This is the final work of the distinguished philosopher Paul Ziff, whose earlier books include Understanding Understanding, Philosophical Turnings, and Semantic Analysis. It is carefully crafted and written in numbered paragraphs rather than chapters, in style of the later Wittgenstein. The work concerns morality, rationality, symbolism and imagery.
In the words of the author: "The primary thesis of this essay is that, although there are many different and conflicting moralities, both here in America and throughout the world, some of them can be criticized and rejected on rational grounds. There are other moralities that one can personally reject, but they cannot be criticized on rational grounds. The same is true of the various values and priorities that different people have. Some are open to criticism on rational grounds; others are not open to such criticism." His conclusion is: "Symbolism and imagery constitute the real and only basis of the moralities that I have endeavored to characterize here, my own morality and that of others. But the most fundamental image of all of my morality is that which is created by an appreciation of life, all life."

Rapid advances in cognitive neuroscience and converging technologies have led to a vigorous debate over cognitive enhancement. This book outlines the ethical and social issues, but goes on to focus on the policy dimensions, which until now have received much less attention. As the economic, social and personal stakes involved with cognitive enhancement are so high, and the advances in knowledge so swift, we are likely to see increasing demands for government involvement in cognitive enhancement techniques. The book therefore places these techniques in a political context and brings the subsequent considerations and divisions to the forefront of the debate, situating their resolution within the milieu of interest group politics. The book will provide a starting point from which readers can develop a balanced policy framework for addressing such concerns.

Ever since Harts The Concept of Law, legal philosophers agree that the practice of law-applying officials is a fundamental aspect of law. Yet there is a huge disagreement on the nature of this practice. Is it a conventional practice? Is it like the practice that takes place, more generally, when there is a social rule in a group? Does it share the nature of collective intentional action? The book explores the main responses to these questions, and claims that they fail on two main counts: current theories do not explain officials beliefs that they are under a duty qua members of an institution, and they do not explain officials disagreement about the content of these institutional duties. Based on a particular theory of collective action, the author elaborates then an account of certain institutions, and claims that the practice is an institutional practice of sorts. This would explain officials beliefs in institutional duties, and officials disagreement about those duties.

The book should be of interest to legal philosophers, but also to those concerned with group and social action theories and, more generally, with the nature of institutions."

What does it mean to say that imagination plays a role in moral reasoning, and what are the theoretical and practical implications? Engaging with three traditions in moral theory and confronting them with three contexts of moral practice, this book offers a more comprehensive framework to think about these questions. The author develops an argument about the relation between imagination and principles that moves beyond competition metaphors and center-periphery schemas. He shows that both cooperate and are equally necessary to cope with moral problems, and combines insights of different theories and disciplines to explore how this works in practice.

Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, first published in 1785, is still one of the most widely read and influential works of moral philosophy. This Broadview edition combines a newly revised version of T.K. Abbott's respected translation with material crucial for placing the Groundwork in the context of Kant's broader moral thought. A varied selection of other ethical writings by Kant on subjects including our moral duties, fundamental principles of justice, the concept of happiness, and the relation of morality to religion are included, along with important criticisms of Kant's ethics by Fichte, Schiller, Hegel, and Sidgwick.

This book discusses outcomes of a study by the National Institute of Mental Health, Czech Republic, examining moral integrity in the post-communist Czech-speaking environment. Chapters map the history of the Euro-Atlantic ethical disciplines from moral philosophy and psychology to evolutionary neuroscience and socio-biology. The authors emphasize the biological and social conditionality of ethics and call for greater differentiation of both research and applied psychological standards in today's globalised world. Using a non-European ethical system - Theravada Buddhism - as a case study, the authors explore the differences in English and Czech interpretations of the religion. They analyse cognitive styles and language as central variables in formatting and interpreting moral values, with important consequences for cultural transferability of psychological instruments. This book will appeal to academics and other specialists in psychology, psychiatry, sociology and related fields, as well as to readers interested in the psychology of ethics.

This book presents a novel proposal for establishing justice and social harmony in the aftermath of genocide. It argues that justice should be determined by the victims of genocide rather than a detached legal system, since such a form of justice is more consistent with a socially grounded ethics, with a democracy that privileges citizen decision-making, and with human rights. The book covers the Holocaust; genocides in Argentina, South Africa, Rwanda, Latin America, and Australia, as well as crimes against humanity in Italy and France. From show trials to state- enforced forgiveness, the book examines various methods that have been used since 1945 to punish the individuals and groups responsible for genocide and how they have ultimately failed to deliver true justice to the victims. The only way to end this failure, the book points out, is to return justice to the victims. This simple proposition; however, challenges the Enlightenment tradition of Western law which was built on the refusal to allow victims to determine the measure of justice. That would amount, according to Bacon, Hegel, and Kant to a revenge system and bring social chaos. But, as this book points out, forgiveness is only something victims can give, no-one can demand it. In order to establish a lasting peace, it is necessary to re-examine the philosophical and theoretical refusal to return justice to the victims. The engaging argument put forth in this book can help deliver true justice and re-establish international social harmony in the aftermath of genocide. Genocide is ubiquitous in the modern, global world. It's understanding is highly relevant for the understanding of specific and perpetuating challenges in migration. Genocide forces the migration of millions to avoid crimes against humanity. When they flee war zones they bring their fears, hates, and misery with them. So migration research must engage fully with the experience of genocide, its human conseque nces and the ethical dilemmas it poses to all societies. Not to do so, will make it more difficult to understand and live with newcomers and to achieve some sort of harmony in host countries, as well as those which are centers of genocide.

