This book differs from others by rejecting the dualist approach associated in particular with Descartes. It also casts serious doubt on the forms of materialism that now dominate English language philosophy. Drawing in particular on the work of Wittgenstein, a central place is given to the importance of the notion of a human being in our thought about ourselves and others.

There are certain things that can be explained and certain things that cannot be explained. This book is about the latter. It is a book about death: how death interrupts and influences the reflection on the self. It is a book about God: a detailed and critical discussion on how Kierkegaard and Derrida apply the concept of God in their philosophical reflections. The most ground-breaking analysis concerns the famous passage on the self (A.A) in The Sickness unto Death, where the author combines logical, rhetorical and dialectical means to establish a new perspective on Kierkegaard's thinking in general. The Cartesian doubt then constitutes a common trait for his detailed and rigorous analysis of Derrida and Kierkegaard on death, madness, faith, and rationality - showing how they both seek to break up the Hegelian Aufhebung from within, but still remain dependent on Hegel. After Kierkegaard and Derrida, the certainty and total uncertainty of death - and of God as infinite other - gives the self a basic, though non-foundational, responsibility. The significance of this responsibility, of this other, of this death, requires sustained and thorough consideration. Where others mark a conclusion, this book therefore marks a point of departure: reflecting on oneself at the graveside of a dead man - thus introducing an Autopsia.

Montaigne is one of the most cross-cultural writers ever - both in the assimilation of writings from other cultures into his own work and in the subsequent translations, critical receptions, and creative adaptations of the Essais by other writers throughout the world for the last four hundred years. His work is generally considered as exemplary of the European Renaissance, yet also demonstrates a remarkable relevance to the literary and intellectual activity at the present time. However, whereas there has been an abundance of commentary on Montaigne during the first centuries after his death, much less attention has been paid to his impact on writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particularly those outside France. This study redresses the imbalance. By establishing a stylistic and ideological relationship between Montaigne's work and that of such writers as Emerson, Nietzsche, Pater, Woolf, and Sollers, we not only gain a greater appreciation of the richness of the Essays, but also of some of the roots of modernist and postmodernist writing.

Despite characterizing himself as the antichrist, Nietzsche had great respect for Jesus and his message and often identified with his life. His opinion of early Christianity--and particularly of St. Paul, the single most hated figure in Nietzsche's passionate career--however, was very different. This volume brings order to Nietzsche's scattered reflections on Jesus, St. Paul, and the birth of Christianity by tracing the development of his ideas and examining the intellectual reality behind his deliberately confrontational remarks concerning early Christianity's key players. By analyzing exactly what it is that Nietzsche celebrates and identifies with in the life and message of Jesus, and criticizes so harshly in the case of St. Paul, the author provides fresh insight into the mind and the philosophy of one of the 19th century's most original thinkers.

Why should the sociologist concern himself with time? asks Franco Ferrarotti in his latest work. Temporality is, he argues, the essential fluid dimension in the study of the social. Including time as a factor in sociological analysis is the only way to reintroduce the dynamic moment of social reality as a mental construct into an analytical process otherwise reified by the limits of quantitative methods. Ultimately, Ferrarotti contends, the usual way of laying out and proceeding with sociological analysis must be decisively inverted. This book is challenging reading for the sociologist and philosopher alike. Why should the sociologist concern himself with time? asks Franco Ferrarotti in his latest work. Temporality is, he argues, the essential fluid dimension in the study of the social. Including time as a factor in sociological analysis is the only way to reintroduce the dynamic moment of social reality as a mental construct into an analytical process otherwise reified by the limits of quantitative methods. The biographical and autobiographical approaches are also rooted in time. They elicit a problematic human situation and distinguish radically between the technical problem, resolvable through the exact practical application of a given, ideally indifferent, and interchangable formula, and the human dimension. Ultimately, Ferrarotti contends, the usual way of laying out and proceeding with sociological analysis must be decisively inverted. The order of priorities in the research process now followed in the human sciences tends to encourage the loss of the sense of the problem through the crude postulation of technical and human problems as equivalent. Time, Memory, and Society will be challenging, thought provoking reading for the sociologist, social theorist, and philosopher.

