Death and taxes are our inevitable fate. We've been told this since the beginning of civilisation. But what if we stopped to question our antiquated system? Is it fair? And is it capable of serving the needs of our rapidly-changing, modern society? In Daylight Robbery, Dominic Frisby traces the origins of taxation, from its roots in the ancient world, through to today. He explores the role of tax in the formation of our global religions, the part tax played in wars and revolutions throughout the ages, why, at one stage, we paid tax for daylight or for growing a beard. Ranging from the despotic to the absurd, the tax laws of the past reveal so much about how we got to where we are today and what we can do to build a system fit for the future. Featured on Stepping up with Nigel Farage 'An important book for investors in gold and bitcoin' - Daniela Cambone, Stansberry Research 'This entertaining, surprising, contrarian book is a tour de force!' - Matt Ridley, author of The Evolution of Everything 'In this spectacular gallop through history, Frisby shows how taxation has warped, stunted and thwarted human progress' - Mark Littlewood, Director General, Institute of Economic Affairs 'Frisby's historical interpretation and utopian ideas will outrage Left and Right' - Steve Baker, MP for Wycombe and Member of the House of Commons Treasury Committee 'Fascinating book which exposes the political and economic basis of tax. A must read for those of us who believe in simpler, lower taxes' - Rt Hon Liz Truss, MP for South West Norfolk, Secretary of State for International Trade and President of the Board of Trade

The history of England's House of Lords in the nineteenth century has been largely misunderstood or ignored by historians. Richard W. Davis argues that the Lords were not primarily reactionary or obstructive, but rather a House in which much beneficial legislation was enacted. More conservative in political questions than the Commons perhaps, the Lords at least equaled them in compassion for the poor and suffering. While many historians also argue that after the Reform Act of 1832 the Lords had little real power, the Lords actually had precisely the same power after the Act as before: a bill could become law only after it passed both Houses of Parliament. They also had the power of veto and used it, particularly from 1833 to 1841 after the passage of the Act that is supposed to have so weakened them. The Whig House of Commons did not appreciate the actions of the Conservative majority in the Lords, but the electorate, becoming more conservative with every election, cared not at all.

Bob Woodward’s new book, Rage, is an unprecedented and intimate tour de force of original reporting on the Trump presidency. Rage goes behind the scenes like never before, with stunning new details about early national security decisions and operations and Trump’s moves as he faces a global pandemic, economic disaster and racial unrest.

Woodward, the #1 internationally bestselling author of 13 #1 bestsellers, including Fear: Trump in the White House, shows Trump up close in his entirety before the 2020 presidential election. President Trump has said publicly that Woodward has interviewed him. What is not known is that Trump provided Woodward a window into his mind through a series of exclusive interviews.

At key decision points, Rage shows how Trump’s responses to the crises of 2020 were rooted in the instincts, habits and style he developed during his first three years as president. Rage draws from hundreds of hours of interviews with firsthand witnesses, as well as participants’ notes, emails, diaries, calendars and confidential documents. Woodward obtained 25 personal letters exchanged between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un that have not been public before. Kim describes the bond between the two leaders as out of a “fantasy film,” as the two leaders engage in an extraordinary diplomatic minuet.

Rage will be the foundational account of the Trump presidency, its turmoil, contradictions and risks. It is an essential document for any voter seeking an accurate inside view of the Trump years — volatile and vivid.

What goes by the description of "conservatism" these days is a far cry from its past incarnations. Forget the legacy of moderate conservatism promoted by Dwight Eisenhower. Today's conservatism, according to Robert Brent Toplin, has taken a decidedly radical turn.

Toplin offers an intriguing critique of this fast-growing movement that resembles religious fundamentalism - a rigid true believer's mindset that dismisses opposing views and leaves almost no room for dialogue. Toplin observes that the right's orthodox approach represents a significant rejection of the more open-minded and practical outlook that characterized both liberal and conservative politics in earlier years.

Toplin considers three major subgroups within radical conservatism: stealth libertarians, who espouse free markets and small government, culture warriors, who crusade for morality and "values," and hawkish nationalists, who favor military solutions in foreign affairs. He points out that, whatever their differences, these groups manage to unite behind a common loathing. Conservatives demonize liberals, blaming them for most everything they dislike in American life. But, as Toplin shows, their view of "liberals" has little to do with reality, for it treats everyone from the center to the far-left as a liberal and equates liberal ideas with extremism.

