John Locke's complex masterpiece, "An Essay of Human Understanding," was a sustained attack on the dogmatism of the day and the last great work of philosophical realism before the onset of idealism. One of the most influential books in the history of thought, it is the most renowned work of the great English philosopher. Originally published in two volumes, this one-volume edition of "Locke" examines the historical meaning and philosophical significance of this work through careful explanations of the context of debate to which it was a decisive contribution. The first volume of this comprehensive work focuses on Locke's "Essay" from the epistemological side, and the second turns to the concepts of Locke's ontology--substance, mode, essence, law, and identity.

Shows how Hegel gradually discovers philosophy and the necessiy of personal commitment as a philosopher.

This book reconstructs key aspects of the early career of Descartes from 1618 to 1633; that is, up through the point of his composing his first system of natural philosophy, "Le Monde, " in 1629-33. It focuses upon the overlapping and intertwined development of Descartes projects in physico-mathematics, analytical mathematics, universal method, and, finally, systematic corpuscular-mechanical natural philosophy. The concern is not simply with the conceptual and technical aspects of these projects; but, with Descartes agendas within them and his construction and presentation of his intellectual identity in relation to them.

Descartes technical projects, agendas and senses of identity shifted over time, entangled and displayed great successes and deep failures, as he morphed from a mathematically competent, Jesuit trained graduate in neo-Scholastic Aristotelianism to aspiring prophet of a systematised corpuscular-mechanism, passing through stages of being a committed "physico-mathematicus," advocate of a putative universal mathematics, and projector of a grand methodological dream. In all three dimensions projects, agendas and identity concerns the young Descartes struggled and contended, with himself and with real or virtual peers and competitors, hence the title "Descartes-Agonistes" .

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Adam Smith (1723-90) is well known as the author of The Wealth of Nations and as a champion of free enterprise but he also wrote on moral philosophy and lectured on rhetoric and jurisprudence. This collection reveals a new portrait of the well known economist, not as a simple-minded champion of free trade but as an interdisciplinary social scientist with a moral philosophy for the modern world. His legacy should not be restricted to economics and to the English-speaking world.

Kant's views about mathematics were controversial in his own time, and they have inspired or infuriated thinkers ever since. Though specific Kantian doctrines fell into disrepute earlier in this century, the past twenty-five years have seen a surge of interest in and respect for Kant's philosophy of mathematics among both Kant scholars and philosophers of mathematics. The present volume includes the classic papers from the 1960s and 1970s which spared this renaissance of interest, together with updated postscripts by their authors. It also includes the most important recent work on Kant's philosophy of mathematics. The essays bring to bear a wealth of detailed Kantian scholarship, together with powerful new interpretative tools drawn from modern mathematics, logic and philosophy. The cumulative effect of this collection upon the reader will be a deeper understanding of the centrality of mathematics in all aspects of Kant's thought and a renewed respect for the power of Kant's thinking about mathematics. The essays contained in this volume will set the agenda for further work on Kant's philosophy of mathematics for some time to come.

New materialism challenges the mechanistic models characteristic of early modern philosophy that regarded matter as largely passive and inert. Instead it gives weight to topics often overlooked in such accounts: agency, vitalism, complexity, contingency, and self-organization. This collection, which includes an international roster of contributors from philosophy, history, literature, and science, is the first to ask what is "new" about the new materialism and place it in interdisciplinary perspective. Against current theories of new materialism it argues for a deeper engagement with materialism's history, questions whether matter can be "lively," and asks whether new materialism's wish to revitalize politics and the political lives up to its promise. Contributors: Keith Ansell-Pearson, Sarah Ellenzweig, Christian J. Emden, N. Katherine Hayles, Jess Keiser, Mogens Laerke, Ian Lowrie, Lenny Moss, Angela Willey, Catherine Wilson, Charles T. Wolfe, Derek Woods, and John H. Zammito.

