|
Books > History > Asian / Middle Eastern history > From 1900
A former senior mujahidin figure and an ex-counter-terrorism
analyst cooperating to write a book on the history and legacy of
Arab-Afghan fighters in Afghanistan is a remarkable and improbable
undertaking. Yet this is what Mustafa Hamid, aka Abu Walid
al-Masri, and Leah Farrall have achieved with the publication of
their ground-breaking work. The result of thousands of hours of
discussions over several years, The Arabs at War in Afghanistan
offers significant new insights into the history of many of today's
militant Salafi groups and movements. By revealing the real origins
of the Taliban and al-Qaeda and the jostling among the various
jihadi groups, this account not only challenges conventional
wisdom, but also raises uncomfortable questions as to how events
from this important period have been so badly misconstrued.
On 11th September 2006 - exactly five years after the attacks on
the Twin Towers - a modern day Rorke's Drift was played out in the
town of Garmsir, known as the Taliban gateway to Helmand Province.
40-year-old Capt. Doug Beattie of the 1stBattalion Royal Irish
Regiment was charged with the mission to help retake Garmsir from
the Taliban. His commanders said it would take two days; it
actually took two weeks of exhausting, bloody conflict in which at
times he would be one of only a small unit up against a ferocious
enemy in impossible conditions.For his repeated bravery Doug
Beattie was decorated with the Military Cross. AN ORDINARY SOLDIER
offers an extraordinary insight into the mission in Afghanistan
and, crucially, the relationship between British troops and the
Afghans they serve alongside. Above all, it's Beattie's personal
story of being what he modestly calls 'an ordinary soldier' -
someone who balances being a loving father and husband with that of
fighting in the world's most hostile place. It demands to be read.
A "better war." Over the last two decades, this term has become
synonymous with US strategy during the Vietnam War's final years.
The narrative is enticingly simple, appealing to many audiences.
After the disastrous results of the 1968 Tet offensive, in which
Hanoi's forces demonstrated the failures of American strategy,
popular history tells of a new American military commander who
emerged in South Vietnam and with inspired leadership and a new
approach turned around a long stalemated conflict. In fact, so
successful was General Creighton Abrams in commanding US forces
that, according to the "better war" myth, the United States had
actually achieved victory by mid-1970. A new general with a new
strategy had delivered, only to see his victory abandoned by
weak-kneed politicians in Washington, DC who turned their backs on
the US armed forces and their South Vietnamese allies. In a bold
new interpretation of America's final years in Vietnam, acclaimed
historian Gregory A. Daddis disproves these longstanding myths.
Withdrawal is a groundbreaking reassessment that tells a far
different story of the Vietnam War. Daddis convincingly argues that
the entire US effort in South Vietnam was incapable of reversing
the downward trends of a complicated Vietnamese conflict that by
1968 had turned into a political-military stalemate. Despite a new
articulation of strategy, Abrams's approach could not materially
alter a war no longer vital to US national security or global
dominance. Once the Nixon White House made the political decision
to withdraw from Southeast Asia, Abrams's military strategy was
unable to change either the course or outcome of a decades' long
Vietnamese civil war. In a riveting sequel to his celebrated
Westmoreland's War, Daddis demonstrates he is one of the nation's
leading scholars on the Vietnam War. Withdrawal will be a standard
work for years to come.
Marigold presents the first rigorously documented, in-depth story
of one of the Vietnam War's last great mysteries: the secret peace
initiative, codenamed "Marigold," that sought to end the war in
1966. The initiative failed, the war dragged on for another seven
years, and this episode sank into history as an unresolved
controversy. Antiwar critics claimed President Johnson had bungled
(or, worse, deliberately sabotaged) a breakthrough by bombing Hanoi
on the eve of a planned secret U.S.-North Vietnamese encounter in
Poland. Yet, LBJ and top aides angrily insisted that Poland never
had authority to arrange direct talks and Hanoi was not ready to
negotiate. This book uses new evidence from long hidden communist
sources to show that, in fact, Poland was authorized by Hanoi to
open direct contacts and that Hanoi had committed to entering talks
with Washington. It reveals LBJ's personal role in bombing Hanoi as
he utterly disregarded the pleas of both the Polish and his own
senior advisors. The historical implications of missing this
opportunity are immense: Marigold might have ended the war years
earlier, saving thousands of lives, and dramatically changed U.S.
political history.
