Warlords are charismatic military leaders who exploit weak central authorities in order to gain control of sub-national areas. Notwithstanding their bad reputation, warlords have often participated in state formation. In Empires of Mud Giustozzi analyses the dynamics of warlordism in Afghanistan within the context of such debates. He approaches this complex task by first analysing aspects of the Afghan environment that might have been conductive to the fragmentation of central authority and the emergence of warlords and then accounts for the emergence of warlordism in the 1980s and subsequently. He accounts for the phenomenon from the 1980s to today, considering Afghanistan's two foremost warlords, Ismail Khan and Abdul Rashid Dostum, and their political, economic, and military systems of rule. Despite the intervention of Allied forces in 2001, both of these leaders continue to wield considerable power. The author also discusses Ahmad Shah Massoud, whose 'system' incorporated elements of rule not dissimilar from that of the warlords. Giustozzi reveals common themes in the emergence of warlordism, particularly the role of local military leaders and their gradual acquisition of 'class consciousness,' which over time evolves into a more sophisticated, state-like, or political party-like, structure.

There is a widespread belief that the Taliban and al-Qaeda are in many respects synonymous, that their ideology and objectives are closely intertwined and that they have made common cause against the West for decades. Such opinions have been stridently supported by politicians, media pundits and senior military figures, yet they have hardly ever been scrutinised. This is all the more surprising given that the West's present entanglement in Afghanistan is commonly predicated on the need to defeat the Taliban in order to forestall further terrorist attacks worldwide. The relationship between the two groups and the individuals who established them is undeniably complex, and has remained so for many years. Links between the Taliban and al-Qaeda were retained in the face of a shared enemy following the invasion of Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks, an adversary that was selected by al-Qaeda rather than by the Taliban, and which led the latter to become entangled in a war that was not of its choosing. This book is the first to examine in detail the relationship from the Taliban's perspective based on Arabic, Dari and Pashtu sources, drawing on the authors' many years experience in southern Afghanistan, the Taliban's heartland. They also interviewed Taliban decision-makers, field commanders and ordinary fighters while immersing themselves in Kandahar's society. Van Linschoten and Kuehn's forensic examination of the evolution of the two groups allows the background and historical context that informed their respective ideologies to come to the fore. The story of those individuals who were to become their key decision-makers, and the relationships among all those involved, from the mid-1990s onwards, reveal how complex the interactions were between the Taliban and al-Qaeda and how they frequently diverged rather than converged. An Enemy We Created concludes that there is room to engage the Taliban on the issues of renouncing al-Qaeda and guaranteeing that Afghanistan will deny sanctuary to international terrorists. Yet the insurgency is changing, and it could soon be too late to find a political solution. The authors contend that certain aspects of the campaign, especially night raids and attempts to fragment and decapitate the Taliban, are transforming the resistance, creating more opportunities for al-Qaeda and helping it to attain its goals.

The Western-led efforts to establish a new post-Taliban order in Afghanistan are in serious trouble, and in this book Suhrke sets out to explain why. She begins with the dynamic of the intervention and its related peace-building mission. What were the forces shaping this grand international project? What explains the apparent systemic bias towards a deeper and broader international involvement? Many reasons have been cited for its limited achievements and ever-growing difficulties, the most common explanation being that the national, regional, and international contexts were unfavourable. But many policies were misguided while the multinational operation itself was extraordinarily and unnecessarily complex. Astri Suhrke's main thesis is that the international project itself contains serious tensions and contradictions that significantly contributed to the lack of progress. As a result, the deepening involvement proved dysfunctional: massive international support has created an extreme version of a rentier state that is predictably weak, corrupt and unaccountable; US-led military operations undercut the peacebuilding agenda, and more international aid and monitoring to correct the problems generate Afghan resentment and evasion. Continuing these policies will only reinforce the dynamic. The alternative is a less intrusive international presence, a longer time-frame for reconstruction and change, and negotiations with the militants that can end the war and permit a more Afghan-directed order to emerge.

When the tyrannical Saddam Hussein was captured in 2003, the war in Iraq was in a precarious position. A provisional government had been assembled, but the Iraqi government was not yet recognized as sovereign. They were now expected to put their most infamous citizen on trial for war crimes. Called into duty at this moment was Rear Admiral Greg Slavonic, who was tasked with facilitating U.S. media presence at the arraignment which would establish the judicial framework for future tribunals. Admiral Slavonic was party to the historic US-Iraqi Transfer of Sovereignty and then as the senior military officer in the Iraqi courtroom where he was one of fifteen individuals to witness the historic event. As the senior military officer in the room with fifteen other observers, he managed a challenging pool of media jockeying for access for this once in a career story and plus served as advisor to the Iraqi judge on various media issues. Slavonic's first-hand narrative of a unique moment in military history features never-before-seen transcripts of Saddam Hussein's trial. For the first time, readers can read how Saddam responded to his charges, along with eleven of Hussein's closest advisors and cabinet members who were arraigned that day, and several charged with war "crimes against humanity". This would be the last time all twelve men would be together again who were responsible for the deaths of over several million fellow Iraqi citizens. This book expands our examination of difficult wars and chronicles the legal reckoning and downfall of a tyrant.

The Mysteries of Haditha is a war story unlike any other. This riveting and hilarious memoir of M. C. Armstrong's journey into the Iraq War as an embedded journalist pulls no punches and lifts the veil on the lies we tell each other-and the ones we tell ourselves. This is a story about both the strong women in Armstrong's life and his road to true manhood. Armstrong's family was nearly ripped at the seams as he struggled to secure his embed with Navy SEALs in the Al Anbar Province in 2008. Armstrong's searingly honest narrative about his relationship with his father, his fiance, and his friend in the SEAL team takes the reader on a nosedive ride from a historically black college in the American South straight into Baghdad, the burn pits, and the desert beyond the mysterious Haditha dam. Honest and vulnerable, tender but fearless, The Mysteries of Haditha is an incredible coming-of-age story and a unique glimpse into the world of the war on terror.