The economic and geopolitical implications of China's rise have been the subject of vast commentary. However, the institutional implications of China's transformative development under state capitalism have not been examined extensively and comprehensively. Regulating the Visible Hand? The Institutional Implications of Chinese State Capitalism examines the domestic and global consequences of Chinese state capitalism, focusing on the impact of state-owned enterprises on regulation and policy, while placing China's variety of state capitalism in comparative perspective. It first examines the domestic governance of Chinese state capitalism, looking at institutional design and regulatory policy in areas ranging from the environment and antitrust to corporate law and taxation. It then analyses the global consequences for the regulation of trade, investment and finance. Contributors address such questions as: What are the implications of state capitalism for China's domestic institutional trajectory? What are the global implications of Chinese state capitalism? What can be learned from a comparative analysis of state capitalism?

Tribal Criminal Law and Procedure examines complex Indian nations' tribal justice systems, analyzing tribal statutory law, tribal case law, and the cultural values of Native peoples. Using tribal court opinions and tribal codes, it reveals how tribal governments use a combination of oral and written law to dispense justice and strengthen their nations and people. Carrie E. Garrow and Sarah Deer discuss the histories, structures, and practices of tribal justice systems, comparisons of traditional tribal justice with American law and jurisdictions, elements of criminal law and procedure, and alternative sentencing and traditional sanctions. New features of the second edition include new chapters on: * The Tribal Law and Order Act's Enhanced Sentencing Provisions * The Violence Against Women Act's Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction * Tribal-State Collaboration Tribal Criminal Law and Procedure is an invaluable resource for legal scholars and students. The book is published in cooperation with the Tribal Law and Policy Institute (visit them at www.tlpi.org).

This book reflects the wide range of current scholarship on Roman law. The essays, newly commissioned for this volume, cover the sources of evidence for classical Roman law, the elements of private law, as well as criminal and public law, and the second life of Roman law in Byzantium, in civil and canon law, and in political discourse from AD 1100 to the present. Roman law nowadays is studied in many different ways, which is reflected in the diversity of approaches in the essays. Some focus on how the law evolved in ancient Rome, others on its place in the daily life of the Roman citizen, still others on how Roman legal concepts and doctrines have been deployed through the ages. All of them are responses to one and the same thing: the sheer intellectual vitality of Roman law, which has secured its place as a central element in the intellectual tradition and history of the West.

Roger Douglas compares responses to terrorism by five liberal democracies--the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand--over the past 15 years. He examines each nation's development and implementation of counterterrorism law, specifically in the areas of information-gathering, the definition of terrorist offenses, due process for the accused, detention, and torture and other forms of coercive questioning.

Douglas finds that terrorist attacks elicit pressures for quick responses, often allowing national governments to accrue additional powers. But emergencies are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for such laws, which may persist even after fears have eased. He argues that responses are influenced by both institutional interests and prior beliefs, and complicated when the exigencies of office and beliefs point in different directions. He also argues that citizens are wary of government's impingement on civil liberties and that courts exercise their capacity to restrain the legislative and executive branches. Douglas concludes that the worst antiterror excesses have taken place outside of rather than within the law and that the legacy of 9/11 includes both laws that expand government powers and judicial decisions that limit those very powers.

" S]trong, well-researched, and well-argued. . . . It is a useful book bringing together a clear and thoughtful analysis of the counter-terrorism law of five different countries."
--Robert Strassfeld, Case Western University School of Law

This book offers a new theory of property and distributive justice derived from Talmudic law, illustrated by a case study involving the sale of organs for transplant. Although organ donation did not exist in late antiquity, this book posits a new way, drawn from the Talmud, to conceive of this modern means of giving to others. Our common understanding of organ transfers as either a gift or sale is trapped in a dichotomy that is conceptually and philosophically limiting. Drawing on Maussian gift theory, this book suggests a different legal and cultural meaning for this property transfer. It introduces the concept of the 'divine lien', an obligation to others in need built into the definition of all property ownership. Rather than a gift or sale, organ transfer is shown to exemplify an owner's voluntary recognition and fulfilment of this latent property obligation.

