The author presents a new philosophical theory according to which we need intuitions and emotions in order to have objective moral knowledge, which is called affectual intuitionism. Affectual Intuitionism combines ethical intuitionism with a cognitive theory of emotions.

This work is an introductory treatment of issues and options in social and bioethics which center on the end of life. Moreland and Geisler have attempted to simplify and summarize various end-of-life topics without being simplistic or caricaturing different viewpoints, even though the authors' own viewpoints are made perfectly clear. A comprehensive bibliography, glossary, and subject and author index make this a valuable textbook as well as a resource for further study. The major purpose of this book is to make the reader think more clearly and deeply about the important issues discussed between its covers. Beginning the work is an essay that introduces the dilemma of ethical decisions. The following chapters separately discuss the situations of abortion, infanticide, euthanasia, suicide, capital punishment, and war. The discussion concludes with a chapter of practical and theoretical guidance for making ethical decisions. A glossary, subject index, author index, and selected bibliography for each chapter make this a valuable text. This important work will not only appeal to experienced philosophers, but also to students of moral philosophy, theology, and ethics.

It is widely held in contemporary moral philosophy that moral agency must be explained in terms of some more basic account of human nature. This book presents a fundamental challenge to this view. Specifically, it argues that sympathy, understood as an immediate and unthinking response to another's suffering, plays a constitutive role in our conception of what it is to be human, and specifically in that conception of human life on which anything we might call a moral life depends.

A disciple of Kant and a significant factor in shaping Nietzsche's thinking, Arthur Schopenhauer worked from the foundation that all knowledge derives from our experience of the world but that our experience is necessarily subjective and formed by our own intellect and biases: reality, therefore, is but an extension of our own will. In this essay, translated by THOMAS BAILEY SAUNDERS (1860-1928) and first published in English in the 1890s, Schopenhauer offers his outlook on human nature... and a pessimistic one it is, for Schopenhauer saw life through a Buddhist-like lens of desire leading to suffering, and the abjuration of desire as the only path to temporary relief. Here, the philosopher examines human institutions such as government, human ideals such as free will, and human understanding of character and morality, and finds underlying them a fatalistic impulse driving culture from extremes of despotism to those of anarchy, with little stopping along the way. Students of philosophy and of 19th-century intellectualism will find this a fascinating read.

The pioneering moral philosopher Annette Baier presents a series of new and recent essays in ethics, broadly conceived to include both engagements with other philosophers and personal meditations on life. Baier's unique voice and insight illuminate a wide range of topics. In the public sphere, she enquires into patriotism, what we owe future people, and what toleration we should have for killing. In the private sphere, she discusses honesty, self-knowledge, hope, sympathy, and self-trust, and offers personal reflections on faces, friendship, and alienating affection.

Each chapter can be read independently, so useful to a variety of courses. It presupposes no prior knowledge, so useful for introductory, as well as more advanced, courses. It enables students to progress from practical issues to moral theories. It introduces debates over controversial and topical moral and political issues - drug laws, punishment, civil disobedience, and global poverty. It presents clear and concise examination of key concepts in moral and political theory - liberty, liberty-limiting principles (harm, offence, paternalism, and harmless wrongdoing), rights, equality and social justice.This title provides a clear and concise introduction to moral and political philosophy which critically analyzes arguments about controversial and topical practical issues - drug laws, justifications of punishment, civil disobedience, whether there is a duty to obey the law, and global poverty.