Embodiment-defined as having, being in, or being associated with a body-is a feature of the existence of many entities, perhaps even of all entities. Why entities should find themselves in this condition is the central concern of the present volume. The problem includes, but also goes beyond, the philosophical problem of body: that is, what the essence of a body is, and how, if at all, it differs from matter. On some understandings there may exist bodies, such as stones or asteroids, that are not the bodies of any particular subjects. To speak of embodiment by contrast is always to speak of a subject that variously inhabits, or captains, or is coextensive with, or even is imprisoned within, a body. The subject may in the end be identical to, or an emergent product of, the body. That is, a materialist account of embodied subjects may be the correct one. But insofar as there is a philosophical problem of embodiment, the identity of the embodied subject with the body stands in need of an argument and cannot simply be assumed. The reasons, nature, and consequences of the embodiment of subjects as conceived in the long history of philosophy in Europe as well as in the broader Mediterranean region and in South and East Asia, with forays into religion, art, medicine, and other domains of culture, form the focus of these essays. More precisely, the contributors to this volume shine light on a number of questions that have driven reflection on embodiment throughout the history of philosophy. What is the historical and conceptual relationship between the idea of embodiment and the idea of subjecthood? Am I who I am principally in virtue of the fact that I have the body I have? Relatedly, what is the relationship of embodiment to being and to individuality? Is embodiment a necessary condition of being? Of being an individual? What are the theological dimensions of embodiment? To what extent has the concept of embodiment been deployed in the history of philosophy to contrast the created world with the state of existence enjoyed by God? What are the normative dimensions of theories of embodiment? To what extent is the problem of embodiment a distinctly western preoccupation? Is it the result of a particular local and contingent history, or does it impose itself as a universal problem, wherever and whenever human beings begin to reflect on the conditions of their existence? Ultimately, to what extent can natural science help us to resolve philosophical questions about embodiment, many of which are vastly older than the particular scientific research programs we now believe to hold the greatest promise for revealing to us the bodily basis, or the ultimate physical causes, of who we really are?

Kant claimed that the principal topics of philosophy all converge on one question: "Was ist der Mensch?" Starting with the main claim that conceptions of the human play a significant structuring role in theory construction, the contributors in this volume investigate the roles that conceptions of the human play both in philosophy and in other human and social sciences. Renowned scholars from various disciplines - philosophy, anthropology, psychology, literary studies - discuss not only the relations between philosophicy and empirical knowledge of the human being. In a rare dialogue between Anglo-Saxon and German humananities, the contributors refer to each other and take up questions of their co-contributors. Thus, controversial, cross-disciplinary debates develop, arise providing new arguments and insights to a question which is methodologically prior to that posed by Kant: How can conceptions of the human be justified?

This book is a collection of essays each of which discusses the work of one of eight individuals - Rush Rhees, Peter Winch, R. F. Holland, J. R. Jones, H. O. Mounce, D. Z. Phillips, Ilham Dilman and R.W. Beardsmore - who taught philosophy at the University of Wales, Swansea, for some time from the 1950s through to the 1990s and so contributed to what in some circles came to be known as 'the Swansea School'. These eight essays are in turn followed by a ninth that, drawing on the previous eight, offers something of a critical overview of philosophy at Swansea during that same period. The essays are not primarily historical in character. Instead they aim at both the critical assessment and the continuation of the sort of philosophical work that during those years came to be especially associated with philosophy at Swansea, work that is deeply indebted to the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein but also distinctively sensitive to the relevance of literary works to philosophical reflection.

In his notes, Nietzsche refers to "the struggle between science and wisdom exhibited in the ancient Greek philosophers". Nietzsche's own view about "science" (learning) was to the effect that, at its best, it should be greatly respected yet always tested by the demands of personal wisdom, an "egotistical" quality which nevertheless transcends self-indulgence.;This volume considers the meaning and implications of Nietzsche's belief in relation to philosophy up to the time of Aristotle, and then its bearing on modern (essentially nihilistic) attitudes, to which it supplies something of an antidote. By the author of "Aldous Huxley", "Out of the Maestrom: Psychology and the Novel in the Twentieth Century", "Characters of Women in Narrative Literature", "Ibsen and Shaw", "Nietzsche and Modern Literature: Themes in Yeats, Rilke, Mann and Lawrence", and "Nietzsche and the Spirit of Tragedy".

This wide-ranging collection of essays contains eighteen original articles by authors representing some of the most important recent work on Wittgenstein. It deals with questions pertaining to both the interpretation and application of Wittgenstein's thought and the editing of his works. Regarding the latter, it also addresses issues concerning scholarly electronic publishing. The collection is accompanied by a comprehensive introduction which lays out the content and arguments of each contribution. Contributors: Knut Erik Tranoy, Lars Hertzberg, Georg Henrik von Wright, Marie McGinn, Cora Diamond, James Conant, David G. Stern, Eike von Savigny, P.M.S. Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock, Allan Janik, Kristof Nyiri, Antonia Soulez, Brian McGuinness, Anthony Kenny, Joachim Schulte, Herbert Hrachovec, Cameron McEwen.

