In the ruined Europe of World War II, American soldiers on the front lines had no eye for breathtaking vistas or romantic settings. The brutality of battle profoundly darkened their perceptions of the Old World. As the only means of international travel for the masses, the military exposed millions of Americans to a Europe in swift, catastrophic decline.

Drawing on soldiers' diaries, letters, poems, and songs, Peter Schrijvers offers a compelling account of the experiences of U.S. combat ground forces: their struggles with the European terrain and seasons, their confrontations with soldiers, and their often startling encounters with civilians. Schrijvers relays how the GIs became so desensitized and dehumanized that the sight of dead animals often evoked more compassion than the sight of enemy dead.

The Crash of Ruin concludes with a dramatic and moving account of the final Allied offensive into German-held territory and the soldiers' bearing witness to the ultimate symbol of Europe's descent into ruin--the death camps of the Holocaust.

The harrowing experiences of the GIs convinced them that Europe's collapse was not only the result of the war, but also the Old World's deep-seated political cynicism, economic stagnation, and cultural decadence. The soldiers came to believe that the plague of war formed an inseparable part of the Old World's decline and fall.

The history of Dutch volunteers in the Waffen-SS forms a dark and, up until now, unwritten gage in Dutch history. 16th February 1945. The Red Army has reached the river Oder; the capital of Nazi Germany is in sight. the final military operations seem to be merely routine when suddenly, without any artillery warning, the German front at Stettin moves forward. At first, the German offensive makes some headway but at Atnswalde and Reetzit grinds to a halt. It is not just the small scale of this last desperate offensive that makes its efforts remarkale. What is perhaps even more remarkable is the fact that it was mounted by non-German volunteers serving in the Waffen-SS. These non-German soldiers made one last desperate attempt to save the front at Berlin. This book focuses on the political and military history of the legion, brigade, and division know as Nederland. Barely a thousand soldiers strong the Dutch Waffen-SS division at Reetz mounted its final offensive but, to no avail, because exactly two months later, on 16th april, the unprecedented drunfire of 1.2 million gernades rang out. The Red Army opened its attack on Berlin. The division "Nederland" was forced to await its downfall.

Hitler's tank divisions were some of his most feared troops and most lethal weapons in the taking and securing of territory during World War II. From success to failure, in victory and in defeat, each division played a role in Hitler's campaign against the Allies. This is the first guide to chronicle the history of each division from its inception to its destruction. With painstaking research and attention to detail, Mitcham describes the formation and organization of each, then discusses its overall combat history. He also includes a career sketch of every panzer divisional commander.

While this reference will serve as a valuable research tool, it contains more than facts and figures. Mitcham assesses the performance and quality of each division, including how and why it changed over time. He evaluates strengths and weaknesses during different phases of the conflict in terms of manpower, vehicles, and armor quality. He also analyzes commander performance and its impact on overall efforts. The story follows the panzer legions until their ultimate disposition-destruction or disbanding. Includes a comprehensive index of individuals, units, battles and campaigns.

Having evolved over the past two and a quarter centuries to become the premier military force in the world, the U.S. Army has a heritage rich in history and tradition. This historical dictionary provides short, clear, authoritative entries on a broad cross section of military terms, concepts, arms and equipment, units and organizations, campaigns and battles, and people who have had a significant impact on Army. It includes over 900 entries written by some 100 scholars, providing a valuable resource for the interested reader, student, and researcher.

For those interested in pursuing specific subjects further, the book provides sources at the end of each entry as well as a general bibliography. Appendixes provide a useful list of abbreviations and acronyms and a listing of ranks and grades in the U.S. Army.

Kaufman examines the training and status of British military surgeons during the late 18th and 19th centuries. Their management of the sick and wounded during the wars with France leading up to and including the Peninsular War is also described. He concludes with an analysis of the medical problems associated with the Crimean War.