The observation that our world is signed by a lasting crisis is as much underwritten as it is questioned. This book offers a new and provocative thesis by taking recourse to the religious discourse of Limbo, and by investigating the temporal and spatial structures of crisis and modernity. Modernity reveals itself to be the state of perennial crisis, and we all live in an immanentized state of Limbo.

This book reveals the sense in which our postmodern societies are characterized by the obscene absence of the intellectual. The modern intellectual--who had once been associated with humanism and enlightenment-has in our day been replaced by media stars, talking heads, and technical experts. At issue is the ongoing crisis of democracy, under the aegis of the societe du spectacle and its vast networks of politically-induced idiocy, industrially-produced biocide, and militarily-provoked genocide. Spectacle fills the resulting moral and intellectual vacuum with electronic technologies of control, punishment, and destruction. This postmodern tyranny reduces intelligence to mechanistic, positivist, and grammatological models of inquiry, while increasing the segmentation, fragmentation, and dissolution of human existence. The apotheosis of the spectacle explains the intellectual void that lies at the heart of our postmodern decadence; it also accounts for the need to recuperate the humanist values of enlightenment promoted by the modern intellectual tradition.

In this thought-provoking book, an internationally acclaimed scholar writes about the passion for ideology among nineteenth- and twentieth-century Russian intellectuals and about the development of sophisticated critiques of ideology by a continuing minority of Russian thinkers inspired by libertarian humanism. Aileen Kelly sets the conflict between utopian and anti-utopian traditions in Russian thought within the context of the shift in European thought away from faith in universal systems and "grand narratives" of progress toward an acceptance of the role of chance and contingency in nature and history. In the current age, as we face the dilemma of how to prevent the erosion of faith in absolutes and final solutions from ending in moral nihilism, we have much to learn from the struggles, failures, and insights of Russian thinkers, Kelly says. Her essays-some of them tours de force that have appeared before as well as substantial new studies of Turgenev, Herzen, and the Signposts debate-illuminate the insights of Russian intellectuals into the social and political consequences of ideas of such seminal Western thinkers as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Darwin. Russian Literature and Thought Series

Paul Helm is a distinguished philosopher, with particular interests in the philosophy of religion. His work covers some of the most important aspects of the field as it has developed in the last thirty years with particular contributions to metaphysics, religious epistemology and philosophical theology. In celebration of Helm's life's work, Reason in the Service of Faith brings together a range of his essays which reflect these central concerns of his thought. Over thirty of Helm's selected essays and four unpublished articles are gathered into five parts: Metaphilosophical issues, Action, Change and Personal Identity, Epistemology, God and Creation, Providence and Prayer. The volume is prefaced with a short editorial introduction and ends with an extensive bibliography of Helm's published works. Demonstrating the important connection between Helm's theological and philosophical interests across his body of work, this collection is a remarkable resource for scholars of religion, philosophy and theology.

Nelson Goodman's acceptance and critique of certain methods and tenets of positivism, his defence of nominalism and phenomenalism, his formulation of a new riddle of induction, his work on notational systems, and his analysis of the arts place him at the forefront of the history and development of American philosophy in the twentieth-century. However, outside of America, Goodman has been a rather neglected figure. In this first book-length introduction to his work Cohnitz and Rossberg assess Goodman's lasting contribution to philosophy and show that although some of his views may be now considered unfashionable or unorthodox, there is much in Goodman's work that is of significance today. The book begins with the "grue"-paradox, which exemplifies Goodman's way of dealing with philosophical problems. After this, the unifying features of Goodman's philosophy are presented - his constructivism, conventionalism and relativism - followed by an discussion of his central work, The Structure of Appearance and its significance in the analytic tradition. The following chapters present the technical apparatus that underlies his philosophy, his mereology and semiotics, which provides the background for discussion of Goodman's aesthetics. The final chapter examines in greater depth the presuppositions underlying his philosophy.