This new book by Michael Slote argues that Western philosophy on the whole has overemphasized rational control and autonomy at the expense of the important countervailing value and virtue of receptivity. Recently the ideas of caring and empathy have received a great deal of philosophical and public attention, but both these notions rest on the deeper and broader value of receptivity, and in From Enlightenment to Receptivity, Slote seeks to show that we need to focus more on receptivity if we are to attain a more balanced sense and understanding of what is important to us.
Beginning with a critique of Enlightenment thinking that calls into question its denial of any central role to considerations of emotion and empathy, he goes on to show how a greater emphasis on these factors and on the receptivity that underlies them can give us a more realistic, balanced, and sensitive understanding of our core ethical and epistemological values. This means rejecting post-modernism's blanket rejection of reason and of compelling real values and recognizing, rather, that receptivity should play a major role in how we lead our lives as individuals, in how we relate to nature, in how we acquire knowledge about the world, and in how we relate morally and politically with others.

The author presents a new philosophical theory according to which we need intuitions and emotions in order to have objective moral knowledge, which is called affectual intuitionism. Affectual Intuitionism combines ethical intuitionism with a cognitive theory of emotions.

This book presents new findings that deal with different facets of the well-being of children and their relevance to the proper treatment of children. The well-being of children is considered against the background of a wide variety of legal, political, medical, educational and familial perspectives. The book addresses diverse issues from a range of disciplinary perspectives using a variety of methods. It has three major sections with the essays in each section loosely organized about a common general theme. The first section focuses on issues concerning the relation between children's well-being and autonomy or agency. The second section deals with child well-being insofar as the limits of parental authority are concerned. The third section has a more applied orientation and addresses a variety of public policy controversies involving the interpretation of children's well-being.

Americans pride themselves on being an ethical people. They go to church, quote the Bible, erect statues, and discuss morality with abandon. They also trust their government to do the right thing when it comes to delivering legal justice and conducting foreign policy. Trouble is, American foreign policy has yielded some pretty spectacular ethical lapses, and (as 9/11 starkly demonstrated) the world is beginning to notice. Here, Mark Gibney lays out some of the most egregious insults the U.S. has visited upon international law, economic justice, and human rights in recent times. He covers everything from multinational corporations, the first Persian Gulf war, and Guantanamo Bay to American refugee policy, foreign aid, and global environmental degradation. Through all these examples, he exposes the discrepancy between the guise of ethical policy motivation and the reality of situational international ethics or worse. He shows us how we practice 'easy ethics' in an uneasy world, and how it is beginning to catch up with us. Part I concludes with a gallop through the alphabet of countries where the U.S. has engaged in nefarious legal behavior and supported brutal dictatorships everywhere from Argentina to Zaire. Part II offers a cautious 'coda of hope' in exploring recent trends toward public political apology and forgiveness, new U.S. policies toward AIDS in Africa, and renewed civic commitment flowing out of the tragedy of 9/11. Only when the exercise of American ethics becomes as muscular as our use of military force will the United States become the ethical superpower it projects itself to be. And only then will the concert of nations join us in the harmonization of global governance."

This book recovers Aristotle's understanding of the roles of rhetoric and prudence in public leadership, comparing it to the other major political theories of leadership: utilitarianism, as advocated by J.S. Mill, and duty-ethics, as advocated by Immanuel Kant.

What effect does creativity have on individuals, groups and societies, and on the fundamental values on which they base their actions and institutions? What constitutes good and evil, right and wrong, and how does creativity disrupt these beliefs? 'The Ethics of Creativity' brings together an impressive collaboration of thinkers from several countries and disciplines to illuminate the thorny issues that arise when novel ideas and products brought forth by creativity collide with the rules and norms of what we believe to be right or good.

This work is an introductory treatment of issues and options in social and bioethics which center on the end of life. Moreland and Geisler have attempted to simplify and summarize various end-of-life topics without being simplistic or caricaturing different viewpoints, even though the authors' own viewpoints are made perfectly clear. A comprehensive bibliography, glossary, and subject and author index make this a valuable textbook as well as a resource for further study. The major purpose of this book is to make the reader think more clearly and deeply about the important issues discussed between its covers. Beginning the work is an essay that introduces the dilemma of ethical decisions. The following chapters separately discuss the situations of abortion, infanticide, euthanasia, suicide, capital punishment, and war. The discussion concludes with a chapter of practical and theoretical guidance for making ethical decisions. A glossary, subject index, author index, and selected bibliography for each chapter make this a valuable text. This important work will not only appeal to experienced philosophers, but also to students of moral philosophy, theology, and ethics.