Anti-Bribery Laws in Common Law Jurisdictions provides a comprehensive analysis of the foreign bribery laws, related laws, and regulations in all of the major common law jurisdictions. This book extensively addresses the official guidance associated with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the UK Bribery Act, along with the related legal obligations pertaining to record-keeping practices and maintaining adequate internal controls. Foreign bribery legislation in the major common law jurisdictions of Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and South Africa are also addressed. Stuart H. Deming directs careful attention to laws that may expose an individual or entity to private or commercial bribery in foreign settings, as well as to the application of laws relating to money laundering, accounting, and record-keeping practices to situations involving foreign bribery. Throughout, special attention is given to explaining the criteria used in each jurisdiction to establish liability on the part of an entity or organization.

This work presents the newest trends appearing in the field of Roman Law particularly devoted to the fault-based liability - culpa - that were addressed at the International Conference organised by the Faculty of Law and Administration of Warsaw University in February 2010. Articles written by Merola, Rampazzo and Tucillo touch the problem of culpa in the public law. The authors concentrated on the question of liability of public officers and their culpa or negligence during the performance of their duties. The social scope of culpa as the prerequisite for a censorial note has been presented by Tarwacka. Adamo addressed some important aspect of fault-related liability in criminal law dealing with the regulations of Theodosian Code. Private law side fault based-liability in contracts was presented by Benincasa and Kordasiewicz. They both analysed contracts used in maritime trade, the former regarding armature's partnership, the latter in the aspect of the transition from objective liability to the liability based on fault in the case of guarantee for the goods admitted by the sailor. Manni and Swiecicka devoted their studies to the delictual liability based on culpa. Finally, Alonso and Urbanik attempted to present culpa-liability in the light of papyrological sources, confronting Roman Law sources and documents of legal practice. These studies provide a wealth of information on the law of antiquity in the subject of liability based on fault, both in the aspect of private and public law.

Customary laws and traditional institutions in Africa constitute comprehensive legal systems that regulate the entire spectrum of activities from birth to death. Once the sole source of law, customary rules now exist in the context of pluralist legal systems with competing bodies of domestic constitutional law, statutory law, common law, and international human rights treaties. The Future of African Customary Law is intended to promote discussion and understanding of customary law and to explore its continued relevance in sub-Saharan Africa. This volume considers the characteristics of customary law and efforts to ascertain and codify customary law, and how this body of law differs in content, form, and status from legislation and common law. It also addresses a number of substantive areas of customary law including the role and power of traditional authorities; customary criminal law; customary land tenure, property rights, and intestate succession; and the relationship between customary law, human rights, and gender equality.

As Kent Greenwalt's second volume on aspects of legal interpretation, this book analyzes statutory and common law interpretation and compares the two. In respect to statutory interpretation, it first asks whether judges are "faithful agents" of the legislature or "independent cooperative partners." It concludes that the obvious answer is that neither simple categorization really fits-that the function of judges involves a combination of roles. The next issue addressed is whether the intent of those in authority matters for interpreting the kinds of instructions contained in statutes. At the general level, the answer is "yes." This answer follows even if one thinks interpretation should concentrate on the understanding of readers, because readers themselves would treat intentions as part of the relevant context of the language of statutes. It would take some special reasons, such as constitutional structure or unreliability, to discount actual intents of legislators and use of legislative history. The book argues that none of these special reasons are convincing. On the question whether judges should focus on the language of specific provision or overall purpose, both are relevant, and purpose should become more important as time passes. In an analysis of various other features of statutory interpretation, the book claims that presidential signing statements should not have weight, that subsequent legislative actions short of new statutes should only occasionally carry importance, that "canons of interpretation," such as the rule of lenity, can provide some, limited, guidance, and that there are special reasons for courts to adhere to precedents in statutory cases, but these should not yield any absolute rule. A chapter on administrative interpretation of statutes claims that the standards agencies apply should differ to a degree from those of courts and that judicial deference to those interpretations is ordinarily warranted. The book's second part, on common law interpretation, considers the force of precedents, resisting any simple dichotomy between holding and dictum. It also defends the use of reasoning by analogy, not only in the initial stages thinking about a problem, but also in respect to some final justifications for decisions. An examination of the place of rules, principles, and policies argues that all three are relevant in common law interpretation; and shows that common law interpretation is not reducible to any formula. A final chapter compares statutory and common law interpretation, similarities and differences, how each can affect the other, and the significance of having a legal system in which they both play prominent roles.