Anapolitanos critically examines and evaluates three basic characteristics of the Leibnizian metaphysical system: Leibniz's version of representation; the principle of continuity; and space, time, and the phenomenally spatio-temporal. Chapter I discusses representation, especially as it refers to the connection between the real and the phenomenal levels of Leibniz's system. Chapter II examines the principle of continuity, including continuity as a general feature of every level of Leibniz's metaphysics. The position adopted is that the problem of the composition of the continuum played a central role on the development of Leibniz's non-spatial and non-temporal monadic metaphysics. The machinery developed is then used to offer a new interpretation of Leibniz' metaphysics of space and time. The notion of indirect representation is used to construct appropriate models that clarify the nature of the correspondence between the real and the phenomenal levels in the case of the relations spatially between' and temporally between', as well as in the cases of spatial and temporal density. Finally, Leibniz's solution to the problem of the continuum is discussed, arguing that it is not entirely satisfactory. A non-anachronistic alternative is proposed, compatible with Leibniz's metaphysics of substance.

"Nothing is more curiously enquired after . . . than the causes of every phenomenon. . . . We] push on our enquiries, till we arrive at the original and ultimate principle. . . . This is our aim in all our studies and reflections."
These words sum up David Hume's plan: To discover the fundamental principles at work in the nature and extent of human knowledge, and in so doing to gain a clearer understanding of our perception, ideas (e.g. of cause and effect), impressions, beliefs, passions, virtues, and vices. Hume's piercing critique and relentless analysis make this truly one of the most influential works of the Early Modern period.

Descartes' philosophy represented one of the most explicit statements of mind-body dualism in the history of philosophy. Its most familiar expression is found in the Meditations (1641) and in Part I of The Principles 0/ Philosophy (1644). However neither of these books provided a detailed discussion of dualism. The Meditations was primarily concerned with finding a foundation for reliable human knowledge, while the Principles attempted to provide an alternative metaphysical framework, in contrast with scholastic philosophy, within which natural philosophy or a scien tific explanation of natural phenomena could be developed. Thus neither book ex plicitly presents a Cartesian theory of the mind nor does either give a detailed account of how, if dualism were accepted, mind and body would interact. The task of articulating such a theory was left to two further works, only one of which was completed by Descartes, viz. the Treatise on Man (published posthumously in 1664). The Treatise began with the following sentence, describing the hypothetical human beings who were to be explained in that work: 'These human beings will be com posed, as we are, of a soul and a body; and, first of all, I must describe the body for you separately; then, also separately, the soul; and fmally I must show you how these two natures would have to be joined and united to constitute human beings resembling us."

The philosopher and poet Vladimir Solovyov (1853-1900) is largely unknown to English readers, though translations of his works do exist. This book presents his central teachings and analyses his treatment of the non-Christian religions, Buddhism and Taosim in particular. This now makes it more possible to reassess his religious philosophy as a whole. The book will be of interest to students of comparative religion, theology, philosophy and Russian intellectual history.

By what channels did the French Enlightenment reach the eighteenth-century Irish reader, and what was its impact? What were the images of Ireland current in France? What did philosophes like Montesquieu and Voltaire think of the country and its people? These are the questions which a team of scholars attempt to answer in this volume. Part I explains who could read French and evaluates the reception of French thought in areas like periodicals and scientific exchange as well as looking at reactions to Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau. Part II examines the views of Ireland and the Irish prevailing in Enlightenment France. Part III explores the transmission of ideas through the importation of French books and translations from a number of cosmopolitan centres, and the thriving trade in Dublin reprints of the 'best-sellers' among these titles. Appendix I catalogues contemporary Irish literary periodicals and their French contents: Appendix II provides an extensive list of French books and translations connected with the Enlightenment and published in Ireland in the period 1700-1800. These appendixes will provide a useful tool for further research.

Normativity has long been conceived as more properly pertaining to the domain of thought than to the domain of nature. This conception goes back to Kant and still figures prominently in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind and ethics. By offering a collection of new essays by leading scholars in early modern philosophy and specialists in contemporary philosophy, this volume goes beyond the point where nature and normativity came apart, and challenges the well-established opposition between these all too neatly separated realms. It examines how the mind's embeddedness in nature can be conceived as a starting point for uncovering the links between naturally and conventionally determined standards governing an agent's epistemic and moral engagement with the world. The original essays are grouped in two parts. The first part focuses on specific aspects of theories of perception, thought formation and judgment. It gestures towards an account of normativity that regards linguistic conventions and natural constraints as jointly setting the scene for the mind's ability to conceptualise its experiences. The second part of the book asks what the norms of desirable epistemic and moral practices are. Key to this approach is an examination of human beings as parts of nature, who act as natural causes and are determined by their sensibilities and sentiments. Each part concludes with a chapter that integrates features of the historical debate into the contemporary context.

