Being Apart from Reasons deals with the question of how we should go about using reasons to decide what to do. More particularly, the book presents objections to the most common response given by contemporary legal and political theorists to the moral complexity of decision-making in modern societies, namely: the attempt to release public agents from their argumentative burden by insulating a particular set of reasons from the general pool of reasons and assigning the former systematic priority over all other reasons. If those attempts succeed, public agents should not reason comprehensively, taking into account all reasons and weighing them against one another. Some reasons would be excluded from decision-making by kind.

That strategy is apparent both in Rawlsa (TM) claim that reasons concerning the right are systematically prior to reasons concerning the good and in Raza (TM)s claim that pre-emptive reasons are systematically prior to first-order reasons. The same strategy is also instantiated by certain arguments for the procedural value of law, such as Jeremy Waldrona (TM)s. In the book, each of those arguments for the insulation of reasons is objected to in order to defend the thesis the reasoning by public agents must always be as comprehensive as possible.

In order to reach that conclusion a particular picture of public decision-making in needed. That picture in provided by the comparison between the use of reasons in public and private decision-making which is carried out in the first two chapters of the book. That comparison brings to light peculiar features of public decision-making that imply the need for public agents to reason comprehensively before deciding. Theremaining chapters object to those arguments mentioned above which aim at justifying the exclusion of certain reasons from public agenta (TM)s decision-making.

This collection explores the nature and role of ethics within anarchist thought and practice, examining normative, meta-ethical and applied ethical issues through some of the theoretical insights of anarchism. It comprises contributions from international scholars working within the fields of philosophy and political theory.

The author presents a new philosophical theory according to which we need intuitions and emotions in order to have objective moral knowledge, which is called affectual intuitionism. Affectual Intuitionism combines ethical intuitionism with a cognitive theory of emotions.

Why do people do evil? How can we learn to do better? Philosophers in the long-standing tradition of 'virtue ethics' argue that we act badly because of shortcomings in our character, and that we can improve by practicing virtues such as courage, honesty, and compassion. Recently, philosophical 'situationists' have issued a profound challenge to this tradition: they argue that anyone can act badly if placed in a sufficiently tempting situation, and that the goal of cultivating good character is misguided and may even be harmful. Rather than encouraging us to pursue the ideal of virtue, these philosophers propose that ethics should instead begin by recognizing the profound limits of human self-knowledge and self-control. This book critically examines the arguments and evidence on each side of this debate, with a special focus on the connections between the philosophical issues and current research in social and personality psychology. Character also includes guides to further reading that will help students deepen their understanding of this essential topic in contemporary ethics.

It is widely held in contemporary moral philosophy that moral agency must be explained in terms of some more basic account of human nature. This book presents a fundamental challenge to this view. Specifically, it argues that sympathy, understood as an immediate and unthinking response to another's suffering, plays a constitutive role in our conception of what it is to be human, and specifically in that conception of human life on which anything we might call a moral life depends.

A disciple of Kant and a significant factor in shaping Nietzsche's thinking, Arthur Schopenhauer worked from the foundation that all knowledge derives from our experience of the world but that our experience is necessarily subjective and formed by our own intellect and biases: reality, therefore, is but an extension of our own will. In this essay, translated by THOMAS BAILEY SAUNDERS (1860-1928) and first published in English in the 1890s, Schopenhauer offers his outlook on human nature... and a pessimistic one it is, for Schopenhauer saw life through a Buddhist-like lens of desire leading to suffering, and the abjuration of desire as the only path to temporary relief. Here, the philosopher examines human institutions such as government, human ideals such as free will, and human understanding of character and morality, and finds underlying them a fatalistic impulse driving culture from extremes of despotism to those of anarchy, with little stopping along the way. Students of philosophy and of 19th-century intellectualism will find this a fascinating read.

The pioneering moral philosopher Annette Baier presents a series of new and recent essays in ethics, broadly conceived to include both engagements with other philosophers and personal meditations on life. Baier's unique voice and insight illuminate a wide range of topics. In the public sphere, she enquires into patriotism, what we owe future people, and what toleration we should have for killing. In the private sphere, she discusses honesty, self-knowledge, hope, sympathy, and self-trust, and offers personal reflections on faces, friendship, and alienating affection.