When Americans talk about radical conservatism, they usually think of strident commentators on radio and television such as Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity, and Ann Coulter. Toplin offers a much broader picture of the radical, fundamentalist mentality. He shows that a religious-like approach to political ideas can also be found in the thinking of prominent scholars, journalists, and public officials such as Milton Friedman, William F. Buckley, Irving Kristol, Allan Bloom, George Will, Fred Barnes, William J. Bennett, and Ronald Reagan. Toplin finds political fundamentalism at work, too, in media outlets like the Fox News Network and the "Wall Street Journal" and at think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Cato Institute.

Offering a roadmap of the radical right's emergence over the past half century, Toplin reveals how enthusiasm for a conservative "faith" helped to erect a bully pulpit in an increasingly powerful political church.

This is a study of the growth of the right wing in a reunited Germany. Since the end of the Cold War, an explosion of xenophobia and attacks on foreigners - some of them asylum-seekers - has attracted world-wide media attention. Coming after the seemingly miraculous celebration of freedom accompanying the fall of the Berlin Wall and the country's reunification, these events have caused acute anxiety within Germany itself. These phenomena are not exclusive to Germany, but their undertones of Nazism have prompted the question: how could this happen in a country that had so firmly repudiated its past and rightly prided itself on its anti-fascism and liberal democracy? The author sets this development in its historical context, showing the long-established continuity of right-wing influence and power in German conservative politics, and he explores the effects of the end of the Cold War on German society and politics. He also examines the growth of xenophobia and right-wing attitudes in the former GDR since the implosion of communism. Germany's current position as a regional super-power and its contribution to European economic progress, make this text a significant and topical contribution.

Holding fast to traditional values in the face of unprecedented economic hardship, nearly a million American women joined right-wing organizations during the Great Depression and World War II. "Days of Discontent" provides a new perspective for understanding why the far right appealed to these women, whose political self-awareness grew with the tumultuous times.
Influenced by the conventional image of women as mothers and nurturers, many women viewed the right-wing movement as a way to protect and maintain American morality. The radical right leaders, such as Elizabeth Dilling and Grace Wick, held ideas in common with European fascists but based their politics on a uniquely American mixture of nativism, anticommunism, anti-Semitism, and racism. Benowitz's insight into their motivations sheds new light on the interaction between women's daily lives and national politics.

We're often told that the United States is, was, and always has been a Christian nation. But in One Nation Under God , historian Kevin M. Kruse reveals that the belief that America is fundamentally and formally Christian originated in the 1930s.To fight the slavery" of FDR's New Deal, businessmen enlisted religious activists in a campaign for freedom under God" that culminated in the election of their ally Dwight Eisenhower in 1952. The new president revolutionized the role of religion in American politics. He inaugurated new traditions like the National Prayer Breakfast, as Congress added the phrase under God" to the Pledge of Allegiance and made In God We Trust" the country's first official motto. Church membership soon soared to an all-time high of 69 percent. Americans across the religious and political spectrum agreed that their country was one nation under God."Provocative and authoritative, One Nation Under God reveals how an unholy alliance of money, religion, and politics created a false origin story that continues to define and divide American politics to this day.

Dr. Richard Bishirjian's Conservative Rebellion examines the American conservative movement in light of phases of American history in which the life of the American nation took shape from forces and conditions of the American soul. The author argues that the first phase of our common political life was a rebellion that we call the "Spirit of '76." That rebellion attempted to preserve the practices, traditions, and customary rights of a tradition of self-government that developed during the 140 years of the Colonial era. That first "Conservative Rebellion," erupting in Lexington and Concord, was a conservative rebellion whose spirit shapes American politics and society even today through the American conservative "movement." The author contrasts their rebellion to the revolutionary political religion of President Woodrow Wilson. President Woodrow Wilson's redemptive desire to destroy the "balance of power politics" of early twentieth century Europe engendered conditions that led to World War II and, ultimately, the Korean War, the war in Vietnam, and two wars by George W. Bush in Afghanistan and Iraq that the President clearly intended to be redemptive from the authoritarian practices of the Middle East. The divisions that trouble American society today were unleashed by Woodrow Wilson's political religion and continued by Democrat and Republican Presidents alike. The Conservative Rebellion has the potential, the author believes, to replace political religion with lessons learned from the statesmanship of Americans during the Colonial and Founding eras and the mid-twentieth century revival of classical political thought. The renaissance of classical political theory by University of Notre Dame political theorists Stanley Parry, Gerhart Niemeyer, and Eric Voegelin and University of Chicago political scientist Leo Strauss is central to the conservative "rebellion" of twenty-first century American conservatives. Their knowledge that recovery of political order is necessarily based on recovery of spiritual substance and order of American society, culture, and soul is a cautionary lesson that there are no quick fixes to the crises, divisions, and failed Presidents of modern America.