This book defines theatricality and performativity through metaphors of texture and weaving, drawn mainly from anthropologist Tim Ingold and philosopher Stephen C. Pepper. Tracing the two concepts' various relations to practices of seeing and doing, but also to conflicting values of novelty and normativity, the study proceeds in a series of intertwining threads, from the theatrical to the performative: Antitheatrical (Plato, the Baroque, Michael Fried); Pro-theatrical (directors Wagner, Fuchs, Meyerhold, Brecht, and Brook); Dramatic (weaving memory in Shaffer's Amadeus and Beckett's Footfalls); Efficient (from modernist "machines for living in" to the "smart home"); Activist (knit graffiti, clown patrols, and the Anthropo(s)cene). An approach is developed in which 'performativity' names the way we tacitly weave worlds and identities, variously concealed or clarified by the step-aside tactics of 'theatricality'.

This book is about Enlightenment culture in Spanish America before Independence-in short, there where, according to Hegel, one would least expect to find it. It explores the Enlightenment in texts from five cultural fields: science, history, the periodical press, law, and literature. Texts include the journals of the geodesic expedition to Quito, philosophical histories of the Americas, a year's work from the Mercurio Peruano, the writings of Mariano Moreno, and Lizardi's El periquillo sarniento. Each chapter takes one field, one body of writing, and one key question: Is modern science universal? Can one disavow the discourse of progress? What is a "Catholic" Enlightenment? Are Enlightenment reason and sovereignty monological? Must the individual be the normative subject of modernity? The book's premise is that the above texts not only speak to the contradictions of a doubtless marginalised colonial American Ilustracion but illuminate the constitutive aporias of the so-called modern project itself. Drawing on the work of Derrida, but also on both historical and philosophical accounts of the various Enlightenments, this incisive book will be of interest to students of Spanish America and scholars in the fields of postcolonialism and the Enlightenment.

Augustine's christianization of Plato and Thomas Aquinas's of Aristotle provided the two main foundations of medieval Judeo- Christian philosophy. In The Christianization of Pyrrhonism, JosA(c) R. Maia Neto shows that Greek scepticism played a similar role in the development of a major strand of modern religious thought. From the Jansenist reaction of Molinism in the early 17th century to Shestov's resistance to the arrival of Kantian enlightenment in Russia in the late 19th century, Greek scepticism was reconstructed in terms of Christian doctrines and used against major secular philosophers who posed threats to religion. At the same time, the ancient sceptics' practical stance was attacked in order that it does not constitute a viable alternative to the modern secular philosophies. The resulting Christianized Pyrrhonism would be the basis for a genuine Christian or Biblical thought, for the first time emancipated from the rationalist assumptions and methods of Greek philosophy. The Christianization of Pyrrhonism is extremely valuable for those interested in the modern developments of ancient scepticism, in the relations between religious and philosophical ideas in modernity, and for scholars and the general public interested in Pascal, Kierkegaard and Shestov.

In his well-known Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz puts individual substance at the basis of metaphysical building. In so doing, he connects himself to a venerable tradition. His theory of individual concept, however, breaks with another idea of the same tradition, that no account of the individual as such can be given.

Contrary to what has been commonly accepted, Leibniza (TM)s intuitions are not the mere result of the transcription of subject-predicate logic, nor of the uncritical persistence of some old metaphysical assumptions. They grow, instead, from an unprejudiced inquiry about our basic ontological framework, where logic of truth, linguistic analysis, and phenomenological experience of the minda (TM)s life are tightly interwoven. Leibniza (TM)s struggle for a concept capable of grasping concrete individuals as such is pursued in an age of great paradigm changes a" from the Scholastic background to Hobbesa (TM)s nominalism to the Cartesian a ~way of ideasa (TM) or Spinozaa (TM)s substance metaphysics a" when the relationships among words, ideas and things are intensively discussed and wholly reshaped.

This is the context where the genesis and significance of Leibniza (TM)s theory of a ~complete beinga (TM) and its concept are reconstrued. The result is a fresh look at some of the most perplexing issues in Leibniz scholarship, like his ideas about individual identity and the thesis that all its properties are essential to an individual.

The questions Leibniz faces, and to which his theory of individual substance aims to answer, are yet, to a large extent, those of contemporary metaphysics: how to trace a categorial framework? How to distinguish concrete andabstract items? What is the metaphysical basis of linguistic predication? How is trans-temporal sameness assured? How to make sense of essential attributions? In this ontological framework Leibniza (TM)s further questions about the destiny of human individuals and their history are spelt out. Maybe his answers also have something to tell us.

This book is aimed at all who are interested in Leibniza (TM)s philosophy, history of early modern philosophy and metaphysical issues in their historical development.