Each chapter can be read independently, so useful to a variety of courses. It presupposes no prior knowledge, so useful for introductory, as well as more advanced, courses. It enables students to progress from practical issues to moral theories. It introduces debates over controversial and topical moral and political issues - drug laws, punishment, civil disobedience, and global poverty. It presents clear and concise examination of key concepts in moral and political theory - liberty, liberty-limiting principles (harm, offence, paternalism, and harmless wrongdoing), rights, equality and social justice.This title provides a clear and concise introduction to moral and political philosophy which critically analyzes arguments about controversial and topical practical issues - drug laws, justifications of punishment, civil disobedience, whether there is a duty to obey the law, and global poverty.

The debate about the existence of climate change seems finally at an end. We now have to decide what to do about it. Here, James Garvey argues that the ultimate rationale for action on climate change cannot be simply economic, political, scientific or social, though no doubt our decisions should be informed by such things. Instead, climate change is largely a moral problem. What we should do about it depends on what matters to us and what we think is right. This book is an introduction to the ethics of climate change. It considers a little climate science and a lot of moral philosophy, ultimately finding a way into the many possible positions associated with climate change. It is also a call for action, for doing something about the moral demands placed on both governments and individuals by the fact of climate change. This is a book about choices, responsibility, and where the moral weight falls on our warming world. Articulate, provocative and stimulating, this timely book will make a significant contribution to one of the most important debates of our time .

This collection is a unique joint venture of teachers in, and practitioners of military ethics. Representatives of each branch of the Armed Forces, i.e. the Navy, the Army, the Air Force and the Military Police, discuss their branch-specific experiences with moral questions and dilemma's. The moral questions and dilemma's which arise in their work are also discussed by certain professional groups within the Armed Forces, such as the Military Medical Service and the Military Psychological Service. Detailed attention is given to how junior commanders can enhance morally responsible behaviour within their unit. A substantial part of the book focuses on teaching military ethics. It includes the Socratic dialogue, decision-making skills, and a chapter containing fictitious moral dilemmas that can be used as exercises. The book is aimed at those responsible for training at military training centres as well as at cadets, midshipmen and young officers. It will also be an important tool for commanders preparing for a mission. And it will be of use for all those concerned with the subject of military ethics at policy and management level, both in the armed forces and outside it. Military Ethics: The Dutch Approach - A Practical Guide is an adapted translation of the main chapters of the Dutch-language volume "Praktijkboek Militaire Ethiek" (Practitioner's Guide Military Ethics).

If humans are purely physical, and if it is the brain that does the work formerly assigned to the mind or soul, then how can it fail to be the case that all of our thoughts and actions are determined by the laws of neurobiology? If this is the case, then free will, moral responsibility, and, indeed, reason itself would appear to be in jeopardy. Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown here defend a non-reductive version of physicalism whereby humans are (sometimes) the authors of their own thoughts and actions.
Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? brings together insights from both philosophy and the cognitive neurosciences to defeat neurobiological reductionism. One resource is a "post-Cartesian" account of mind as essentially embodied and constituted by action-feedback-evaluation-action loops in the environment, and "scaffolded" by cultural resources. Another is a non-mysterious account of downward (mental) causation explained in terms of a complex, higher-order system exercising constraints on lower-level causal processes. These resources are intrinsically related: the embeddedness of brain events in action-feedback loops is the key to their mentality, and those broader systems have causal effects on the brain itself.
With these resources Murphy and Brown take on two problems in philosophy of mind: a response to the charges that physicalists cannot account for the meaningfulness of language nor the causal efficacy of the mental qua mental. Solutions to these problems are a prerequisite to addressing the central problem of the book: how can biological organisms be free and morally responsible? The authors argue that the free-will problem is badly framed if it is put in terms ofneurobiological determinism; the real issue is neurobiological reductionism. If it is indeed possible to make sense of the notion of downward causation, then the relevant question is whether humans exert downward causation over some of their own parts and processes. If all organisms do this to some extent, what needs to be added to this animalian flexibility to constitute free and responsible action? The keys are sophisticated language and hierarchically ordered cognitive processes allowing (mature) humans to evaluate their own actions, motives, goals, and rational and moral principles.

