Dana Kay Nelkin presents a simple and natural account of freedom and moral responsibility which responds to the great variety of challenges to the idea that we are free and responsible, before ultimately reaffirming our conception of ourselves as agents. Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility begins with a defense of the rational abilities view, according to which one is responsible for an action if and only if one acts with the ability to recognize and act for good reasons. The view is compatibilist - that is, on the view defended, responsibility is compatible with determinism - and one of its striking features is a certain asymmetry: it requires the ability to do otherwise for responsibility when actions are praiseworthy, but not when they are blameworthy. In defending and elaborating the view, Nelkin questions long-held assumptions such as those concerning the relation between fairness and blame and the nature of so-called reactive attitudes such as resentment and forgiveness. Her argument not only fits with a metaphysical picture of causation - agent-causation - often assumed to be available only to incompatibilist accounts, but receives positive support from the intuitively appealing Ought Implies Can Principle, and establishes a new interpretation of freedom and moral responsibility that dovetails with a compelling account of our inescapable commitments as rational agents.

The idea of a virtue has traditionally been important in ethics, but only recently has gained attention as an idea that can explain how we ought to form beliefs as well as how we ought to act. Moral philosophers and epistemologists have different approaches to the idea of intellectual virtue; here, Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski bring work from both fields together for the first time to address all of the important issues. It will be required reading for anyone working in either field.

This book presents a radical and intuitive argument against the notion that intentional action, agency and autonomy are features belonging only to humans. Using evidence from research into the minds of non-human animals, it explores the ways in which animals can be understood as individuals who are aware of themselves, and the consequent basis of our moral obligations towards them. The first part of this book argues for a conception of agency in animals that admits to degrees among individuals and across species. It explores self-awareness and its various levels of complexity which depend on an animals' other mental capacities. The author offers an overview of some established theories in animal ethics including those of Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Bernard Rollin and Lori Gruen, and the ways these theories serve to extend moral consideration towards animals based on various capacities that both animals and humans have in common. The book concludes by challenging traditional Kantian notions of rationality and what it means to be an autonomous individual, and discussing the problems that still remain in the study of animal ethics.

Sarah Conly argues that we do not have the right to have more than one child. If recent increases in global population continue, we will reduce the welfare of future generations to unacceptable levels. We do not have a right to impose on others in this way. While voluntary efforts to restrain population growth are preferable and may be enough, government regulations against having more than one child can be justified if they are necessary. Of course, government regulations have to be consistent with rights that we do hold, but Conly argues that since we do not have a right to have more than one child, government regulations are one of the methods we might use to reduce the fertility rate until we reach a sustainable population.

This book examines the ethical concepts which lie at the heart of journalism, including freedom, democracy, truth, objectivity, honesty and privacy. The common concern of the authors is to promote ethical conduct in the practice of journalism, as well as the quality of the information that readers and audience receive from the media.

A philosophical exploration of such subjects as terrorism, just war and pacifism, Andrew Fiala's book reflects on the moral demands that conflict makes on us. "Public War, Private Conscience" offers a philosophical reflection on the moral demands made upon us by war, providing a clear and accessible overview of the different ways of thinking about war. Engaging both with contemporary examples and historical ideas about war, the book offers unique analysis of issues relating to terrorism, conscience objection, just war theory and pacifism. Andrew Fiala examines the conflict between utilitarian and deontological points of view. On the one hand, wars are part of the project of public welfare, subject to utilitarian evaluation. On the other hand, war is also subject to deontological judgment that takes seriously the importance of private conscience and human rights. This book argues that the conflict between these divergent approaches is unavoidable. We are continually caught in the tragic conflict between these two values: public happiness and private morality. And it is in war that we find the conflict at its most obvious and most disturbing.