The defeat of South Vietnam was arguably America's worst foreign
policy disaster of the 20th Century. Yet a complete understanding
of the endgame--from the 27 January 1973 signing of the Paris Peace
Accords to South Vietnam's surrender on 30 April 1975--has eluded
us. Black April addresses that deficit. A culmination of exhaustive
research in three distinct areas: primary source documents from
American archives, North Vietnamese publications containing primary
and secondary source material, and dozens of articles and numerous
interviews with key South Vietnamese participants, this book
represents one of the largest Vietnamese translation projects ever
accomplished, including almost one hundred rarely or never seen
before North Vietnamese unit histories, battle studies, and
memoirs. Most important, to celebrate the 30th Anniversary of South
Vietnam's conquest, the leaders in Hanoi released several
compendiums of formerly highly classified cables and memorandum
between the Politburo and its military commanders in the south.
This treasure trove of primary source materials provides the most
complete insight into North Vietnamese decision-making ever
complied. While South Vietnamese deliberations remain less clear,
enough material exists to provide a decent overview. Ultimately,
whatever errors occurred on the American and South Vietnamese side,
the simple fact remains that the country was conquered by a North
Vietnamese military invasion despite written pledges by Hanoi's
leadership against such action. Hanoi's momentous choice to destroy
the Paris Peace Accords and militarily end the war sent a
generation of South Vietnamese into exile, and exacerbated a
societal trauma in America over our long Vietnam involvement that
reverberates to this day. How that transpired deserves deeper
scrutiny.
A groundbreaking look at how the interrogation rooms of the Korean
War set the stage for a new kind of battle-not over land but over
human subjects Traditional histories of the Korean War have long
focused on violations of the thirty-eighth parallel, the line drawn
by American and Soviet officials in 1945 dividing the Korean
peninsula. But The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War presents
an entirely new narrative, shifting the perspective from the
boundaries of the battlefield to inside the interrogation room.
Upending conventional notions of what we think of as geographies of
military conflict, Monica Kim demonstrates how the Korean War
evolved from a fight over territory to one over human interiority
and the individual human subject, forging the template for the US
wars of intervention that would predominate during the latter half
of the twentieth century and beyond. Kim looks at how, during the
armistice negotiations, the United States and their allies proposed
a new kind of interrogation room: one in which POWs could exercise
their "free will" and choose which country they would go to after
the ceasefire. The global controversy that erupted exposed how
interrogation rooms had become a flashpoint for the struggles
between the ambitions of empire and the demands for decolonization,
as the aim of interrogation was to produce subjects who attested to
a nation's right to govern. The complex web of interrogators and
prisoners-Japanese-American interrogators, Indian military
personnel, Korean POWs and interrogators, and American POWs-that
Kim uncovers contradicts the simple story in US popular memory of
"brainwashing" during the Korean War. Bringing together a vast
range of sources that track two generations of people moving
between three continents, The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War
delves into an essential yet overlooked aspect of modern warfare in
the twentieth century.
Professor Havens analyzes the efforts of Japanese antiwar
organizations to portray the war as much more than a fire across
the sea" and to create new forms of activism in a country where
individuals have traditionally left public issues to the
authorities. This path-breaking study examines not only the methods
of the protesters but the tightrope dance performed by Japanese
officials forced to balance outspoken antiwar sentiment with treaty
obligations to the U.S.
Originally published in 1987.
The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand
technology to again make available previously out-of-print books
from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press.
These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these
important books while presenting them in durable paperback
editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly
increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the
thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since
its founding in 1905.
The bombing campaign that was meant to keep South Vietnam secure,
Rolling Thunder became a byword for pointless, ineffective
brutality, and was a key factor in America's Vietnam defeat. But in
its failures, Rolling Thunder was one of the most influential air
campaigns of the Cold War. It spurred a renaissance in US air power
and the development of an excellent new generation of US combat
aircraft, and it was still closely studied by the planners of the
devastatingly successful Gulf War air campaign. Dr Richard P.
Hallion, a vastly knowledgeable air power expert at the Pentagon,
explains in this fully illustrated study how the might of the US
air forces was crippled by inadequate strategic thinking, poor
pilot training, ill-suited aircraft and political interference.
The southernmost region of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
encompassed the vast Mekong River Delta, and area covering 10,190
square miles. Three major rivers run through the Delta, the Song
Hou Giang (aka Bassac) and the Song Mekong, which broke into three
large rivers (Song My Tho, Ham Luong, and Go Chien). The Nhon Trach
delineated the Delta's eastern edge. In all there were some 1,500
miles of natural navigable waterways and 2,500 miles of man-made
canals and channels. The canal system was begun in 800 AD and its
expansion continued up to World War II. The nation's capital,
Saigon, lies on the Delta's northern edge. Few roads and highways
served the region with sampans and other small watercraft via the
canals being the main means of transportation.
At least 70,000 Viet Cong (VC) were scattered over the area
controlling up to a quarter of the population. Three Army of the
Republic Vietnam (ARVN) divisions as well as various paramilitary
forces battled the VC in the marshes, forests, and paddies. In 1965
the military situation in the Delta had deteriorated and the
decision was taken to shore things up by committing a joint Army
and Navy Mobile Riverine Force. This force was unique in its
composition, mission, and the special craft in which it operated.