'Spencer regarded the Principles of Ethics - of which The "Data of Ethics and "Justice constitutes parts one and four respectively - as the culmination and crowning achievement of the System of Synthetic Philosophy, to which the other volumes on biology, psychology, and sociology had been mere preliminaries' - Michael Taylor, from the Introduction. In "Justice Spencer revisits the Law of Equal Freedom which first appeared in "Social Statics and forms the keystone of social morality.

Almost everyone can run. Only very few can run a marathon. But what is it for agents to be able to do things? This question, while central to many debates in philosophy, is still awaiting a comprehensive answer. The book provides just that. Drawing on some valuable insights from previous works of abilities and making use of possible world semantics, Jaster develops the "success view", a view on which abilities are a matter of successful behavior. Along the way, she explores the gradable nature of abilities, the contextsensitivity of ability statements, the difference between general and specific abilities, the relationship between abilities and dispositions, and the ability to act otherwise. The book is mandatory reading for anyone working on abilities, and provides valuable insights for anyone dealing with agents' abilities in other fields of philosophy. For this book, Romy Jaster has received both the Wolfgang Stegmuller Prize and the De Gruyter Prize for Analytical Philosophy of Mind or Metaphysics/Ontology.

Christos Yannaras pioneering critique of the concept of the right of the individual is presented in English for the first time. This central aspect of political theory (since Hegels Philosophy of Right) summarizes the philosophical and cultural identity of the paradigm of modernity, but the philosophical assumptions underlying the concept of right have not hitherto been subject to scrutiny. Yannaras shows that the starting-point of the concept of right is a phenomenalistic naturalism, which presupposes an abstract concept of the human subject as a fundamentally undifferentiated natural individual. The question is also explored of how the priority accorded to this concept of right is related to the contemporary crisis of the modern politico-social paradigm, while a new preface from the translator underlines the continued significance of Yannaras proposal for Anglophone readers. Against the modern concept of right with its illusion of objectivity, The Inhumanity of Right sketches out the basic lines of a political theory that prioritizes new social needs that reflect the relational character of the human person.

This is the first edited collection to bring together classic pieces and new work by leading scholars of Thomas Reid. The contributors explore key elements of Reid's moral theory in an organised and thematic way, offering a balanced and broad ranging volume.

Value, Reality, and Desire is an extended argument for a robust realism about value. The robust realist affirms the following distinctive theses. There are genuine claims about value which are true or false - there are facts about value. These value-facts are mind-independent - they are not reducible to desires or other mental states, or indeed to any non-mental facts of a non-evaluative kind. And these genuine, mind-independent, irreducible value-facts are causally efficacious. Values, quite literally, affect us. These are not particularly fashionable theses, and taken as a whole they go somewhat against the grain of quite a lot of recent work in the metaphysics of value. Further, against the received view, Oddie argues that we can have knowledge of values by experiential acquaintance, that there are experiences of value which can be both veridical and appropriately responsive to the values themselves. Finally, these value-experiences are not the products of some exotic and implausible faculty of 'intuition'. Rather, they are perfectly mundane and familiar mental states - namely, desires. This view explains how values can be 'intrinsically motivating', without falling foul of the widely accepted 'queerness' objection. There are, of course, other objections to each of the realist's claims. In showing how and why these objections fail, Oddie introduces a wealth of interesting and original insights about issues of wider interest - including the nature of properties, reduction, supervenience, and causation. The result is a novel and interesting account which illuminates what would otherwise be deeply puzzling features of value and desire and the connections between them.