Ethicmentality is an innovative book. It blends ethics with mentality to capture the interdependence of ethical life and social life creatively. The book is also innovative because of the way this interdependence is explored. By focusing on practical ethical behavior in today's economy, business, and society, Michela Betta has advanced an understanding of ethics freed from the burden of moral theory. By introducing a new type of analysis this book also contributes to methodological innovation. Familiar issues are revisited through the notion of ethicmentality. Capitalist economy is presented in terms of a mentality embedded in society, culture, and politics. Government is revealed as mentality about how to govern economically through market freedom rather than human rights. The rise of the financial economy is described as challenging the traditional capitalist mentality of equal opportunities. A money mentality around debts and owing is perceived as having replaced credit and owning, and the rise of corporation managers as having destroyed the old mentality of ownership. Ethicmentality shows the potential of constructive critique from economic, business, and society perspectives. It also breaches traditional limits by developing the idea of ethical capital and entrepreneurial ethics. Ethical thinking is infused with the Aristotelian notion of virtues and moderation to reflect about modern work. Ethicmentality helps us see the complexity of social and personal life. Given the pervasive nature of mentality and ethics' focus on individual deliberation, ethicmentality represents their productive combination, a new blend for ethical and social analysis.

The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of content.
To show how these principles are realized in specific domains, Peacocke applies the theory in detail to several classical problems of philosophy, including the nature of perceptual entitlement, induction, and the status of moral thought. These discussions involve an elaboration of the structure of entitlement in ways that have applications in many other areas of philosophy. He also relates the theory to classical and recent rationalist thought, and to current issues in the theory of meaning, reference and explanation. In the course of these discussions, he proposes a general theory of the a priori.
The focus of the work lies in the intersection of epistemology, metaphysics, and the theory of meaning, and will be of interest both to students and researchers in these areas, and to anyone concerned with the idea of rationality.

This gripping book brings back to life the events surrounding the internment of ten German Nuclear Scientists immediately after World War II. It is also an "eye-witness" account of the dawning of the nuclear age, with the dialogue and narrative spanning the period before, during and after atomic bombs were dropped on Japan at the end of the war. This pivotal historical episode is conveyed, along with the emotions as well as the facts, through drama, historical narrative, and photographs of the captive German nuclear scientists - who included Werner Heisenberg, Otto Hahn, and Max von Laue. The unique story that unfolds in the play is based on secretly recorded transcripts of the scientists' actual conversations at Farm Hall, together with related documents and photographs.

In Life's Values Alan H. Goldman seeks to explain what is of ultimate value in individual lives. The proposed candidates include pleasure, happiness, meaning, and well-being. Only the latter is the all-inclusive category of personal value, and it consists in the satisfaction of deep rational desires. Since individuals' rational desires differ, the book cannot dictate what will maximize your own well-being and what in particular you ought to pursue. However it can tell you to make your desires rational (that is, informed and coherent) and it can also explain the nature of these states that typically enter into well-being: pleasure, happiness, and meaning being typically partial causes as well as effects of well-being. All are by-products of satisfying rational desires and rarely successfully aimed at directly. Pleasure comes in sensory, intentional, and pure feeling forms, each with an opposite in pain or distress. Happiness in its primary sense is an emotion, not a constant state as some philosophers assume, and in secondary senses a mood (disposition to have an emotion) or temperament (disposition to be in a mood). Meaning in life is a matter of events in one's life fitting into intelligible narratives. Events in narratives are understood teleologically as well as causally, in terms of outcomes aimed at as well antecedent events. So, in the briefest terms, this book distinguishes and relates pleasure, happiness, well-being, and meaning, and relates each to motivation and value.

This book defends antitheodicism, arguing that theodicies, seeking to excuse God for evil and suffering in the world, fail to ethically acknowledge the victims of suffering. The authors argue for this view using literary and philosophical resources, commencing with Immanuel Kant's 1791 "Theodicy Essay" and its reading of the Book of Job. Three important twentieth century antitheodicist positions are explored, including "Jewish" post-Holocaust ethical antitheodicism, Wittgensteinian antitheodicism exemplified by D.Z. Phillips and pragmatist antitheodicism defended by William James. The authors argue that these approaches to evil and suffering are fundamentally Kantian. Literary works such as Franz Kafka's The Trial, Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot, and George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, are examined in order to crucially advance the philosophical case for antitheodicism.

