems. How should we spend our tax d'ollars, and who should get help? The purpose of this volume is to reflect upon our choices. The authors whose papers appear herein identify major difficulties and offer various solutions to them. Four topics are discussed throughout the volume: First, encounters between patients and health professionals in critical situations in general, and where scarcity makes rationing necessary; second, allocation and social policy, including how much to spend on preventive, chronic or critical care medicine, or for medicine in general compared to other important social projects; third, conflicts between or ranking of important goals and values; and fourth, conceptual issues affecting the choices we make. Since these topics are raised by the authors in almost every essay, we did not divide the papers into separate sections within the volume. Warren Reich begins the volume with a parable illustrating a key problem for contemporary medicine and two very different approaches to its solution. His story begins with the "delivery" of three indigent, critically ill, foreign patients to the emergency room of a large American private hospital. Although the hospital is legally bound to care for these patients, providing long term, high cost care for them and others soon becomes a major financial strain.

'Reprogen-Ethics and the Future of Gender' brings together three tightly related topics, which have so far been dealt separately in bioethics: assisted reproduction, enhancing and gender. Part one in this book targets present policies and legislature of assisted reproduction. Part two focuses on current views of the ethics of PGD and enhancing. Part three tackles the future of gender. Part four deals with artificial wombs and ectogenesis. The aim of this book is to provide a joint perspective in order to get the big picture. Contributors include Matti Hayry, Tuija Takala, Soren Holm, David Heyd, Daniel Callahan, Harriet Bradley, Ekaterina Balabanova and others. Some chapters in this book will significantly contribute to the current discussion of the topics at stake; other chapters will start a discussion on issues that have not yet been discussed. 'Reprogen-Ethics and the Future of Gender' will certainly appeal to readers who are interested in any of the intersecting topics of assisted reproduction, genetic enhancing and gender; bioethicists, sociologists, genetic counsellors, gynaecologists, legislators, and students of the relevant disciplines.

Can the Hippocratic and Judeo-Christian traditions be synthesized with contemporary thought about practical reason, virtue and community to provide real-life answers to the dilemmas of healthcare today? Bishop Anthony Fisher discusses conscience, relationships and law in relation to the modern-day controversies surrounding stem cell research, abortion, transplants, artificial feeding and euthanasia, using case studies to offer insight and illumination. What emerges is a reason-based bioethics for the twenty-first century; a bioethics that treats faith and reason with equal seriousness, that shows the relevance of ancient wisdom to the complexities of modern healthcare scenarios and that offers new suggestions for social policy and regulation. Philosophical argument is complemented by Catholic theology and analysis of social and biomedical trends, to make this an auspicious example of a new generation of Catholic bioethical writing which has relevance for people of all faiths and none.

We who live in this post-modern late twentieth century culture are still children of dualism. For a variety of rather complex reasons we continue to split apart and treat as radical opposites body and spirit, medicine and religion, sacred and secular, private and public, love and justice, men and women. Though this is still our strong tendency, we are beginning to discover both the futility and the harm of such dualistic splitting. Peoples of many ancient cultures might smile at the belatedness of our discovery concerning the commonalities of medicine and religion. A cur sory glance back at ancient Egypt, Samaria, Babylonia, Persia, Greece, and Rome would disclose a common thread - the close union of religion and medicine. Both were centrally concerned with healing, health, and wholeness. The person was understood as a unity of body, mind, and spirit. The priest and the physician frequently were combined in the same individual. One of the important contributions of this significant volume of essays is the sustained attack upon dualism. From a variety of vantage points, virtually all of the authors unmask the varied manifestations of dualism in religion and medicine, urging a more holistic approach. Since the editor has provided an excellent summary of each article, I shall not attempt to comment on specific contributions. Rather, I wish to highlight three 1 broad themes which I find notable for theological ethics."

