Humankind has pondered many mysteries, but few more enticing than the existence of a divine creator who is said to have set the universe in motion. Imitating the well-known style of Platonic dialogues, the relentless inquirer and empiricist David Hume assembles a group to discuss the existence of God, his divine nature, his attributes, and the point of his creation. How do we come to have knowledge of God? Who has the burden of proof with respect to these matters of intense religious significance, and what sort of proof might gain universal assent? Can one argue from the orderliness of the universe to the conclusion that it must have had a purposeful creator at its helm? Hume has captured the nature of this intense debate in a classic work that has stood the test of time.

Is knowledge possible? If so, what can we know and how do we come to know it? What degree of certainty does our knowledge enjoy? In these two powerful works, Descartes, the seventeenth-century philosopher considered to be the father of modern philosophy, outlines his philosophical method and then counters the skeptics of his time by insisting that certain knowledge can be had. He goes on to address the nature and extent of human knowledge, the distinction between mind and body, the existence of God, and the existence of external objects.

Normativity has long been conceived as more properly pertaining to the domain of thought than to the domain of nature. This conception goes back to Kant and still figures prominently in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind and ethics. By offering a collection of new essays by leading scholars in early modern philosophy and specialists in contemporary philosophy, this volume goes beyond the point where nature and normativity came apart, and challenges the well-established opposition between these all too neatly separated realms. It examines how the mind's embeddedness in nature can be conceived as a starting point for uncovering the links between naturally and conventionally determined standards governing an agent's epistemic and moral engagement with the world. The original essays are grouped in two parts. The first part focuses on specific aspects of theories of perception, thought formation and judgment. It gestures towards an account of normativity that regards linguistic conventions and natural constraints as jointly setting the scene for the mind's ability to conceptualise its experiences. The second part of the book asks what the norms of desirable epistemic and moral practices are. Key to this approach is an examination of human beings as parts of nature, who act as natural causes and are determined by their sensibilities and sentiments. Each part concludes with a chapter that integrates features of the historical debate into the contemporary context.

Throughout history, but most especially during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, great minds of philosophy grappled with two thorny questions: What are the objects of knowledge? and How do we come to know them? Using the revealing dialogue technique, Berkeley shakes the very ground of those who believe that something called matter exists to support the sensible qualities we perceive. In his critique of this view, Berkeley argues for ideas in the mind as the only true reality about which one can have knowledge. His arguments for these conclusions, and for the ultimate foundation of all sensible things, can be found in this essential work of early modern philosophy.

Although Descartes' natural philosophy marked an advance in the development of modern science, many critics over the years, such as Newton, have rejected his particular relational' theory of space and motion. Nevertheless, it is also true that most historians and philosophers have not sufficiently investigated the viability of the Cartesian theory.
This book explores, consequently, the success of the arguments against Descartes' theory of space and motion by determining if it is possible to formulate a version that can eliminate its alleged problems. In essence, this book comprises the first sustained attempt to construct a consistent Cartesian' spacetime theory: that is, a theory of space and time that consistently incorporates Descartes' various physical and metaphysical concepts.
Intended for students in the history of philosophy and science, this study reveals the sophisticated insights, and often quite successful elements, in Descartes' unjustly neglected relational theory of space and motion.

In this collection, thirteen distinguished contributors examine the influence of the ancient skeptical philosophy of Pyrrho of Elis and Sextus Empiricus on early modern political thought. Classical skepticism argues that in the absence of certainty one must either suspend judgment and live by habit or act on the basis of probability rather than certainty. In either case, one must reject dogmatic confidence in politics and philosophy. Surveying the use of skepticism in works by Hobbes, Descartes, Hume, Smith, and Kant, among others, the essays in Skepticism and Political Thought in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries demonstrate the pervasive impact of skepticism on the intellectual landscape of early modern Europe. This volume is not just an authoritative account of skepticism's importance from the Enlightenment to the French Revolution, it is also the basis for understanding skepticism's continuing political implications.