Putnam is one of the most influential philosophers of recent times, and his authority stretches far beyond the confines of the discipline. However, there is a considerable challenge in presenting his work both accurately and accessibly. This is due to the width and diversity of his published writings and to his frequent spells of radical re-thinking. But if we are to understand how and why philosophy is developing as it is, we need to attend to Putnam's whole career. He has had a dramatic influence on theories of meaning, semantic content, and the nature of mental phenomena, on interpretations of quantum mechanics, theory-change, logic and mathematics, and on what shape we should desire for future philosophy. By presenting the whole of his career within its historical context, de Gaynesford discovers a basic unity in his work, achieved through repeated engagements with a small set of hard problems. By foregrounding this integrity, the book offers an account of his philosophy that is both true to Putnam and helpful to readers of his work.

One of the most influential philosophers and cultural theorists of the twentieth century, Theodor Adorno poses a considerable challenge to students. His works can often seem obscure and impenetrable, particularly for those with little knowledge of the philosophical traditions on which he draws. Adorno: A Guide for the Perplexed is an engaging and accessible account of his thought that does not patronise or short-change the reader. Those new to Adorno - and those who have struggled to make headway with his work - will find this an invaluable resource: clearly written, comprehensive and specifically focused on just what makes Adorno difficult to read and understand.

This book offers an examination of Levinas 's philosophy of religion in light of his ethics and anthropology. It provides critical perspectives on Levinas by relating his work to that of Heidegger, Ricoeur, Rorty, Derrida and Vattimo. The focus of interpretation is the hermeneutics of kenosis: the subject 's ability to be open towards the other to the point where man can be seen as a place of God.

In the last decades, Ingvar Johansson has made a formidable contribution to the development of philosophy in general and perhaps especially to the development of metaphysics. This volume consists of original papers written by 50 philosophers from all over the world in honour of Ingvar Johansson to celebrate his 70th birthday. The papers cover traditional issues in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, applied ethics and applied metaphysics, the nature of human rights, the philosophy of economics and sports. Some of the papers study the philosophy of Ingvar Johansson. All of them studies subjects which he has shown an interest in. The variety of subjects covered, testifies to the extraordinary wide range of issues his thought has had a bearing on.

Heidegger holds that our age is dominated by the ambition of reason to possess the world. And he sees in Leibniz the man who formulated the theorem of our modern age: nothing happens without a reason. He calls this attitude `calculating thought' and opposes to it a kind of thought aimed at preserving the essence of things, which he calls `meditating thought'. Cristin's book ascribes great importance to this polarity of thinking for the future of contemporary philosophy, and thus compares the basic ideas of the two thinkers. Leibniz announces the conquest of reason; Heidegger denounces the dangers of reason. Their diversity becomes manifest in the difference between the idea of reason and the image of the path. But is Leibniz's thought really only `calculating'? And do we not perhaps also encounter the traces of reason along Heidegger's path? With these questions in mind we may begin to redefine the relation between the two thinkers and between two different conceptions of reason and philosophy. The hypothesis is advanced that Heidegger's harsh judgment of Leibniz may be mitigated, but it also becomes clear that Heidegger's rewriting of the code of reason is an integral part of our age, in which many signs point to new loci of rationality. With his original interpretation, aware of the risks he is taking, Renato Cristin offers a new guide to the understanding of reason: he shows forth Leibniz as one who defends the thought of being in the unity of monadology, and Heidegger as a thinker who preserves the sign of reason in his meditating thought.