This volume offers a collection of writings on ethical issues regarding retarded persons. Because this important subject has been generally omitted from formal discussions of ethics, there is a great deal which needs to be addressed in a theoretical and critical way. Of course, many people have been very concerned with practical matters concerning the care of retarded persons such as what liberties, entitlements or advocacy they should have. Interestingly, because so much practical attention has been given to issues which are not discussed by ethical theorists, they offer a rare opportunity to evaluate ethical theories themselves. That is, certain theories which appear convincing on other subjects seem implausible when they are applied to reasoned and com pelling views we hold concerning retarded individuals. Our subject, then, has both practical and conceptual dimensions. More over, because it is one where pertinent information comes from many sources, contributors to this volume represent many fields, including philosophy, religion, history, law and medicine. We regret that it was not possible to include more points of view, like those of psychologists, sociologists, nurses and families. There is however, a good and longstanding literature on mental retardation from these perspectives."

Not long ago, a colleague chided me for using the term "the biological revolution. " Like many others, I have employed it as an umbrella term to refer to the seemingly vast, rapidly-moving, and fre quently bewildering developments of contemporary biomedicine: psy chosurgery, genetic counseling and engineering, artificial heart-lung machines, organ transplants-and on and on. The real "biological revo lution," he pointed out, began back in the nineteenth century in Europe. For it was then that death rates and infant mortality began to decline, the germ theory of disease was firmly established, Darwin took his famous trip on the Beagle, and Gregor Mendel stumbled on to some fundamental principles of heredity. My friend, I think, was both right and wrong. The biological revolution did have its roots in the nineteenth century; that is when it first began to unfold. Yet, like many intellectual and scientific upheav als, its force was not felt for decades. Indeed, it seems fair to say that it was not until after the Second World War that the full force of the earlier discoveries in biology and medicine began to have a major impact, an impact that was all the more heightened by the rapid bi omedical developments after the war."

This book arises from a two-fold conviction. The first is that autonomy, despite recent critiques about its importance in bioethics and philosophy of medicine, and the traditional resistance of medicine to its "intrusion" into the doctor-patient relation, is a fundamental building block of an individual's identity and mechanisms for dealing with illness, disease, and incapacity. As such it is an essential component in the health care professional's armamentarium employed to bring about healing. Furthennore, it functions in a similar way to assist the health professional in his or her relations to the sick and injured. The second conviction follows from the fITst. Autonomy is far more complex than appears from the philosophical use of the concept. In this conviction we join those who have criticized the over-reliance on autonomy in modem, secular bioethics originating in the United States, but gaining ascendancy in other cultures. This critique relies on appeals to the richer contexts of persons' lives. Elsewhere the contemporary critique of autonomy appears in a variety of alternative ethical models like narrative ethics, casuist ethics, and contextualism. Indeed, postmodern criticism of all bioethics argues that there is no defensible foundation for claims that one ought to respect autonomy or any other principle as a way of ensuring that one is ethical.

The Dutch experience has influenced the debate on euthanasia and death with dignity around the globe, especially with regard to whether physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia should be legitimized or legalized. A review of the literature reveals complex and often contradictory views about the Dutch experience. Some claim that the Netherlands offers a model for the world to follow; others believe that the Netherlands represents danger, rather than promise, and that the Dutch experience is the definitive answer regarding why we should not make active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide part of our lives. Given these contradictory views, it has become clear that fieldwork is essential to developing a more informed opinion. Having investigated the Dutch experience for a number of years, and after thoroughly reading the vast literature published in English, I went to the Netherlands for one month in the summer of 1999 to get a feel for the local situation. I felt that this would provide the basis on which I could better interpret the findings of the available literature. I visited the major centers of medical ethics, as well as some research hospitals, and spoke with leading figures in the euthanasia policy and practice. The time spent was extremely beneficial and enriching. I followed in the footsteps of Carlos Gomez, who 1 published a book following one month of extensive research in the Netherlands.

The best things in my Ufe have come to me by accident and this book results from one such accident: my having the opportunity, out of the blue, to go to work as H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. 's, research assistant at the Institute for the Medical Humanities in the University of Texas Medi cal Branch at Galveston, Texas, in 1974, on the recommendation of our teacher at the University of Texas at Austin, Irwin C. Lieb. During that summer Tris "lent" me to Chester Bums, who has done important schol arly work over the years on the history of medical ethics. I was just finding out what bioethics was and Chester sent me to the rare book room of the Medical Branch Library to do some work on something called "medical deontology. " I discovered that this new field of bioethics had a history. This string of accidents continued, in 1975, when Warren Reich (who in 1979 made the excellent decisions to hire me to the faculty in bioethics at the Georgetown University School of Medicine and to persuade Andre Hellegers to appoint me to the Kennedy Institute of Ethics) took Tris Engelhardt's word for it that I could write on the history of modem medical ethics for Warren's major new project, the Encyclopedia of Bioethics. Warren then asked me to write on eighteenth-century British medical ethics."