Using important contemporary texts, Kaufman describes the personalities who served in the British Army Medical Department during the late 18th and 19th centuries, when diseases caused a much higher mortality than injuries sustained in battle. Many military surgeons were only poorly trained, and the management of the sick and wounded only gradually improved over this period despite significant advances in medicine, surgery, and hygene. Government spending cuts after the Peninsular War greatly depleted the medical service of the army so that by the time of the Crimean War it was unable to cope with a European-style war. Deficiencies were recognized and, in the case of the medical services, this led to the establishment of the Army Medical School in 1860. This analysis should be of particular interest to serving military medical officers and to historians and other researchers interested in the management of 18th and 19th century armies in times of peace and war.

The last U.S. Army mules were formally mustered out of the service in December 1956, ending 125 years of military reliance on the virtues of this singular animal. Much less glamorous than the cavalryman's horse, the Army pack mule was a good deal more important: from the Mexican War through World War II, mules were an indispensable adjunct to army movement. The author has exhaustively researched the ubiquitous yet nearly invisible army mule. Through his work we learn a great deal about military procurement, transport, and supply, the bedrock on which military mobility rests.

Did the Vietnam War have to happen? And why couldn't it have ended earlier? These are among the questions that Robert McNamara and his collaborators ask in "Argument Without End," a book that will stand as a major contribution to what we know about the Vietnam War. Drawing on a series of meetings that brought together, for the first time ever, senior American and Vietnamese officials who had served during the war, the book looks at the many instances in which one side, or both, made crucial mistakes that led to the war and its duration. Using Vietnamese and Chinese documents, many never before made public, McNamara reveals both American and Vietnamese blunders, and points out ways in which such mistakes can be avoided in the future. He also shows conclusively that war could not be won militarily by the United States.McNamara's last book on Vietnam was one of the most controversial books ever published in this country. This book will reignite the passionate debate about the war, about McNamara, and about the lessons we can take away from the tragedy.

A meticulously documented challenge to previous views about the extent and effectiveness of Confederate manpower in the last year of the Civil War.

At the beginning of the First World War, Henri Mathias Berthelot was recognized as one of France's most brilliant younger generals. His sharp intelligence, prodigious organizational talents, and verbal skills had made him the trusted assistant to a succession of French chiefs of staff. He shared responsibility for the earliest defeats of the French Army, but also for the remarkable recovery that followed. His career as a field commander began with a reverse at Soissons (January 1915) but acclaimed successes followed, including the Labyrinth (Artois 1915) and Mort Homme (Verdun 1916). Following the war, he contributed to the reintegration of Alsace and Lorraine into France in his role as military governor of Metz (1919-1921) and Strasbourg (1923-1926). Simultaneously, he played an influential role on the Conseil Superieure de Guerre in its debates over the defense of France which eventually produced the Maginot Line. While, unfortunately, Berthelot's military career in France has not re

An examination of the life of General Manton S. Eddy, this study details his experiences in World War II as leader of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division through North Africa, Sicily and France, and subsequently, as commander of XII Corps, into the heart of Germany. While much has been written about the top military leaders of this era, there is little information about corps commanders whose missions were limited to doing battle and whose organizations were tailored exclusively for this task. Eddy's career provides a model for the Army's most ambitious officers, particularly those who, like Eddy, faced the challenge without family connections or the traditional West Point education. He devoted his life to the U.S. Army, enhancing his innate talents through the incorporation of a daily program of self-education.

Eddy had an excellent grasp of the basic principles of military tactics and strategy. He attained this art through home study and assiduous application at the Army's professional education institutions, in particular at the Command and General Staff College, where he served as an instructor for four years. He focused on people, quickly learning and applying basic skills to draw out their best efforts. He came to know what to expect from them in the chaos and under the pressure of combat. This facilitated his development of strong, mission-oriented subordinates. His personal goal was always to maximize all available power at the correct point for crushing his nation's enemies, and to this end, he was extraordinarily successful.