One of the most influential philosophers and cultural theorists of the twentieth century, Theodor Adorno poses a considerable challenge to students. His works can often seem obscure and impenetrable, particularly for those with little knowledge of the philosophical traditions on which he draws. Adorno: A Guide for the Perplexed is an engaging and accessible account of his thought that does not patronise or short-change the reader. Those new to Adorno - and those who have struggled to make headway with his work - will find this an invaluable resource: clearly written, comprehensive and specifically focused on just what makes Adorno difficult to read and understand.

From the mid-1960s, after the important works by J. Hintikka, S. Korner, W. Sellars and P.F. Strawson, there has been a marked revival of Kantian epistemological thought. Against this background, featuring fruitful exchange between historical research and theoretical prospects, the main point of the book is the discussion of Kantian theory of scientific knowledge from the perspective of present-day analytical philosophy and philosophy of empirical and mathematical sciences. The main topics are the problem of a priori knowledge in logic, mathematics and physics, the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, the constitution of physical objectivity and the questions of realism and truth, the Kantian conception of time, causal laws and induction, the relations between Kantian epistemological thought, relativity theory, quantum theory and some recent developments of philosophy of science. The book is addressed to research workers, specialists and scholars in the fields of epistemology, philosophy of science and history of philosophy. "

During his long life (1872-1970) Bertrand Russell was one of a handful of social thinkers, let alone internationally recognized philosophers, whose views on contemporary issues won for him a devoted and supportive audience on the one hand and a host of vituperative critics on the other. Russell's revolutionary writings frequently placed him in the center of controversy with conservatives and all those who were unwilling to consider moral questions from a rational rather than an emotional stance. Al Seckel has compiled an exhaustive collection of Russell's very best and most thought-provoking essays on ethics, social morality, happiness, sex, adultery, marriage, and divorce. Often hidden in obscure journals, pamphlets, out-of-print periodicals, and hard-to-find books, the works assembled here comprise a comprehensive volume that is augmented by valuable section introductions and editor's comments. This volume also includes "Morality and Instinct," which is published here for the first time.

Many articles and books dealing with Donald Davidson's philosophy are dedicated to the papers and ideas Davidson put forward in the sixties and seventies. In the last two decades, however, Davidson has continued to work in many areas of philosophy, offering new contributions, many of which are highly regarded by philosophers working in the fields concerned. For instance, Davidson has considerably developed his ideas about interpretation, theory of meaning, irreducibility of the mental, causation, and action theory; he has proposed an innovative externalist conception of the mental content and a new analysis of the concept of truth; and he has partly modified his theses about event, and the supervenience of the mental on the physical. In Interpretations and Causes, some of the leading contemporary analytic philosophers discuss Davidson's new ideas in a lively, relevant, useful, and not always entirely sympathetic way. Davidson himself offers and original contribution.

This collection offers a reinterpretation of the history of British criticism by exploring the work of neglected as well as celebrated critics. It contextualizes the current crisis and shows how traditional criticism anticipates and to some extent parallels the concerns of postmodern critical theory. The issue of value is also addressed as is the question of the future direction of criticism making this volume an important contribution to contemporary critical debate.

In this examination of problems in the modern world, Michio Kitahara argues that a logical inconsistency in the philosophy of Enlightenment has caused humans to approach their environment in a way that is inconsistent with their biological background. Human biological and cultural evolution has created a form of suffering that derives in part from Western civilization's simultaneous acceptance and rejection of human variation. Both specialists and the general public assume that evolution is good and desirable, but Kitahara's analysis suggests the opposite: that evolution itself is tragic.

In his analysis of human evolution, Kitahara discusses deviant and criminal behavior, social conflict, liberalism, and the nature of Western civilization. He holds two axiomatic assumptions: that humans are characterized by stimulus seeking behavior accompanied by the manipulatory drive, and that humans are characterized by physical, psychological and cultural variation. He argues that the tyranny of the majority and the technology we have developed deny human variation, and that the drive to manipulate the environment is the wellspring of modern, sociocultural phenomena. This book will be of interest to scholars of anthropology, sociology, philosophy, history, political science, and environmental studies.