Nothing is more important in English land law than 'possession'. It is the foundation of all title, rights and remedies. But what exactly is it, and why does it still matter? This book, first published in 2006, is about the meaning, significance and practical effect of the concept of possession in contemporary land law. It explains the different meanings of possession, the relationship between possession and title, and the ways in which the common law and equity do, and do not, protect possession. The rights and remedies of freeholders, tenants and mortgage lenders, between themselves and against third parties, are all to some extent dependent on questions of status and possession. This book shows how. It is designed to provide an understanding of the basic principles for the student, and answers to difficult, real problems for the practitioner.

Any effort to understand how law works has to take seriously its main players - judges. Like any performance, judging should be evaluated by reference to those who are its best exponents. Not surprisingly, the debate about what makes a 'great judge' is as heated and inconclusive as the debate about the purpose and nature of law itself. History shows that those who are candidates for a judicial hall of fame are game changers who oblige us to rethink what it is to be a good judge. So the best of judges must tread a thin line between modesty and hubris; they must be neither mere umpires nor demigods. The eight judges showcased in this book demonstrate that, if the test of good judging is not about getting it right, but doing it well, then the measure of great judging is about setting new standards for what counts as judging well.

Political communities are defined - and often contested - through stories and storytelling. Scholars have long recognized that two foundational sets of stories - narratives of contact and narratives of arrival - helped to define settler societies. We are only beginning to understand how ongoing issues of migration and settlement are linked to issues of indigenous-settler contact. In Storied Communities, scholars from multiple disciplines disrupt the assumption in many works that indigenous and immigrant identities fall into two separate streams of analysis. The authors do not attempt to build a new master narrative - they instead juxtapose narratives of contact and arrival as they explore key themes: the nature and hazards of telling stories in the political realm; the literary, ceremonial, and identity-forming dimensions of the narrative form; actual narratives of contact and arrival in Canada, Australia, the Americas, New Zealand, and Europe; and the institutional and theoretical implications of foundation narratives and storytelling. In the process, they deepen our understanding of the role of narrative in community and nation building. By bringing to light the links between narratives of contact and narratives arrival, this innovative volume opens up new ways to imagine, sustain, and transform political communities.

Customary laws and traditional institutions in Africa constitute comprehensive legal systems that regulate the entire spectrum of activities from birth to death. Once the sole source of law, customary rules now exist in the context of pluralist legal systems with competing bodies of domestic constitutional law, statutory law, common law, and international human rights treaties. The Future of African Customary Law is intended to promote discussion and understanding of customary law and to explore its continued relevance in sub-Saharan Africa. This volume considers the characteristics of customary law and efforts to ascertain and codify customary law, and how this body of law differs in content, form, and status from legislation and common law. It also addresses a number of substantive areas of customary law including the role and power of traditional authorities; customary criminal law; customary land tenure, property rights, and intestate succession; and the relationship between customary law, human rights, and gender equality.

This book makes the important but surprisingly under-explored argument that modern international law was built on the foundations of Roman law and Roman imperial practice. A pivotal figure in this enterprise was the Italian Protestant Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), the great Oxford Roman law scholar and advocate, whose books and legal opinions on law, war, empire, embassies and maritime issues framed the emerging structure of inter-state relations in terms of legal rights and remedies drawn from Roman law and built on Roman and scholastic theories of just war and imperial justice. The distinguished group of contributors examine the theory and practice of justice and law in Roman imperial wars and administration; Gentili's use of Roman materials; the influence on Gentili of Vitoria and Bodin and his impact on Grotius and Hobbes; and the ideas and influence of Gentili and other major thinkers from the 16th to the 18th centuries on issues such as preventive self-defence, punishment, piracy, Europe's political and mercantile relations with the Ottoman Empire, commerce and trade, European and colonial wars and peace settlements, reason of state, justice, and the relations between natural law and observed practice in providing a normative and operational basis for international relations and what became international law. This book explores ways in which both the theory and the practice of international politics was framed in ways that built on these Roman private law and public law foundations, including concepts of rights. This history of ideas has continuing importance as European ideas of international law and empire have become global, partly accepted and partly contested elsewhere in the world.