This book is a creative synthesis of the published scholarly research on the contemporary American right wing from the rise of Senator Joseph McCarthy to the election of Ronald Reagan as President. Unlike most other syntheses, it directly engages that research by critically analyzing the major explanations emerging from it. Emphasizing neither the lives and backgrounds of the scholars that he discusses nor paradigms within the social sciences as a whole, William Hixson focuses on the way the concepts of individual researchers have interacted with accumulating evidence on the American right, and how this evidence has led to new and more comprehensive theories. Hixson first summarizes and evaluates the research on the major developments analyzed by scholars--the social sources of "McCarthyism," the "radical right" of the early 1960s, George Wallace's constituency in his Presidential campaigns, and the emerging "new right" of the late 1970s. He then compares the interpretations of the two most influential students of the right wing, Seymour Martin Lipset and Michael Paul Rogin. Finally, he offers his own explanations, suggesting that the right wing is both a mass and elite phenomenon, that its durability comes from its appeal to the upwardly mobile, especially in economically expanding regions, and that far from being either "traditionalist" or reactive, it represents a proactive defense of values associated with late nineteenth-century "modernization." Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

In his recent book Against Liberalism, philosopher John Kekes argued that liberalism as a political system is doomed to failure by its internal inconsistencies. In this companion volume, he makes a compelling case for conservatism as the best alternative. His is the first systematic description and defense of the basic assumptions underlying conservative thought.Conservatism, Kekes maintains, is concerned with the political arrangements that enable members of a society to live good lives. These political arrangements are based on skepticism about ideologies, pluralism about values, traditionalism about institutions, and pessimism about human perfectibility. The political morality of conservatism requires the protection of universal conditions of all good lives, social conditions that vary with societies, and individual conditions that reflect differences in character and circumstance. Good lives, according to Kekes, depend equally on pursuing possibilities that these conditions establish and on setting limits to their violations.Attempts to make political arrangements reflect these basic tenets of conservatism are unavoidably imperfect. Kekes concludes, however, that they represent a better hope for the future than any other possibility.

First published in 1980, The Meaning of Conservatism is now recognized as a major contribution to political thought, and the liveliest and most provocative modern statement of the traditional "paleo-conservative" position. Roger Scruton challenges those who would regard themselves as conservatives, and also their opponents. Conservatism, he argues, has little in common with liberalism, and is only tenuously related to the market economy, to monetarism, to free enterprise, or to capitalism. It involves neither hostility toward the state, not the desire to limit the state's obligation toward the citizen. Its conceptions of society, law, and citizenship regard the individual not as the premise but as the conclusion of politics. At the same time it is fundamentally opposed to the ethic of social justice, to equality of station, opportunity, income, and achievement, and to the attempt to bring major institutions of society - such as schools and universities - under government control. Its root conceptions are those of loyalty, allegiance, community, and tradition. The conservative vision of society is one in which autonomous institutions and private initiative predominate, and in which the law protects the shared values that bind the community together, rather than the rights of those who would blow the community apart.

Exploring Russian thought, politics, and culture in the early nineteenth century, Martin offers the first in-depth probe of the origins of Russian conservatism. He traces the indigenous and foreign roots of conservative ideology through a wide range of sources and shows how Russian conservatism, uniquely double-edged, was part of the movement for change.

Second revised edition of a study of the Conservative government of 1970-74 which discusses and attacks recent revisionist interpretations which exonerate Heath from culpability for the economic and industrial meltdown of 1972-74. Reveals the economic, political and electoral misjudgements of the Heath government.