If humans are purely physical, and if it is the brain that does the work formerly assigned to the mind or soul, then how can it fail to be the case that all of our thoughts and actions are determined by the laws of neurobiology? If this is the case, then free will, moral responsibility, and, indeed, reason itself would appear to be in jeopardy. Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown here defend a non-reductive version of physicalism whereby humans are (sometimes) the authors of their own thoughts and actions.
Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? brings together insights from both philosophy and the cognitive neurosciences to defeat neurobiological reductionism. One resource is a "post-Cartesian" account of mind as essentially embodied and constituted by action-feedback-evaluation-action loops in the environment, and "scaffolded" by cultural resources. Another is a non-mysterious account of downward (mental) causation explained in terms of a complex, higher-order system exercising constraints on lower-level causal processes. These resources are intrinsically related: the embeddedness of brain events in action-feedback loops is the key to their mentality, and those broader systems have causal effects on the brain itself.
With these resources Murphy and Brown take on two problems in philosophy of mind: a response to the charges that physicalists cannot account for the meaningfulness of language nor the causal efficacy of the mental qua mental. Solutions to these problems are a prerequisite to addressing the central problem of the book: how can biological organisms be free and morally responsible? The authors argue that the free-will problem is badly framed if it is put in terms ofneurobiological determinism; the real issue is neurobiological reductionism. If it is indeed possible to make sense of the notion of downward causation, then the relevant question is whether humans exert downward causation over some of their own parts and processes. If all organisms do this to some extent, what needs to be added to this animalian flexibility to constitute free and responsible action? The keys are sophisticated language and hierarchically ordered cognitive processes allowing (mature) humans to evaluate their own actions, motives, goals, and rational and moral principles.

Almost everyone can run. Only very few can run a marathon. But what is it for agents to be able to do things? This question, while central to many debates in philosophy, is still awaiting a comprehensive answer. The book provides just that. Drawing on some valuable insights from previous works of abilities and making use of possible world semantics, Jaster develops the "success view", a view on which abilities are a matter of successful behavior. Along the way, she explores the gradable nature of abilities, the contextsensitivity of ability statements, the difference between general and specific abilities, the relationship between abilities and dispositions, and the ability to act otherwise. The book is mandatory reading for anyone working on abilities, and provides valuable insights for anyone dealing with agents' abilities in other fields of philosophy. For this book, Romy Jaster has received both the Wolfgang Stegmuller Prize and the De Gruyter Prize for Analytical Philosophy of Mind or Metaphysics/Ontology.

Christos Yannaras pioneering critique of the concept of the right of the individual is presented in English for the first time. This central aspect of political theory (since Hegels Philosophy of Right) summarizes the philosophical and cultural identity of the paradigm of modernity, but the philosophical assumptions underlying the concept of right have not hitherto been subject to scrutiny. Yannaras shows that the starting-point of the concept of right is a phenomenalistic naturalism, which presupposes an abstract concept of the human subject as a fundamentally undifferentiated natural individual. The question is also explored of how the priority accorded to this concept of right is related to the contemporary crisis of the modern politico-social paradigm, while a new preface from the translator underlines the continued significance of Yannaras proposal for Anglophone readers. Against the modern concept of right with its illusion of objectivity, The Inhumanity of Right sketches out the basic lines of a political theory that prioritizes new social needs that reflect the relational character of the human person.

This is the first edited collection to bring together classic pieces and new work by leading scholars of Thomas Reid. The contributors explore key elements of Reid's moral theory in an organised and thematic way, offering a balanced and broad ranging volume.

'Spencer regarded the Principles of Ethics - of which The "Data of Ethics and "Justice constitutes parts one and four respectively - as the culmination and crowning achievement of the System of Synthetic Philosophy, to which the other volumes on biology, psychology, and sociology had been mere preliminaries' - Michael Taylor, from the Introduction. In "Justice Spencer revisits the Law of Equal Freedom which first appeared in "Social Statics and forms the keystone of social morality.

Value, Reality, and Desire is an extended argument for a robust realism about value. The robust realist affirms the following distinctive theses. There are genuine claims about value which are true or false - there are facts about value. These value-facts are mind-independent - they are not reducible to desires or other mental states, or indeed to any non-mental facts of a non-evaluative kind. And these genuine, mind-independent, irreducible value-facts are causally efficacious. Values, quite literally, affect us. These are not particularly fashionable theses, and taken as a whole they go somewhat against the grain of quite a lot of recent work in the metaphysics of value. Further, against the received view, Oddie argues that we can have knowledge of values by experiential acquaintance, that there are experiences of value which can be both veridical and appropriately responsive to the values themselves. Finally, these value-experiences are not the products of some exotic and implausible faculty of 'intuition'. Rather, they are perfectly mundane and familiar mental states - namely, desires. This view explains how values can be 'intrinsically motivating', without falling foul of the widely accepted 'queerness' objection. There are, of course, other objections to each of the realist's claims. In showing how and why these objections fail, Oddie introduces a wealth of interesting and original insights about issues of wider interest - including the nature of properties, reduction, supervenience, and causation. The result is a novel and interesting account which illuminates what would otherwise be deeply puzzling features of value and desire and the connections between them.