This collection of essays is the fruit of about fifteen years of discussion and research by James Force and me. As I look back on it, our interest and concern with Newton's theological ideas began in 1975 at Washington University in St. Louis. James Force was a graduate student in philosophy and I was a professor there. For a few years before, I had been doing research and writing on Millenarianism and Messianism in the 17th and 18th centuries, touching occasionally on Newton. I had bought a copy of Newton's Observations upon the Prophecies of Daniel, and the Apocalypse of St. John for a few pounds and, occasionally, read in it. In the Spring of 1975 I was giving a graduate seminar on Millenarian and Messianic ideas in the development of modem philosophy. Force was in the seminar. One day he came very excitedly up to me and said he wanted to write his dissertation on William Whiston. At that point in history, the only thing that came to my mind about Whiston was that he had published a, or the, standard translation of Josephus (which I also happened to have in my library. ) Force told me about the amazing views he had found in Whiston's notes on Josephus and in some of the few writings he could find in St. Louis by, or about, Whiston, who was Newton's successor as Lucasian Professor of mathematics at Cambridge and who wrote inordinately on Millenarian theology.

This volume critically reexamines Otto Neurath s conception of the unity of science. Some of the leading scholars of Neurath s work, along with many prominent philosophers of science critically examine his place in the history of philosophy of science and evaluate the relevance of his work for contemporary debates concerning the unity of science."

This book explores the concept of epistemic justification and our understanding of the problem of skepticism. Providing critical examination of key responses to the skeptical challenge, Hamid Vahid presents a theory which is shown to work alongside the internalism/externalism issue and the thesis of semantic externalism, with a deontological conception of justification at its core.

This book briefly outlines the evolution of general philosophical ideas since 1900, emphasizing how the concept of philosophy itself has changed.

Kant’s defence of religion and attempts to reconcile faith with reason position him as a moderate Enlightenment thinker in existing scholarship. Challenging this view and reconceptualising Kant’s religion along rationalist lines, Anna Tomaszewska sheds light on its affinities with the ideas of the radical Enlightenment, originating in the work of Baruch Spinoza and understood as a critique of divine revelation. Distinguishing the epistemological, ethical and political aspects of such a critique, Tomaszewska shows how Kant’s defence of religion consists of rationalizing its core tenets and establishing morality as the essence of religious faith. She aligns him with other early modern rationalists and German Spinozists and reveals the significance for contemporary political philosophy. Providing reasons for prioritizing freedom of thought, and hence religious criticism, over an unqualified freedom of belief, Kant's theology approximates the secularising tendency of the radical Enlightenment. Here is an understanding of how the shift towards a secular outlook in Western culture was shaped by attempts to rationalize rather than uproot Christianity.

In Divine Audacity, Peter Dillard presents a historically informed and rigorous analysis of the themes of mystical union, volition and virtue that occupied several of the foremost theological minds in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. In particular, the work of Marguerite Porete raises complex questions in these areas, which are further explored by a trio of her near contemporaries. Their respective meditations are thoroughly analysed and then skilfully brought into dialogue. What emerges from Dillard's synthesis of these voices is a contemporary mystical theology that is rooted in Hugh of Balma's affective approach, sharpened through critical engagement with Meister Eckhart's intellectualism, and strengthened by crucial insights gleaned from the writings of John Ruusbroec. The fresh examination of these thinkers - one of whom paid with her life for her radicalism - will appeal to philosophers and theologians alike, while Dillard's own propositions demand attention from all who concern themselves with the nature of the union between the soul and God.