Jolowicz's classic work traces the development of Roman Law historically from the earliest times until the age of Justinian. Private Law is treated at some length for the republican period, but for imperial times the emphasis is on constitutional law and the sources of law, together with the procedure and structure of the judicial system. There are also chapters on social conditions and on the general characteristics of classical and post-classical law.

This appealing text for the Law and Economics course features: An engaging approach that stresses student comprehension Numerous cases based on court decisions Extensive coverage of important and timely topics such as the Coase theorem, intellectual property, and behavioral economics Law and Economics in Action boxes that heighten student interest Short chapters to allow maximum flexibility for the instructor

How should a judge's moral convictions bear on his judgments about what the law is? Lawyers, sociologists, philosophers, politicians, and judges all have answers to that question: these range from "nothing" to "everything." In Justice in Robes, Ronald Dworkin argues that the question is much more complex than it has often been taken to be and charts a variety of dimensions-semantic, jurisprudential, and doctrinal-in which law and morals are undoubtedly interwoven. He restates and summarizes his own widely discussed account of these connections, which emphasizes the sovereign importance of moral principle in legal and constitutional interpretation, and then reviews and criticizes the most influential rival theories to his own. He argues that pragmatism is empty as a theory of law, that value pluralism misunderstands the nature of moral concepts, that constitutional originalism reflects an impoverished view of the role of a constitution in a democratic society, and that contemporary legal positivism is based on a mistaken semantic theory and an erroneous account of the nature of authority. In the course of that critical study he discusses the work of many of the most influential lawyers and philosophers of the era, including Isaiah Berlin, Richard Posner, Cass Sunstein, Antonin Scalia, and Joseph Raz. Dworkin's new collection of essays and original chapters is a model of lucid, logical, and impassioned reasoning that will advance the crucially important debate about the roles of justice in law.

This book surveys and analyzes Twelver Shiite relations with the Sunni legal establishment, comprising the four recognized Sunni legal schools, which the author defines as "Islamic Legal Orthdoxy.

What is objectivity? What is the rule of law? Are the operations of legal systems objective? If so, in what ways and to what degrees are they objective? Does anything of importance depend on the objectivity of law? These are some of the principal questions addressed by Matthew H. Kramer in this lucid and wide-ranging study that introduces readers to vital areas of philosophical enquiry. As Kramer shows, objectivity and the rule of law are complicated phenomena, each comprising a number of distinct though overlapping dimensions. Although the connections between objectivity and the rule of law are intimate, they are also densely multi-faceted.

Economic Principles of Law, first published in 2007, applies economics to the doctrines, rules and remedies of the common law. In plain English and using non-technical analysis, it offers an introduction and exposition of the 'economic approach' to law - one of the most exciting and vibrant fields of legal scholarship and applied economics. Beginning with a brief history of the field, it sets out the basic economic concepts useful to lawyers, and applies these to assess the core areas of the common law - property, contract, tort and crime - with particular emphasis on their doctrinal structure and remedies. This is done using leading cases drawn from the birthplace of the common law (England & Wales) and other common law jurisdictions. The book serves as a primer to the wider use of economics which has become increasingly important for law students, lawyers, legislators, regulators and those concerned with our legal system generally.

The concept of common law has been one of the most important conceptual instruments of the western legal tradition, but it has been neglected by legal theory and legal history for the last two centuries. There were many common laws in Europe, including what is known in English as the common law, yet they have never previously been studied as a general phenomenon. Until the nineteenth century, the common laws of Europe lived in constant interaction with the particular laws which prevailed in their territories, and with one another. Common law was the main instrument of conciliation of laws which were drawn from different sources, though applicable on a given territory. Claims of universality could be, and were, reconciled with claims of particularity. Nineteenth and twentieth century legal theory taught that law was the exclusive product of the state, yet common laws continued to function on a world-wide basis throughout the entire period of legal nationalism. As national legal exclusivity is increasingly challenged by the process of globalization, the concept of common law can be looked to once again as a means of conceptualisation and justification of law beyond the state, while still supporting state and other local forms of normativity.