Relying on extensive candid interviews from members of Congress and staff on defense authorization committees and senior Army general officers, Scroggs provides a strong insider analysis with recommendations. He examines the impact of culture on the varying abilities of public agencies, specifically the Army, to pursue its organizational interests through lobbying or liaising Congress. Scroggs argues that despite structural similarities in how the four military services approach Congress, differences in service culture affect their relative success in achieving their goals on the Hill. Scroggs draws four major conclusions. First, despite a law prohibiting lobbying of Congress by public agencies, Congress views lobbying or liaising by public entities, especially the military services, not only as a legitimate activity, but essential to Members carrying out their constitutional responsibilities. Second, relative to the other services, the Army is viewed by Congress as the least effective in its lobbying. Third, the Army's patterned approach with Congress is largely a function of its unrecognized and uncompensated culture in the unique terrain of the nation's capital. Fourth, because of the need for balanced service representation to Congress, relatively less effective Army efforts have troubling implications for national security and Army self-interest.

Relying on extensive candid interviews from members of Congress and staff on defense authorization committees and senior Army general officers, Scroggs provides a strong insider analysis with recommendations. He examines the impact of culture on the varying abilities of public agencies, specifically the Army, to pursue its organizational interests through lobbying or liaising Congress. Scroggs argues that despite structural similarities in how the four military services approach Congress, differences in service culture affect their relative success in achieving their goals on the Hill.

Scroggs draws four major conclusions. First, despite a law prohibiting lobbying of Congress by public agencies, Congress views lobbying or liaising by public entities, especially the military services, not only as a legitimate activity, but essential to Members carrying out their constitutional responsibilities. Second, relative to the other services, the Army is viewed by Congress as the least effective in its lobbying. Third, the Army's patterned approach with Congress is largely a function of its unrecognized and uncompensated culture in the unique terrain of the nation's capital. Fourth, because of the need for balanced service representation to Congress, relatively less effective Army efforts have troubling implications for national security and Army self-interest.

James W. Johnston was a self-confessed small-town youth, who like so many others patriotically stopped what he was doing and enlisted shortly after Pearl Harbor. Johnston chose the Marines, a decision that sent him to years of bloody combat through the Pacific as Allied troops fought their way toward the Japanese home islands. Many did not come back; of those who did, very few have told us what it was like. Johnston tells us directly and honestly, taking us with his First Marine Division through New Guinea, New Britain, Peleliu, and Okinawa.

The mechanized infantry is one of the least-studied components of the U.S. Army's combat arms, and its most visable piece of equipment, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, is one of the military's most controversial pieces of equipment. This study traces the idea of mechanized infantry from its roots in the early armored operations of World War I, through its fruition in World War II, to its drastic transformation in response to the threat of a nuclear, biological, and chemical battlefield. The U.S. Army's doctrinal migration from the idea of specialized "armored infantry" to that of more generalized "mechanized infantry" led to problematic consequences in training and equipping the force. Haworth explores the origins, conduct, and outcome of the Bradley controversy, along with its implications for Army institutional cultures, force designs, and doctrines. Challenging traditional partisan views of the Bradley program, Haworth goes to the roots of the issue. The author details the mechanized infantry's problematic status in the Army's traditional division of roles and missions between its Infantry and Armored branches. While new conditions demand new equipment, old institutions and current commitments inevitably complicate matters; thus, traditional infantry considerations have driven the Bradley's requirements. The raw capability of the vehicle and the fortitude and ingenuity of its users have to some extent compensated for the conflicting pressures in its design. However, the reluctance of the Army to see mechanized infantry as a specialty has led to the problem the vehicle has faced, as this book clearly shows.

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military forces have participated in an increasingly complex array of military operations, from disaster relief and peacekeeping to deadly combat. The unique nature of many of these missions calls into question what it means to be a soldier and may require adjustments not only in military doctrine, but also in the military's combat-oriented warrior identity. Franke examines the extent to which individuals who will lead U.S. forces in the 21st century are prepared cognitively to shift among mission requirements.