On Self-Harm, Narcissism, Atonement and the Vulnerable Christ explores St. Augustine of Hippo's theology of sin, described as various forms of self-loathing and self-destruction, in addition to sin's antidote, a vulnerable relationship with the crucified Christ. Incorporating recent thinking on self-destruction and self-loathing into his reading of Augustine, David Vincent Meconi explores why we are not only allured by sin, but will actually destroy ourselves to attain it, even when we are all too well aware that this sin will bring us no true, lasting pleasure. Meconi traces the phenomena of self-destruction and self-loathing from Augustine to today. In particular, he focuses in on how self-love can turn to self-harm, and the need to provide salvage for such woundedness by surrendering to Christ, showing how Augustine's theology of sin and salvation is still crucially applicable in contemporary life and societies.

Francis BACON, in his Novum Organum, Robert BOYLE, in his Skeptical Chemist and Rene DESCARTES, in his Discourse on Method; all of these men were witnesses to the th scientific revolution, which, in the 17 century, began to awaken the western world from a long sleep. In each of these works, the author emphasizes the role of the experimental method in exploring the laws of Nature, that is to say, the way in which an experiment is designed, implemented according to tried and tested te- niques, and used as a basis for drawing conclusions that are based only on results, with their margins of error, taking into account contemporary traditions and prejudices. Two centuries later, Claude BERNARD, in his Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine, made a passionate plea for the application of the experimental method when studying the functions of living beings. Twenty-first century Biology, which has been fertilized by highly sophisticated techniques inherited from Physics and Chemistry, blessed with a constantly increasing expertise in the manipulation of the genome, initiated into the mysteries of information techn- ogy, and enriched with the ever-growing fund of basic knowledge, at times appears to have forgotten its roots."

Phil Hutchinson engages with philosophers of emotion in both the analytic and continental traditions. He advances a framework for understanding emotion - world-taking cognitivism and argues that reductionist accounts of emotion leave us in a state of poverty regarding our understanding of the world and ourselves.

Morality and the Nature of Law explores the conceptual relationship between morality and the criteria that determine what counts as law in a given societythe criteria of legal validity. Is it necessary condition for a legal system to include moral criteria of legal validity? Is it even possible for a legal system to have moral criteria of legal validity? The book considers the views of natural law theorists ranging from Blackstone to Dworkin and rejects them, arguing that it is not conceptually necessary that the criteria of legal validity include moral norms. Further, it rejects the exclusive positivist view, arguing instead that it is conceptually possible for the criteria of validity to include moral norms. In the process of considering such questions, this book considers Raz's views concerning the nature of authority and Shapiro's views about the guidance function of law, which have been thought to repudiate the conceptual possibility of moral criteria of legal validity. The book, then, articulates a thought experiment that shows that it is possible for a legal system to have such criteria and concludes with a chapter that argues that any legal system, like that of the United States, which affords final authority over the content of the law to judges who are fallible with respect to the requirements of morality is a legal system with purely source-based criteria of validity.

Honor For Us is the first contemporary philosophical inquiry into the concept of honor. It is unique not only in its analysis of six distinct concepts of honor, which includes an investigation into the place of honor in religious thought and ethics, but also in its interpretation of honor's prevalence in our own culture. Many would like to discard honor altogether as "obsolete", but Sessions contends that the concept of honor is poorly understood, standing sorely in need of clarification. He argues that the notion of honor remains viable in the face of powerful criticism, and that it has important features which warrant our normative interest. While not downplaying the "dark side" of honor (violence, sexism, inegalitarianism, its abuse in religion), Sessions shows that honor not only constitutes a descriptively useful concept but also remains a potentially valuable concept for us today.