Late Capitalism is the first major synthesis to have been produced by the contemporary revival of Marxist economics. It represents, in fact, the only systematic attempt so far ever made to combine the general theory of the "laws of motion" of the capitalist mode of production developed by Marx, with the concrete history of capitalism in the twentieth century. Mandel's book starts with a challenging discussion of the appropriate methods for studying the capitalist economies. He seeks to show why the classical approaches of Luxemburg, Bukharin, Bauer and Grossman failed to accomplish the further development of Marxist theory whose urgency became evident after Marx's death. He then sketches the structure of the world market and the variant types of surplus-profit that have characterized its successive stages. On these foundations, Late Capitalism proceeds to advance an extremely bold schema of the "long waves" of expansion and contraction in the history of capitalism, from the Napoleonic Wars to the present. Mandel criticizes and refines Kondratieff's famous use of the notion. Mandel's book surveys in turn the main economic characteristics of late capitalism as it has emerged in the contemporary period. The last expansionary long wave, it argues, started with the victory of fascism on the European continent and the advent of the war economies in the US and UK during the 1940s, and produced the record world boom of 1947-72. Mandel discusses the reasons why the dynamic upswing of growth in this period was bound to reach its limits at the turn of the 1970s, and why a long wave of economic stagnation and intensified class struggle has set in today. Late Capitalism is a landmark in Marxist economic literature. Specifically designed to explain the international recession of the 1970s, it is a central guide to understanding the nature of the world economic crisis today.

In the name of protecting Americans from Soviet espionage, the post-1945 Red Scare curtailed the reform agenda of the New Deal. The crisis of the Great Depression had brought into government a group of policy experts who argued that saving democracy required attacking economic and social inequalities. The influence of these men and women within the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, and their alliances with progressive social movements, elicited a powerful reaction from conservatives, who accused them of being subversives. Landon Storrs draws on newly declassified records of the federal employee loyalty program--created in response to claims that Communists were infiltrating the U.S. government--to reveal how disloyalty charges were used to silence these New Dealers and discredit their policies. Because loyalty investigators rarely distinguished between Communists and other leftists, many noncommunist leftists were forced to leave government or deny their political views. Storrs finds that loyalty defendants were more numerous at higher ranks of the civil service than previously thought, and that many were women, or men with accomplished leftist wives. Uncovering a forceful left-feminist presence in the New Deal, she also shows how opponents on the Right exploited popular hostility to powerful women and their supposedly effeminate spouses. The loyalty program not only destroyed many promising careers, it prohibited discussion of social democratic policy ideas in government circles, narrowing the scope of political discourse to this day. Through a gripping narrative based on remarkable new sources, Storrs demonstrates how the Second Red Scare repressed political debate and constrained U.S. policymaking in fields such as public assistance, national health insurance, labor and consumer protection, civil rights, and international aid.

When most people think of the history of modern conservatism, they think of Ronald Reagan. Yet this narrow view leaves many to question: How did Donald Trump win the presidency? And what is the future of the Republican Party? In The Right, Matthew Continetti gives a sweeping account of movement conservatism's evolution, from the Progressive Era through the present. He tells the story of how conservatism began as networks of intellectuals, developing and institutionalizing a vision that grew over time, until they began to buckle under new pressures, resembling national populist movements. Drawing out the tensions between the desire for mainstream acceptance and the pull of extremism, Continetti argues that the more one studies conservatism's past, the more one becomes convinced of its future. Deeply researched and brilliantly told, The Right is essential reading for anyone looking to understand American conservatism.

Known as the Father of His Country, George Washington is viewed as a demigod for what he was and did, not what he thought. In addition to being a popular icon for the forces of American nationalism, he served as commander-in-chief of the victorious Continental Army. That he played a key role in securing the adoption of the Constitution is well known, but few credit him with a political philosophy that actively shaped the constitutional tradition.

In this revisionist study, Glenn Phelps argues that Washington's political thought influenced the principles informing the federal government then and now. Disinclined to enter the debates by which the framers hammered out a consensus, Washington instead sought to promote his way of thinking through private correspondence, and the example of his public life.

From these sources Phelps draws out his political ideas and demonstrates that Washington developed a coherent and consistent view of a republican government on a continental scale long before Madison, Hamilton, and other nationalists-a view grounded in classically conservative republicanism and continentally-minded commercialism. That he was only partially successful in building the constitutional system that he intended does not undercut his theoretical contribution. Even his failures affected the way our constitutional tradition developed.