Using survey methods, Franke explores the social, political, and professional attitudes and values of cadets at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. By comparing cadets' responses across classes, he assesses the effects of military socialization on their commitment to the military's dual-mission purpose and their cognitive preparation for combat and non-combat assignments. By developing a dynamic model of social identity, Franke extends the applicability of social identity theory from the experimental laboratory environment to a genuine social field setting. Assessing the dynamic relationship between identity, values, and attitudes for identifications that are normatively meaningful to respondents, he illustrates the importance of individuals' identification with social groups for their behavioral choices.

The young daughter of an English-born U. S. infantry officer on the post-Civil War frontier, Mary Leefe Laurence had the childhood of an army nomad, accompanying the regiment from south Texas to the Canadian border. In faithfully recording her travels, she offers extensive and unique insight into life as a child and adolescent in the twilight of the Indian-fighting army.

This is the first study to analyze the content, training, and performance of a World War I draft division from its formation onward. The 82nd division consisted heavily of non-English speaking European immigrants and conscripts fresh from farming towns in Tennessee and North Carolina. Despite these apparent obstacles, it would evolve into an effective combat unit on the front lines of St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne. These All-Americans would prove that they could fight and accomplish several difficult missions in the Great War.

From its birth at Camp Gordon, Georgia, to the battlefields of the Western Front, the 82nd division became a highly successful combat unit through good leadership and hard work. After initial training in France by both British and French forces, the 82nd entered the trenches to face the Germans. Given a difficult mission during the St. Mihiel offensive, the diverse division performed well; and during the Meuse-Argonne battle, it achieved its objectives despite heavy casualties. Despite an early lack of preparation, this force would be a true American success story.

The first book-length treatment of an important Confederate regiment composed mostly of Irish immigrants who were involved in most of the important Civil War battles in the East.

In spite of the outcome of the Cold War, English argues persuasively here that the nuclear defensive posture adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was inherently flawed. Victory in the Cold War, moreover, seems to have increased the attractiveness of this potentially dangerous model. In fact, NATO's attempts to replace conventional armies with nuclear technology represented a misreading of history inasmuch as war has always been more of a social than technological phenomenon. From his succinct survey of the growth and operations of field armies from medieval times to the Gulf War, English concludes that the legitimately constituted conventional army of the nation-state still remains the best instrument for bringing some semblance of order to the destructive chaos of war. The development of field armies has involved much more sophistication than generally supposed. In both practice and theory, army operations have been as knowledge-based and intellectually rigorous as any academic discipline, ensuring them an enduring place as a practical means of applying massive force. Fortunately, the NATO attempt to replace conventional armies with nuclear technology was never tested in a real war. But English suggests that the likelihood of deterrence continuing in war, because of its transmutability, also offers hope that it can be controlled in the future, as it was in the past, by social forces. This book offers a longer, more realistic view of war than that normally embraced by technocrats in search of better weapons and peacemakers in search of utopia. This book also addresses in detail the questions of why armies became so large and why war itself transmutated. The technological transformation of war that occurred after 1815 is discussed, in turn, for the effect it exerted upon the future operations of armies. A novel perspective on the tactical and operational progression of warfighting up to the end of World War II is also provided through an examination of modern defensive theory. On a more elevated plane, the book critically assesses the ways in which nuclear deterrence ultimately affected NATO's defensive posture in central Europe. Also subjected to detailed scrutiny are the theoretical and practical dimensions of ground force concepts for the defense of the NATO central front. Finally, English evaluates ground force operations in the Gulf War with a view to drawing relevant conclusions and lessons for the future.

"Editors Alan Nolan and Sharon Eggleston Vipond's insightful essays provide fresh perspectives on the Iron Brigade's exploits, detailing military and political events in the words of actual combatants." Military Review

Originally called "The Black Hat Brigade" because the soldiers wore the regular army s dress black hat instead of the more typical blue cap, the Iron Brigade was the only all-Western brigade in the Eastern armies of the Union. From Brawner Farm and Second Bull Run to Chancellorsville and Gettysburg the Western soldiers earned and justified the proud name Iron Brigade. And when the war was over, the records showed that it led all federal brigades in percentage of deaths in battle. These essays, by some of the best known historians of the brigade, spotlight significant moments in the history of the Civil War s most celebrated unit."