How we treat animals arouses strong emotions. Many people are repulsed by photographs of cruelty to animals and respond passionately to how we make animals suffer for food, science, and sport. But is this, as some argue, a purely emotional issue? Are there really no rational grounds for opposing our current treatment of animals?
In Why Animal Suffering Matters, Andrew Linzey shows that when analyzed impartially the rational case for extending moral solicitude to all sentient beings is much stronger than many suppose. Indeed, Linzey shows that many of the justifications for inflicting animal suffering in fact provide grounds for protecting them. Because animals, the argument goes, lack reason or souls or language, harming them is not an offense. Linzey suggests that just the opposite is true, that the inability of animals to give or withhold consent, their inability to represent their interests, their moral innocence, and their relative defenselessness all compel us not to harm them. Linzey further shows that the arguments in favor of three controversial practices--hunting with dogs, fur farming, and commercial sealing--cannot withstand rational critique. He considers the economic, legal, and political issues surrounding each of these practices, appealing not to our emotions but to our reason, and shows that they are rationally unsupportable and morally repugnant.
Jeremy Bentham famously wrote of animals, "The question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? but Can they suffer?" In this superbly argued and deeply engaging book, Andrew Linzey not only shows that animals can and do suffer but also makes clear the harm that is done not only to them but to us when we causethem to suffer.

Violence holds considerable philosophical interest, especially today, and yet this concept has not been given sufficient attention by contemporary philosophers. This is the first anthology of philosophical essays on the nature and justifiability of violence. The essays in this volume, taken from the last 100 years, explore a range of philosophical issues pertaining to violence. Three basic questions are scrutinized: 'What is violence?', 'Is violence always wrong?', and 'Can violence be justified?'. Students and Philosophers in political and moral philosophy, but also political theorists, political scientists, and political sociologists, will find this an important and valuable contribution.

It is widely acknowledged that all archaeological research is embedded within cultural, political and economic contexts, and that all archaeological research falls under the heading 'heritage'. Most archaeologists now work in museums and other cultural institutions, government agencies, non-government organisations and private sector companies, and this diversity ensures that debates continue to proliferate about what constitutes appropriate professional ethics within these related and relevant contexts. Discussions about the ethics of cultural heritage in the 20th century focused on standards of professionalism, stewardship, responsibilities to stakeholders and on establishing public trust in the authenticity of the outcomes of the heritage process. This volume builds on recent approaches that move away from treating ethics as responsibilities to external domains and to the discipline, and which seek to ensure ethics are integral to all heritage theory, practice and methods. The chapters in this collection chart a departure from the tradition of external heritage ethics towards a broader approach underpinned by the turn to human rights, issues of social justice and the political economy of heritage, conceptualising ethical responsibilities not as pertaining to the past, but to a future-focused domain of social action.

Wariboko offers a critical-philosophical perspective on the logics and dynamics of finance capital in the twenty-first century in order to craft a model of the care of the soul that will enable citizens to not only better negotiate their economic existences and moral evaluations within it, but also resist its negative impact on social life.

The idea of social injustice is pivotal to much contemporary moral and political philosophy. Starting from a comprehensive and engaging account of the idea of social injustice, this book covers a whole range of issues, including distributive justice, exploitation, torture, moral motivations, democratic theory, voting behaviour and market socialism.

In this fresh evaluation of Western ethics, noted philosopher Richard Taylor argues that philosophy must return to the classical notion of virtue as the basis of ethics. To ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, ethics was chiefly the study of how individuals attain personal excellence, or ovirtue, o defined as intellectual sophistication, wisdom, strength of character, and creativity. With the ascendancy of the Judeo-Christian ethic, says Taylor, this emphasis on pride of personal worth was lost. Instead, philosophy became preoccupied with defining right and wrong in terms of a divine lawgiver, and the concept of virtue was debased to mean mere obedience to divine law. Even today, in the absence of religious belief, modern thinkers unwittingly continue this legacy by creating hairsplitting definitions of good and evil.
Taylor points out that the ancients rightly understood the ultimate concern of ethics to be the search for happiness, a concept that seems to have eluded contemporary society despite unprecedented prosperity and convenience. Extolling AristotleAEs Nicomachean Ethics, Taylor urges us to reread this brilliant and still relevant treatise, especially its emphasis on an ethic of aspiration.