Phelps examines Washington's political ideas not as they were perceived by his contemporaries but in his own words, that is, he shows what Washington believed, not what others thought he believed. He shows how Washington's political values remained consistent over time, regardless of who his counselors or "ghost writers" were. Using letters Washington wrote to friends and family--written free from the constraints of public politics--Phelps reveals "a man with a passionate commitment to a fully developed idea of a constitutional republic on a continental scale."

In recent years scholarship about Washington has seemed to focus on mythmaking. For readers interested in the founding period, the framing of what Hamilton called the "frail fabric," and constitutionalism, Phelps explores the substance behind the myth.

It's not easy being Catholic and conservative in secular 'Blue State' New York, but that's what George J. Marlin is, always has been, and always will be. Don't ask him to change. Besides, like America, it's the Empire State that needs to change. Generation after generation of elitists have put in place their plans for making the machineries of state work more efficiently and more equitably, and they've succeeded in wrecking what was never broken in the first place. And Mr. Marlin has a name for political types who think they know better than the rest of us: narcissists. Narcissists have been fouling up societies since the beginning of time. As Marlin writes: Throughout history, a subset of people have viewed themselves as superior to the rest of the population due to their perceived distinctive qualities: intelli-gence, breeding, class, or wealth. These elites have generally held that because they are exceptional persons they were best suited to conduct the affairs of state. They are wrong. But they have succeeded, and they appear to be ascendant in America today, although the Tea Party may have something to say about that. But consider the following contemporary examples: * The elitist imposition of Obamacare upon an unwilling nation * The lionizing by the Left of eugenicists, such as Margaret Sanger and Ruth Bader Ginsburg * The way "Catholic" politicians such as New York governors George Pataki and David Paterson and former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani run roughshod over Church teaching * The way contemporary education - from nursery school through college - infantilizes and fails our kids, preparing them poorly for the rigors of adulthood With an acid pen and a ready wit, George Marlin takes on many of modern America's most revered intellectuals and shows conclusively that they're just not as smart as they think they are.

It's not easy being Catholic and conservative in secular 'Blue State' New York, but that's what George J. Marlin is, always has been, and always will be. Don't ask him to change. Besides, like America, it's the Empire State that needs to change. Generation after generation of elitists have put in place their plans for making the machineries of state work more efficiently and more equitably, and they've succeeded in wrecking what was never broken in the first place. And Mr. Marlin has a name for political types who think they know better than the rest of us: narcissists. Narcissists have been fouling up societies since the beginning of time. As Marlin writes: Throughout history, a subset of people have viewed themselves as superior to the rest of the population due to their perceived distinctive qualities: intelli-gence, breeding, class, or wealth. These elites have generally held that because they are exceptional persons they were best suited to conduct the affairs of state. They are wrong. But they have succeeded, and they appear to be ascendant in America today, although the Tea Party may have something to say about that. But consider the following contemporary examples: * The elitist imposition of Obamacare upon an unwilling nation * The lionizing by the Left of eugenicists, such as Margaret Sanger and Ruth Bader Ginsburg * The way "Catholic" politicians such as New York governors George Pataki and David Paterson and former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani run roughshod over Church teaching * The way contemporary education - from nursery school through college - infantilizes and fails our kids, preparing them poorly for the rigors of adulthood With an acid pen and a ready wit, George Marlin takes on many of modern America's most revered intellectuals and shows conclusively that they're just not as smart as they think they are.

Can libertarians care about social justice? In "Free Market Fairness," John Tomasi argues that they can and should. Drawing simultaneously on moral insights from defenders of economic liberty such as F. A. Hayek and advocates of social justice such as John Rawls, Tomasi presents a new theory of liberal justice. This theory, free market fairness, is committed to both limited government and the material betterment of the poor. Unlike traditional libertarians, Tomasi argues that property rights are best defended not in terms of self-ownership or economic efficiency but as requirements of democratic legitimacy. At the same time, he encourages egalitarians concerned about social justice to listen more sympathetically to the claims ordinary citizens make about the importance of private economic liberty in their daily lives. In place of the familiar social democratic interpretations of social justice, Tomasi offers a "market democratic" conception of social justice: free market fairness. Tomasi argues that free market fairness, with its twin commitment to economic liberty and a fair distribution of goods and opportunities, is a morally superior account of liberal justice. Free market fairness is also a distinctively American ideal. It extends the notion, prominent in America's founding period, that protection of property and promotion of real opportunity are indivisible goals. Indeed, according to Tomasi, free market fairness is social justice, American style.