When the United States entered the Great War in April of 1917, there were few officers with any staff training, and none had actually served on large, complex staffs in combat. This work traces the development of the staff of the AEF and describes how Pershing found the generals to command those divisions that fought on the Western Front in World War I. Many of Pershing's generals had been colonels only a few months prior to assuming command of divisions. John J. Pershing's task was to mold a diverse group of men into effective staff officers and into general officers to face the rigors of modern combat. How he accomplished this task, and how well the AEF did, is the focus of this work on the AEF's command and staff structure.

Latin America is moving toward democracy. The region's countries hold elections, choose leaders, and form new governments. But is the civilian government firmly in power? Or is the military still influencing policy and holding the elected politicians in check under the guise of guarding against corruption, instability, economic uncertainty, and other excesses of democracy? The editors of this work, Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., argue that with or without direct military rule, antipolitics persists as a foundation of Latin American politics. This study examines the origins of antipolitics, traces its nineteenth- and twentieth-century history, and focuses on the years from 1965 to 1995 to emphasize the somewhat illusory transitions to democracy. This third edition of The Politics of Antipolitics has been revised and updated to focus on the post-Cold War era. With the demise of the Soviet state and international Marxism, the Latin American military has appropriated new threats including narcoterrorism, environmental exploitation, technology transfer, and even AIDS to redefine and relegitimate its role in social, economic, and political policy. The editors also address why and how the military rulers acceded to the return of civilian-elected governments and the military's defense against accusations of human rights abuses.

When Colonel Charles S. Wainwright (1826-1907), later a brevet brigadier general, was commissioned in the First New York Artillery Regiment of the Army of the Potomac in October 1861, he began a journal. As an officer who fought at Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, Cold Harbor, Spotsylvania, and Petersburg, and who witnessed the leadership of Generals McClellan, Hooker, Burnside, Meade, Grant, and Sheridan, he brilliantly describes his experiences, views, and emotions. But Wainwright's entries go beyond military matters to include his political and social observations. Skillfully edited by Allan Nevins, historian and author of the classic multivolume Ordeal of the Union , this journal is Wainwright's vivid and invaluable gift to posterity.

"In the making of Allied Force Headquarters into a truly single Allied inter-service headquarters, Eisenhower started on a task that was to continue throughout the war--and beyond. Its fulfillment was perhaps more than any other his special contribution to the practice of war."Because he did not actually command troops in battle, Eisenhower has occasionally been underestimated by military writers. The "Eisenhower" volume in the classic "Military Commanders" series clearly demonstrates that his organization of the Allied effort in Europe owed nothing to the practices followed in World War I and represented a decisive breakthrough in the conduct of war, particularly in coalition warfare. Ike was a military manager without equal, who also had the ability to inspire confidence and loyalty among his subordinates of all nationalities. Eisenhower is most closely associated with the military principle of "Unity of Command," and his doctrines are more relevant today than ever, in the world of coalition armies and high-tech battlefields. General Sixsmith's comprehensive description of Eisenhower's World War II actions makes for particularly interesting comparisons with the lessons forgotten in Vietnam and re-applied in the Persian Gulf.

An insightful and valuable resource on the major conflicts between American Indian tribes and Euro-American settlers from the arrival of Columbus to the Battle of Wounded Knee. Historians, writers, and students will welcome this extensively illustrated and well-organized volume. An important historical resource, Encyclopedia of American Indian Wars covers the major clashes between American Indian tribes and Euro-American settlers from the arrival of Columbus to the Battle of Wounded Knee, centered mainly within the geographical area that now comprises the contiguous United States. It provides essential information on major battles and military campaigns, treaties, significant sites, American Indian tribes, and notable military and political leaders, both Indian and white, presented in a handy, encyclopedic style.