Christianity is deeply interested in the body. In its central mysteries -- creation, incarnation, and resurrection -- the body and human flesh are radically implicated. Bodies are persons, and persons are spiritual beings, bearers of the divine image and destined for bodily union with God. From the Bible to the Second Vatican Council, from Irenaeus and Tertullian to Aquinas and Luther, the classic sources of the Christian tradition engender a spiritual philosophy that challenges the ever-present gnostic impulse either to marginalize, or else to worship, the body. Adam G. Cooper brings these rich sources into conversation with numerous contemporary voices in philosophy and theology, offering an illuminating and critical perspective on such pressing social and ethical questions as pornography, feminism, philosophy of mind, sterility, and death.

This book represents the first multi-disciplinary introduction to the study of war crimes trials and investigations. It introduces readers to the numerous disciplines engaged with this complex subject, including: Forensic Anthropology, Economics and Anthropometrics, Legal History, Violence Studies, International Criminal Justice, International Relations, and Moral Philosophy. The contributors are experts in their respective fields and the chapters highlight each discipline's major trends, debates, methods and approaches to mass atrocity, genocide, and crimes against humanity, as well as their interactions with adjacent disciplines. Case studies illustrate how the respective disciplines work in practice, including examples from the Allied Hunger Blockade, WWII, the Guatemalan and Spanish Civil Wars, the Former Yugoslavia, and Uganda. Including bibliographical essays to offer readers crucial orientation when approaching the specialist literature in each case, this edited collection equips readers with what they need to know in order to navigate a complex, and until now, deeply fragmented field. A diverse and interdisciplinary body of research, this book will be indispensable reading for scholars of war crimes.

MAHAN ON THE WILL. This is an important work upon an important subject. The liberty of the human will I regard as a first truth. But like some other first truths, it has been extensively denied in theory. A most false and injurious philosophy of the will has extensively prevailed in the christian church, and has given birth to a brood of theological dogmas alike absurd and ruinous. The above named work was designed and is I think highly calculated to correct and rebuke the philosophy just alluded to. It is a fair, an able, and it seems to me a thorough statement and discussion of the subject, and a complete refutation of the dogma of a necessitated will. The book is small, cheap, and for a metaphysical discussion has the rare quality, of perspicuity. Since errorists every where teach and affirm the doctrine of a necessitated will, and since this is the stronghold of infidelity in all its forms, every youth and every person should acquaint himself with the truth and doctrine of the will and with the method of exposing error upon this subject. This treatise of President Mahan, presents the subject in a condensed form, and places it in a strong light. Every family should possess and make themselves familiar with this work. It needs only to be read and understood to be appreciated as a highly important work, and one which cannot fail to exert a most important influence in the cause of truth. Charles G. Finney, Dec. 1847. ASA MAHAN (1799-1889) was America's foremost Christian educator, reformer, philosopher, and pastor. He was founding president of two colleges and one university, where he was able to inspire numerous reforms, publish authoritative philosophical texts, and promote powerfulrevivals like his close associate Charles Finney. He led the way on all important fronts while being severely persecuted. He introduced the new curriculum later adopted by Harvard, was the first to instruct and grant liberal college degrees to white and colored women, advised Lincoln during the Civil War, and among many other remarkable achievements, was a father to the early evangelical and holiness movements.

This is a radically new interpretation of Plato's Meno. Roslyn Weiss takes and defends the position that the Meno is a self-conscious analysis and assessment of the worth not of inquiry itself, but of moral inquiry. Her coherent reading of the Meno identifies serious problems for orthodox interpretations and will appeal to anyone interested in ancient philosophy and the classics.

Since Barry Stroud's classic paper in 1968, the general discussion on transcendental arguments tends to focus on examples from theoretical philosophy. It also tends to be pessimistic, or at least extremely reluctant, about the potential of this kind of arguments. Nevertheless, transcendental reasoning continues to play a prominent role in some recent approaches to moral philosophy. Moreover, some authors argue that transcendental arguments may be more promising in moral philosophy than they are in theoretical contexts. Against this background, the current volume focuses on transcendental arguments in practical philosophy. Experts from different countries and branches of philosophy share their views about whether there are actually differences between "theoretical" and "practical" uses of transcendental arguments. They examine and compare different versions of transcendental arguments in moral philosophy, explain their structure, and assess their respective problems and promises. This book offers all those interested in ethics, meta-ethics, or epistemology a more comprehensive understanding of transcendental arguments. It also provides them with new insights into uses of transcendental reasoning in moral philosophy.