Provocative and vigorously argued, "Free Market Fairness" offers a bold new way of thinking about politics, economics, and justice--one that will challenge readers on both the left and right.

At a time when the label "conservative" is indiscriminately applied to fundamentalists, populists, libertarians, fascists, and the advocates of one or another orthodoxy, this volume offers a nuanced and historically informed presentation of what is distinctive about conservative social and political thought. It is an anthology with an argument, locating the origins of modern conservatism within the Enlightenment and distinguishing between conservatism and orthodoxy. Bringing together important specimens of European and American conservative social and political analysis from the mid-eighteenth century through our own day, "Conservatism" demonstrates that while the particular institutions that conservatives have sought to conserve have varied, there are characteristic features of conservative argument that recur over time and across national borders.

The book proceeds chronologically through the following sections: Enlightenment Conservatism (David Hume, Edmund Burke, and Justus Moser), The Critique of Revolution (Burke, Louis de Bonald, Joseph de Maistre, James Madison, and Rufus Choate), Authority (Matthew Arnold, James Fitzjames Stephen), Inequality (W. H. Mallock, Joseph A. Schumpeter), The Critique of Good Intentions (William Graham Sumner), War (T. E. Hulme), Democracy (Carl Schmitt, Schumpeter), The Limits of Rationalism (Winston Churchill, Michael Oakeshott, Friedrich Hayek, Edward Banfield), The Critique of Social and Cultural Emancipation (Irving Kristol, Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, Hermann Lubbe), and Between Social Science and Cultural Criticism (Arnold Gehlen, Philip Rieff). The book contains an afterword on recurrent tensions and dilemmas of conservative thought."

Are Tea Party supporters merely a group of conservative citizens concerned about government spending? Or are they racists who refuse to accept Barack Obama as their president because he's not white? "Change They Can't Believe In" offers an alternative argument--that the Tea Party is driven by the reemergence of a reactionary movement in American politics that is fueled by a fear that America has changed for the worse. Providing a range of original evidence and rich portraits of party sympathizers as well as activists, Christopher Parker and Matt Barreto show that what actually pushes Tea Party supporters is not simple ideology or racism, but fear that the country is being stolen from "real Americans"--a belief triggered by Obama's election. From civil liberties and policy issues, to participation in the political process, the perception that America is in danger directly informs how Tea Party supporters think and act.

The authors argue that this isn't the first time a segment of American society has perceived the American way of life as under siege. In fact, movements of this kind often appear when some individuals believe that "American" values are under threat by rapid social changes. Drawing connections between the Tea Party and right-wing reactionary movements of the past, including the Know Nothing Party, the Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s, and the John Birch Society, Parker and Barreto develop a framework that transcends the Tea Party to shed light on its current and future consequences.

Linking past and present reactionary movements, "Change They Can't Believe In" rigorously examines the motivations and political implications associated with today's Tea Party.

The populist phenomenon is often identified with the election of Donald Trump in November 2016. But the political, moral, and social realities for which Trump was a symbol both predated his candidacy and achieved independent fulfillment in countries as disparate as the United Kingdom, Hungary, and Brazil. At the center of the populist challenge, this volume proposes, are two questions. The first revolves around the question of sovereignty: who governs a country? This question is at the center of all contemporary populist initiatives and has been posed with increasing urgency as the bureaucratic burden of what has come to be called the administrative state has intruded more and more forcefully upon the political and social life of Western democracies. The second key question, one related to the issue of sovereignty, concerns what Lincoln called "public sentiment": the widespread, almost taken-for-granted yet nonetheless palpable affirmation by a people of their national identity. The erosion of national sovereignty to which populism is a response has been accompanied by an erosion of that shared national consensus. Increasingly, the traditional pillars of this consensus-the binding forces of family, religion, civic duty, and patriotic filiation-have faltered before the blandishments of transnational progressivism. The debate sparked by these problems has turned on a number of high-profile issues which this volume seeks to address, including immigration, free trade, foreign policy, religious freedom, and the question of citizenship.