After 27 years of conflict it seemed that peace would finally settle on the Indochina peninsula on 27January 1973 with the signing of a peace accord in Paris. The North Vietnamese had previously launched their greatest offensive against South Vietnam but fell short of their objectives, the destruction of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and the destruction of the Saigon regime. They now proposed, in exchange for the release of the US prisoners of war, the withdrawal of the remaining American forces in Vietnam. Far from feeling committed by the agreement, the Hanoi leadership prepared the next round, the ultimate conquest of South Vietnam now that Washington had completely evacuated its last troops from the country. That first volume sets the scene, by making an assessment of the situation on the field, in both tactical and strategic perspectives. It also examines the last episode of the US gradual withdrawal as well as the implementation of part of the Peace Accords with the removal by the US Navy of the mines sown by its aircraft from the North Vietnamese ports and inland waters. It then presents the respective opposing armed forces and will particularly focus on the North Vietnamese rebuilding after the havoc wrought by the American aerial campaign of 1972. Furthermore, the expansion of the famous Ho Chi Minh Trail, vital for the logistical support of the communist troops, is thoroughly detailed. The South Vietnamese on their part placed great emphasis on developing their own air force in order to try to replace the withdrawal of American airpower. Most at all, it also details the initial fighting that not only resumed but soon escalated into divisional-level battles where the South Vietnamese still prevailed.

There was another war in Vietnam, one that generally didn't make the headlines: the campaign to "win the hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese people. Fought not with artillery and helicopters but with food, medicine and shelter for civilians devastated by the conflict, the effort was unprecedented in U.S. history, involving both military and civilian personnel working together in far-flung areas of the countryside. Part history, part memoir, this book chronicles an overlooked aspect of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, with a focus on the war victims and refugees most tragically affected by the carnage. The author recounts his two years "in-country" as an aid worker and describes how the humanitarian effort was conducted and why it failed.

Harry S. Truman Book Award In The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning, one of our most distinguished military historians argued that the conflict on the Korean peninsula in the middle of the twentieth century was first and foremost a war between Koreans that began in 1948. In the second volume of a monumental trilogy, Allan R. Millett now shifts his focus to the twelve-month period from North Korea's invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950, through the end of June 1951-the most active phase of the internationalized "Korean War." Moving deftly between the battlefield and the halls of power, Millett weaves together military operations and tactics without losing sight of Cold War geopolitics, strategy, and civil-military relations. Filled with new insights on the conflict, his book is the first to give combined arms its due, looking at the contributions and challenges of integrating naval and air power with the ground forces of United Nations Command and showing the importance of Korean support services. He also provides the most complete, and sympathetic, account of the role of South Korea's armed forces, drawing heavily on ROK and Korea Military Advisory Group sources. Millett integrates non-American perspectives into the narrative-especially those of Mao Zedong, Chinese military commander Peng Dehuai, Josef Stalin, Kim Il-sung, and Syngman Rhee. And he portrays Walton Walker and Matthew Ridgway as the heroes of Korea, both of whom had a more profound understanding of the situation than Douglas MacArthur, whose greatest flaw was not his politics but his strategic and operational incompetence. Researched in South Korean, Chinese, and Soviet as well as American and UN sources, Millett has exploited previously ignored or neglected oral history collections-including interviews with American and South Korean officers-and has made extensive use of reports based on interrogations of North Korean and Chinese POWs. The end result is masterful work that provides both a gripping narrative and a greater understanding of this key conflict in international and American history.