What would Caligula do? What the worst Roman emperors can teach us about how not to lead If recent history has taught us anything, it's that sometimes the best guide to leadership is the negative example. But that insight is hardly new. Nearly 2,000 years ago, Suetonius wrote Lives of the Caesars, perhaps the greatest negative leadership book of all time. He was ideally suited to write about terrible political leaders; after all, he was also the author of Famous Prostitutes and Words of Insult, both sadly lost. In How to Be a Bad Emperor, Josiah Osgood provides crisp new translations of Suetonius's briskly paced, darkly comic biographies of the Roman emperors Julius Caesar, Tiberius, Caligula, and Nero. Entertaining and shocking, the stories of these ancient anti-role models show how power inflames leaders' worst tendencies, causing almost incalculable damage. Complete with an introduction and the original Latin on facing pages, How to Be a Bad Emperor is both a gleeful romp through some of the nastiest bits of Roman history and a perceptive account of leadership gone monstrously awry. We meet Caesar, using his aunt's funeral to brag about his descent from gods and kings-and hiding his bald head with a comb-over and a laurel crown; Tiberius, neglecting public affairs in favor of wine, perverse sex, tortures, and executions; the insomniac sadist Caligula, flaunting his skill at cruel put-downs; and the matricide Nero, indulging his mania for public performance. In a world bristling with strongmen eager to cast themselves as the Caesars of our day, How to Be a Bad Emperor is a delightfully enlightening guide to the dangers of power without character.

The polysemous German word Geschlecht -- denoting gender, genre, kind, kinship, species, race, and somehow also more -- exemplifies the most pertinent questions of the translational, transdisciplinary, transhistorical, and transnational structures of the contemporary humanities: What happens when texts, objects, practices, and concepts are transferred or displaced from one language, tradition, temporality, or form to another? What is readily transposed, what resists relocation, and what precipitate emerges as distorted or new? Drawing on Barbara Cassin's transformative remarks on untranslatability, and the activity of "philosophizing in languages," scholars contributing to The Geschlecht Complex examine these and other durable queries concerning the ontological powers of naming, and do so in the light of recent artistic practices, theoretical innovations, and philosophical incitements. Combining detailed case studies of concrete "category problems" in literature, philosophy, media, cinema, politics, painting, theatre, and the performing arts with a range of indispensable excerpts from canonical texts -- by notable, field-defining thinkers such as Apter, Cassin, Cavell, Derrida, Irigaray, Malabou, and Nancy, among others -- the volume presents "the Geschlecht complex" as a condition to become aware of, and in turn, to companionably underwrite any interpretive endeavor. Historically grounded, yet attuned to the particularities of the present, the Geschlecht complex becomes an invaluable mode for thinking and theorizing while ensconced in the urgent immediacy of pressing concerns, and poised for the inevitable complexities of categorial naming and genre discernment that await in the so often inscrutable, translation-resistant twenty-first century.

More scholarly works on the history of American philosophy have been completed in Russian than in any other language outside of our own; yet most of that body of work has not been translated or studied comprehensively. Consequently, Soviet-era efforts to understand American thought have remained almost entirely unknown to Western scholars.
In his pioneering new book Interpreting America John Ryder makes available for the first time to English-speaking readers Russian views of the full range of American philosophical thought: from seventeenth-century Puritanism through the colonial and revolutionary periods, nineteenth- century idealism, pragmatism, naturalism, and other twentieth-century movements and figures. Using his own accurate translations, he clearly reconstructs a chain of core ideas, emphasizes the most essential concepts of each writer's work, and gives a multidimensional reconstruction of the arguments of each author.
By taking mainstream Soviet philosophical commentators like Baskin, Bogomolov, Karimsky, Melvil, Pokrovsky, Sidorov, and Yulina seriously and letting them speak for themselves, Ryder shows not only what Soviet philosophers and scholars thought of American philosophy (and why they were so interested in the first place) but also the nuances of the internal disagreements among Soviet thinkers about what American philosophers were saying. He also reveals a strong continuity between contemporary, post-Soviet Russian philosophy and earlier Soviet work.
Perhaps no other book has ever explored in such a systematic manner the ways in which one philosophical system has regarded another. Ryder's revealing study of how others have viewed us helps to clarify thedepth, richness, and complexity of our own American philosophical heritage.