Merleau-Ponty in contemporary perspective: this was the theme of the conference at the Institute of Philosophy, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (K. U. L. ) from 29 November to 1 December 1991. Thirty years after Merleau Ponty's untimely death, it seemed appropriate to bring together scholars from Europe and from the United States of America to reappraise his philosophy. In fact, a significant body of scholarship has emerged which would seem to attest to the continuing importance of his thought for a variety of disciplines within the humanities, the social sciences, and the philosophy of nature. In the present volume, Gary Brent Madison addresses the issue whether Merleau-Ponty can be considered to be a classical philosopher. The fact that his work is one of the highlights of the phenomenological tradition and is of continuing inspiration for researchers in various domains seems to justify that claim. Yet, it is the feeling of many of the contributors to this volume that the so-called "second Merleau-Ponty" is still not really known. The unfinished state of The Visible and the Invisible and the cryptic condition of many of the "Working Notes" may be responsible for that. More research should be done, to uncover "the unsaid" of Merleau-Ponty. lowe to a remark of Paul Ricoeur in his introduction to the work of G. B. Madison, La Phenomenologie de Merleau-Ponty. Une recherche des limites de la conscience (Paris, Klincksieck, 1973, p."

The book about John Michell (1724-93) has two parts. The first and longest part is biographical, an account of Michell's home setting (Nottinghamshire in England), the clerical world in which he grew up (Church of England), the university (Cambridge) where he studied and taught, and the scientific activities he made the center of his life. The second part is a complete edition of his known letters. Half of his letters have not been previously published; the other half are brought together in one place for the first time. The letters touch on all aspects of his career, and because they are in his words, they help bring the subject to life. His publications were not many, a slim book on magnets and magnetism, one paper on geology, two papers on astronomy, and a few brief papers on other topics, but they were enough to leave a mark on several sciences. He has been called a geologist, an astronomer, and a physicist, which he was, though we best remember him as a natural philosopher, as one who investigated physical nature broadly. His scientific contribution is not easy to summarize. Arguably he had the broadest competence of any British natural philosopher of the eighteenth century: equally skilled in experiment and observation, mathematical theory, and instruments, his field of inquiry was the universe. From the structure of the heavens through the structure of the Earth to the forces of the elementary particles of matter, he carried out original and far-reaching researches on the workings of nature.

Descartes's Principles 0. / Philosophy is his longest and most ambitious work; it is the only work in which he attempted to actually deduce scientific knowledge from Cartesian metaphysics, as he repeatedly claimed was possible. Whatever the success of this attempt, there can be no doubt that it was enormously influential. Cartesian celestial mechanics held sway for well over a century, and some of the best minds of that period, including Leibniz, Malebranche, Euler, and the Bernoullis, attempted to modify and quantify the Cartesian theory of vortices into an acceptable alternative to Newton's theory of universal gravitation. Thus, the Principles is not only of inherent and historical interest philosophically but is also a seminal document in the history of science and of 17th Century thought. Principles of Philosophy was first published in Latin, in 1644. In 1647, a French translation, done by the Abbe Claude Picot and containing a great deal of additional material and a number of alterations in the original text, was published with Descartes's enthusiastic approval. Unlike some English translations of portions of the Principles, this translation uses the Latin text as its primary source; however, a good deal of additional material from Picot's translation has been included. There are several reasons for this. First, there is good evidence that Descartes himself was responsible for some of the additional material, including, of course, the Preface to the French translation.

As a founding father of Existentialism, Karl Jaspers has been seen as a twentieth-century successor to Nietzsche and Kierkegaard; as an exponent of reason, he has been seen as an heir of Kant. But studies tracing influences upon his thought or placing him in the context of Existentialism have not dealt with Jasper's concern with the political realm and how we think in it and about it. In this study Elisabeth Young-Bruehl explicates Jasper's practical philosophizing, his search for ways in which we can orient ourselves toward our world and its political questions. Political freedom and freedom for philosophizing, for critical thinking, were of a piece for Jaspers, and Young-Bruehl makes the dynamic unity of these two freedoms the subject of her book. What was important for Jaspers was not a systematic set of philosophical concepts but the activity of philosophizing, a mode of thinking that could illuminate the origins and implications of such unprecedented phenomena as nuclear weapons and totalitarian regimes. Young-Bruehl shows how Jaspers aimed at responsibility to the diversity of the world and attempted to formulate criteria for judgment conducive to responsible thought and action.