This major addition to Ideas in Context examines the development of natural law theories in the early stages of the Enlightenment in Germany and France. T. J. Hochstrasser investigates the influence exercised by theories of natural law from Grotius to Kant, with a comparative analysis of the important intellectual innovations in ethics and political philosophy of the time. Hochstrasser includes the writings of Samuel Pufendorf and his followers who evolved a natural law theory based on human sociability and reason, fostering a new methodology in German philosophy. This book assesses the first histories of political thought since ancient times, giving insights into the nature and influence of debate within eighteenth-century natural jurisprudence. Ambitious in range and conceptually sophisticated, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment will be of great interest to scholars in history, political thought, law and philosophy.

Why do appellate courts always have an odd number of judges? And what does the answer tell us about changing concepts of law? How can common law be unconstitutional? Why does the power of judges depend on accurate court reporting?

Because legal education today has come to focus so much on teaching students "how to think like lawyers," some subjects do not fit comfortably in law school curricula. John Orth, a distinguished senior law scholar, here explores some of these neglected but important topics. His insightful volume invites students of the law to look at the origins of accepted legal practices as a means of gaining insight into the judicial role and the evolution of common law.

In six carefully reasoned and clearly argued articles-four never before published--Orth presents the familiar in a fresh light. He considers, in addition to the questions already mentioned, how the centuries-old common law tradition interacts with statutory law-making, why claims that individual rights are grounded in common law are suspect, and how the common law uses what it learns about the past.

In considering these questions related to common law and its remarkable longevity, Orth illuminates both its interaction with written constitutions and its longstanding preoccupation with procedure and property. And by questioning the assertion that individualism was the cornerstone of common law, he deftly resolves an objection that liberal scholars sometimes raise concerning common law--its connection to the Lochner era of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Together, these essays show that common law is constantly in motion, using and reusing techniques that have kept it viable for centuries.

How many judges does it take to make a supreme court? As Orth observes, the institutional novelty of odd numbers of judges provided a means to break ties but did nothing to guarantee acceptance of their decisions. By demonstrating that what seems obvious about the law today was not always so, he cogently addresses changing perceptions of law and invites its future practitioners not only to think like lawyers but also to be more fully grounded in the law.

We think of law as rules whose words are binding, used by the courts in the adjudication of disputes. Bernard S. Jackson explains that early biblical law was significantly different, and that many of the laws in the Covenant Code in Exodus should be viewed as "wisdom-laws." By this term, he means "self-executing" rules, the provisions of which permit their application without recourse to the law-courts or similar institutions. They thus conform to two tenets of the "wisdom tradition": that judicial dispute should be avoided, and that the law is a type of teaching, or "wisdom."

The past 20 years have seen unparalleled advances in neurobiology, with findings from neuroscience being used to shed light on a range of human activities - many historically the province of those in the humanities and social sciences - aesthetics, emotion, consciousness, music. Applying this new knowledge to law seems a natural development - the making, considering, and enforcing of law of course rests on mental processes. However, where some of those activities can be studied with a certain amount of academic detachment, what we discover about the brain has considerable implications for how we consider and judge those who follow or indeed flout the law - with inevitable social and political consequences. There are real issues that the legal system will face as neurobiological studies continue to relentlessly probe the human mind - the motives for our actions, our decision making processes, and such issues as free will and responsibility. This volume represents a first serious attempt to address questions of law as reflecting brain activity, emphasizing that it is the organization and functioning of the brain that determines how we enact and obey laws. It applies the most recent developments in brain science to debates over criminal responsibility, cooperation and punishment, deception, moral and legal judgment, property, evolutionary psychology, law and economics, and decision-making by judges and juries. Written and edited by leading specialists from a range of disciplines, the book presents a groundbreaking and challenging new look at human behaviour.