The book has no illustrations or index. Purchasers are entitled to a free trial membership in the General Books Club where they can select from more than a million books without charge. Subjects: Fishing; Social Science / Sociology / Rural; Sports

Francis BACON, in his Novum Organum, Robert BOYLE, in his Skeptical Chemist and Rene DESCARTES, in his Discourse on Method; all of these men were witnesses to the th scientific revolution, which, in the 17 century, began to awaken the western world from a long sleep. In each of these works, the author emphasizes the role of the experimental method in exploring the laws of Nature, that is to say, the way in which an experiment is designed, implemented according to tried and tested te- niques, and used as a basis for drawing conclusions that are based only on results, with their margins of error, taking into account contemporary traditions and prejudices. Two centuries later, Claude BERNARD, in his Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine, made a passionate plea for the application of the experimental method when studying the functions of living beings. Twenty-first century Biology, which has been fertilized by highly sophisticated techniques inherited from Physics and Chemistry, blessed with a constantly increasing expertise in the manipulation of the genome, initiated into the mysteries of information techn- ogy, and enriched with the ever-growing fund of basic knowledge, at times appears to have forgotten its roots."

Phil Hutchinson engages with philosophers of emotion in both the analytic and continental traditions. He advances a framework for understanding emotion - world-taking cognitivism and argues that reductionist accounts of emotion leave us in a state of poverty regarding our understanding of the world and ourselves.

Morality and the Nature of Law explores the conceptual relationship between morality and the criteria that determine what counts as law in a given societythe criteria of legal validity. Is it necessary condition for a legal system to include moral criteria of legal validity? Is it even possible for a legal system to have moral criteria of legal validity? The book considers the views of natural law theorists ranging from Blackstone to Dworkin and rejects them, arguing that it is not conceptually necessary that the criteria of legal validity include moral norms. Further, it rejects the exclusive positivist view, arguing instead that it is conceptually possible for the criteria of validity to include moral norms. In the process of considering such questions, this book considers Raz's views concerning the nature of authority and Shapiro's views about the guidance function of law, which have been thought to repudiate the conceptual possibility of moral criteria of legal validity. The book, then, articulates a thought experiment that shows that it is possible for a legal system to have such criteria and concludes with a chapter that argues that any legal system, like that of the United States, which affords final authority over the content of the law to judges who are fallible with respect to the requirements of morality is a legal system with purely source-based criteria of validity.

Honor For Us is the first contemporary philosophical inquiry into the concept of honor. It is unique not only in its analysis of six distinct concepts of honor, which includes an investigation into the place of honor in religious thought and ethics, but also in its interpretation of honor's prevalence in our own culture. Many would like to discard honor altogether as "obsolete", but Sessions contends that the concept of honor is poorly understood, standing sorely in need of clarification. He argues that the notion of honor remains viable in the face of powerful criticism, and that it has important features which warrant our normative interest. While not downplaying the "dark side" of honor (violence, sexism, inegalitarianism, its abuse in religion), Sessions shows that honor not only constitutes a descriptively useful concept but also remains a potentially valuable concept for us today.

How we treat animals arouses strong emotions. Many people are repulsed by photographs of cruelty to animals and respond passionately to how we make animals suffer for food, science, and sport. But is this, as some argue, a purely emotional issue? Are there really no rational grounds for opposing our current treatment of animals?
In Why Animal Suffering Matters, Andrew Linzey shows that when analyzed impartially the rational case for extending moral solicitude to all sentient beings is much stronger than many suppose. Indeed, Linzey shows that many of the justifications for inflicting animal suffering in fact provide grounds for protecting them. Because animals, the argument goes, lack reason or souls or language, harming them is not an offense. Linzey suggests that just the opposite is true, that the inability of animals to give or withhold consent, their inability to represent their interests, their moral innocence, and their relative defenselessness all compel us not to harm them. Linzey further shows that the arguments in favor of three controversial practices--hunting with dogs, fur farming, and commercial sealing--cannot withstand rational critique. He considers the economic, legal, and political issues surrounding each of these practices, appealing not to our emotions but to our reason, and shows that they are rationally unsupportable and morally repugnant.
Jeremy Bentham famously wrote of animals, "The question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? but Can they suffer?" In this superbly argued and deeply engaging book, Andrew Linzey not only shows that animals can and do suffer but also makes clear the harm that is done not only to them but to us when we causethem to suffer.