Chinese and Greek ethics remain influential in modern philosophy, yet it is unclear how they can be compared to one another. This volume, following its predecssor 'How should one live?' (DeGruyter 2011), is a contribution to comparative ethics, loosely centered on the concepts of life and the good life. Methods of comparing ethics are treated in three introductory chapters (R.A.H.King, Ralph Weber, G.E.R. Lloyd), followed by chapters on core issues in each of the traditions: human nature (David Wong, Guo Yi), ghosts (Paul Goldin), happiness (Christoph Harbsmeier), pleasure (Michael Nylan), qi (Elisabeth Hsu & Zhang Ruqing), cosmic life and individual life (Dennis Schilling), the concept of mind (William Charlton), knowledge and happiness (Joerg Hardy), filial piety (Richard Stalley), the soul (Hua-kuei Ho), and deliberation (Thomas Buchheim). The volume closes with three essays in comparison - Mencius and the Stoics (R.A.H. King), equanimity (Lee Yearley), autonomy and the good life (Lisa Raphals). An index locorum each for Chinese and Greco-Roman authors, and a general index complete the volume.

Recent years have seen a growth of interest in the great English idealist thinker T. H. Green (1836-82) as philosophers have begun to overturn received opinions of his thought and to rediscover his original and important contributions to ethics, metaphysics, and political philosophy. This collection of essays by leading experts, all but one published here for the first time, introduces and critically examines his ideas both in their context and in their relevance to contemporary debates.

Speech, Media, and Ethics: The Limits of Free Expression is an interdisciplinary work that employs ethics, liberal philosophy, and legal and media studies to outline the boundaries to freedom of expression and freedom of the press, defined broadly to include the right to demonstrate and to picket, the right to compete in elections, and the right to communicate views via the written and electronic media. Moral principles are applied to analyze practical questions that deal with free expression and its limits.

This book offers the first comprehensive discussion of Lacan's Kant with Sade, an essay widely recognised as one of his most important and difficult texts. Here, the reader will find a detailed roadmap for each section of the essay, including clarifications of the allusions, implicit borrowings and references in Lacan's text, unique insights into the essay's publication history, and a critical assessment of its reception. The author expertly defines key terms, explains complex theoretical arguments, and contextualises the work within a larger philosophical discourse. No prior knowledge of Lacan, Kant or Sade is assumed, allowing both newcomers and those who are well-versed in psychoanalysis, philosophy, and literary criticism to benefit from the book. This engaging book clears the path for a long overdue re-discovery and a proper appreciation of one of Lacan's most challenging works, inspiring a renewed debate on the significance of Lacanian psychoanalysis for moral philosophy and literary theory.

"Personalist Bioethics" calls us to reflect on the intimate meaning of human existence and the social environment, going beyond any specific religious perspective and invoking human reason. It advances a metaphysics that is rationally grounded in philosophical anthropology and has a broad range of ethical applications for professors of bioethics, members of ethics committees, bioethics students, and those interested in the field in general, whether in medicine, law, or philosophy. Readers will find a presentation and discussion of the basic contours of personalist bioethics, comparisons of personalism with other philosophical positions, and ethical investigations of particular topics, ranging from genetic engineering to euthanasia. Translated by John A. Di Camillo and Michael J. Miller.

Do philosophers have a responsibility to their society that is distinct from their responsibility to it as citizens? This edited volume explores both what type of contribution philosophy can make and what type of reasoning is appropriate when addressing public matters now. These questions are posed by leading international scholars working in the fields of moral and political philosophy. Each contribution also investigates the central issue of how to combine critical, rational analysis with a commitment to politically relevant public engagement. The contributions to this volume analyse issues raised in practical ethics, including abortion, embryology, and assisted suicide. They consider the role of ethical commitment in the philosophical analysis of contemporary political issues, and engage with matters of public policy such as poverty, the arts, meaningful work, as well as the evidence base for policy. They also examine the normative legitimacy of power, including the use of violence.

Drawing on research in plant science, systems ecology, environmental philosophy, and cultural anthropology, Andrew F. Smith shatters the distinction between vegetarianism and omnivorism. The book outlines the implications that these manufactured distinctions have for how we view food and ourselves as eaters.