The Army component was the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division; the
Navy component was River Assault Flotilla One. The various
watercraft assigned to the Mobile Riverine Force are the subject of
this book. These included much-modified landing craft,
purpose-built patrol boats including Swift Boats and Monitors, and
a variety of auxiliary and support vessels. Task Force CLEARWATER,
a much smaller operation in the extremenorthern portion of South
Vietnam, also used these craft.
After World War II, the escalating tensions of the Cold War shaped
the international system. Fearing the Worst explains how the Korean
War fundamentally changed postwar competition between the United
States and the Soviet Union into a militarized confrontation that
would last decades. Samuel F. Wells Jr. examines how military and
political events interacted to escalate the conflict. Decisions
made by the Truman administration in the first six months of the
Korean War drove both superpowers to intensify their defense
buildup. American leaders feared the worst-case scenario-that
Stalin was prepared to start World War III-and raced to build up
strategic arms, resulting in a struggle they did not seek out or
intend. Their decisions stemmed from incomplete interpretations of
Soviet and Chinese goals, especially the belief that China was a
Kremlin puppet. Yet Stalin, Mao, and Kim Il-sung all had their own
agendas, about which the United States lacked reliable
intelligence. Drawing on newly available documents and
memoirs-including previously restricted archives in Russia, China,
and North Korea-Wells analyzes the key decision points that changed
the course of the war. He also provides vivid profiles of the
central actors as well as important but lesser known figures.
Bringing together studies of military policy and diplomacy with the
roles of technology, intelligence, and domestic politics in each of
the principal nations, Fearing the Worst offers a new account of
the Korean War and its lasting legacy.
The leader of one of the most successful U. S. Marine long range
reconnaissance teams during the Vietnam War, Andrew Finlayson
recounts his team's experiences in the pivotal period in the war,
the year leading up to the Tet Offensive of 1968. Using primary
sources, such as Marine Corps unit histories and his own weekly
letters home, he presents a highly personal account of the
dangerous missions conducted by this team of young Marines as they
searched for North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong units in such
dangerous locales as Elephant Valley, the Enchanted Forest, Charlie
Ridge, Happy Valley and the Que Son Mountains. Taking only six to
eight men on each patrol, Killer Kane searches for the enemy far
from friendly lines, often finding itself engaged in desperate fire
fights with enemy forces that vastly outnumber this small band of
brave Marines. In numerous close contacts with the enemy, Killer
Kane fights for its survival against desperate odds, narrowly
escaping death time and again. The book gives vivid descriptions of
the life of recon Marines when they are not on patrol, the beauty
of the landscape they traverse, and several of the author's
Vietnamese friends. It also explains in detail the preparations
for, and the conduct of, a successful long range reconnaissance
patrol.
Moving from the White House to the B-52 cockpits to the missile
sites and POW camps of Hanoi, "The Eleven Days of Christmas" is a
gripping tale of heroism and incompetence in a battle whose
political and military legacy is still a matter of controversy.
With words and photographs, Rain in Our Hearts takes readers into
Alpha Company, 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry, 196th LIB, Americal
Division in 1969-1970. Jim Logue, a professional photographer, was
drafted and served as an infantryman; he also carried a camera. "In
order to take my mind off the war," he would say, "I took
pictures." Logue's photos showcase the daily lives of infantrymen:
setting up a night laager, chatting with local children, making
supply drops, and "humping" rucksacks miles each day in search of
the enemy. His camera records the individual experiences and daily
lives of the men who fought the war. Accompanying Logue's over 100
photographs is the narrative written by Gary D. Ford. Wanting to
reconstruct the story of Alpha Company during the time in which
Logue served, Ford and Logue trekked across America to meet with
and interview every surviving member whom they could locate and
contact. Each chapter of Rain in Our Hearts focuses on the
viewpoint and life of one member of Alpha Company, including
aspects of life before and after Vietnam. The story of the
Company's movements and missions over the year unfold as readers
are introduced to one soldier at a time. Taken together, Rain in
Our Hearts offers readers a window into the words and sights of
Alpha Company's Vietnam War.
Deborah L. Jaramillo investigates cable news' presentation of
the Iraq War in relation to "high concept" filmmaking. High concept
films can be reduced to single-sentence summaries and feature
pre-sold elements; they were considered financially safe projects
that would sustain consumer interest beyond their initial
theatrical run. Using high concept as a framework for the analysis
of the 2003 coverage of the Iraq War paying close attention to how
Fox News and CNN packaged and promoted the U.S. invasion of Iraq
Ugly War, Pretty Package offers a new paradigm for understanding
how television news reporting shapes our perceptions of
events."
|
|