This book contributes to an overall understanding of the nature and the impact of sexual boundary violations. By exploring an extreme human experience, childhood sexual abuse, the present study allows an insight into a hidden, silenced, and destructive aspect of human relations. It is the first of its kind to make comprehensible both the general path from violation to sickness, and the particular logic of assault embodiment. Due to its theoretical and methodological framework, the present study provides evidence that the embodiment of sexual violation experience is informed by situated logic and rationality. These, however, do not correspond to scientific logic and rationality. The universe of socio-culturally constituted meaning and that of scientifically constructed knowledge are shown to be incompatible. Subjectively informed violation embodiment is likely to be misinterpreted and consequently maltreated within the objectively grounded framework of current biomedical praxis. Consequently, victims of silenced sexual violence are revictimized by medicine.

This is an original contribution to the much debated area of the value that we should place on human life. With the euthanasia issue highlighted in the public arena this book argues for a non-absolutist highest value on life ethic and how that fits with society's current emphasis on individual autonomy. By the use of everyday examples the impact of placing a high value on life is explored. It will be useful for students of ethics, nursing and medicine and those engaged in the public debate on euthanasia.

Papers presented at a symposium on philosophy and medicine at the Institute for the Medical Humanities at the University of Texas Medical Branch in 1974 were published in the inaugural volume of this series. To help celebrate more than 20 years of extraordinary success with the series, another symposium was convened in Galveston in 1995. The convenors asked the participants these questions: In what ways and to what ends have academic humanists and medical scientists and practitioners become serious conversation partners in recent years? How have their dialogues been shaped by prevailing social views, political philosophies, academic habits, professional mores, and public pressures? What have been the key concepts and questions of these dialogues? Have the dialogues made any appreciable intellectual or social difference? Have they improved the care of the sick? Authors respond from a variety of theoretical perspectives in the humanities. They also articulate conceptions of philosophy of medicine and bioethics from various practice experiences, and bring critical attention to aspects of the contemporary health policy.

The term bioethics' was coined in 1971, just as interest in the medical humanities claimed a prominent place in medical education. Out of this interest, a substantial area of research and scholarship took shape: the philosophy of medicine. This field has been directed to the epistemological, ontological, and value-theoretical issues occasioned by medicine and the biomedical sciences. Bioethics is nested in this field and can only be fully understood in terms of the foundational issues it addresses. This collection of essays in honor of Stuart F. Spicker, one of the individuals who gave shape to the philosophy of medicine, lays out the broad scope of concerns from the philosophy of embodiment, to issues of the role of ethics consultants, to concepts of disease, equity and the meaning of history.

This book is a part of the ongoing enterprise to understand the nature of human health and illness. This enterprise has expanded dramatically during the last decades. A great number of articles, as weIl as a fair number of monographs, on this topic have been published by renowned international publishers. In this discussion most participants share the idea that health is a partially normative concept, Le. that health is not a phe nomenon which can be wholly characterised in biological (or otherwise descriptive) terms. To ascribe health to a person is eo ipso, according to this line of thought, to as cribe a positively evaluated property to this person. Moreover, most debators share the idea that health is a holistic property, belonging to the person as a whole, whereas dis eases, injuries and defects are entities (or properties of entities) which can be very lim ited and and normally affect only a part of the individual. My own monograph belongs to this tradition. A feature of my position, which is not universally acknowledged in riyal theories, however, is my emphasis on the notion of ability as a fundament in the theory of health. In my formal characterisation of health I view it as astate of a person which is such that the person has the ability to fulfi1 his or her vital goals."

This book addresses well-known issues - the ethical, legal, and social implications of human genetics - but does so from an unusual perspective: the perspective of the scientific community itself. In distinction to what is common in the ELSI literature, the book also discusses bioethical method. A new kind of casuistry is developed on the basis of the empirical findings of cognitive semantics. It will be of interest to philosophers, bioethicists, geneticists, and policymakers.