This book details possible ethical situations and pitfalls that forensic psychiatric experts would commonly encounter when making a court testimony. Richly illustrated with cases from medicine, psychiatry, and law, this elegantly written volume examines the common moral ground that links these usually separate domains, and relates forensic ethics to larger concepts of morality and justice.

Each chapter can be read independently, so useful to a variety of courses. It presupposes no prior knowledge, so useful for introductory, as well as more advanced, courses. It enables students to progress from practical issues to moral theories. It introduces debates over controversial and topical moral and political issues - drug laws, punishment, civil disobedience, and global poverty. It presents clear and concise examination of key concepts in moral and political theory - liberty, liberty-limiting principles (harm, offence, paternalism, and harmless wrongdoing), rights, equality and social justice.This title provides a clear and concise introduction to moral and political philosophy which critically analyzes arguments about controversial and topical practical issues - drug laws, justifications of punishment, civil disobedience, whether there is a duty to obey the law, and global poverty.

This collection explores the nature and role of ethics within anarchist thought and practice, examining normative, meta-ethical and applied ethical issues through some of the theoretical insights of anarchism. It comprises contributions from international scholars working within the fields of philosophy and political theory.

This book draws on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, psychology, neuroscience and Buddhist philosophy to explicate Merleau-Ponty's unwritten ethics. Daly contends that though Merleau-Ponty never developed an ethics per se, there is significant textual evidence that clearly indicates he had the intention to do so. This book highlights the explicit references to ethics that he offers and proposes that these, allied to his ontological commitments, provide the basis for the development of an ethics. In this work Daly shows how Merleau-Ponty's relational ontology, in which the interdependence of self, other and world is affirmed, offers an entirely new approach to ethics. In contrast to the 'top-down' ethics of norms, obligations and prescriptions, Daly maintains that Merleau-Ponty's ethics is a 'bottom-up' ethics which depends on direct insight into our own intersubjective natures, the 'I' within the 'we' and the 'we' within the 'I'; insight into the real nature of our relation to others and the particularities of the given situation. Merleau-Ponty and the Ethics of Intersubjectivity is an important contribution to the scholarship on the later Merleau-Ponty which will be of interest to graduate students and scholars. Daly offers informed readings of Merleau-Ponty's texts and the overall approach is both scholarly and innovative.

Although they were not written by Kant himself, the transcripts of his lectures constitute an important source for philosophical research today. Some of the contributions presented in this volume discuss the authenticity and significance of these transcripts, for example the status of Kant's lectures on logic and anthropology, while others shed light on the historical formation of specific writings, for instance the texts on the philosophy of religion. The contributions provide new insights into Kant's philosophy, that, if looking at Kant's published writings alone, we would not be able to gain. In a number of cases, a critical analysis of Kant's lectures gives us a better understanding of his published works. Thus his lectures on metaphysics shed new light on his Critique of Pure Reason, while the lecture on natural law is a valuable source for the understanding of his published legal writings.

The downsides of monogamy are felt by most people engaged in long-term relationships, including restrictions on self-discovery, limits on friendship, sexual boredom, and a circumscribed understanding of intimacy. Yet, a "happily ever after" monogamy is assumed to be the ideal form of romantic love in many modern societies: a relationship that is morally ideal and will bring the most happiness to its two partners. In Why It's OK to Not Be Monogamous, Justin L. Clardy deeply questions these assumptions. He rejects the claim that non-monogamy among honest, informed and consenting adults is morally impermissible. He shows instead how polyamorous relationships can actually be exemplars of moral virtue. The book discusses how social and political forces sustain and reward monogamous relationships. The book defines non-monogamy as a privative concept; a negation of monogamy. Looking at its prevalence in the United States, the book explains how common criticisms of non-monogamy come up short. Clardy argues, as some researchers have recently shown-monogamy relies on continually demonizing non-monogamy to sustain its moral status. Finally, the book concludes with a focus on equality, asking what justice for polyamorous individuals might look like.

Being Apart from Reasons deals with the question of how we should go about using reasons to decide what to do. More particularly, the book presents objections to the most common response given by contemporary legal and political theorists to the moral complexity of decision-making in modern societies, namely: the attempt to release public agents from their argumentative burden by insulating a particular set of reasons from the general pool of reasons and assigning the former systematic priority over all other reasons. If those attempts succeed, public agents should not reason comprehensively, taking into account all reasons and weighing them against one another. Some reasons would be excluded from decision-making by kind.

That strategy is apparent both in Rawlsa (TM) claim that reasons concerning the right are systematically prior to reasons concerning the good and in Raza (TM)s claim that pre-emptive reasons are systematically prior to first-order reasons. The same strategy is also instantiated by certain arguments for the procedural value of law, such as Jeremy Waldrona (TM)s. In the book, each of those arguments for the insulation of reasons is objected to in order to defend the thesis the reasoning by public agents must always be as comprehensive as possible.

In order to reach that conclusion a particular picture of public decision-making in needed. That picture in provided by the comparison between the use of reasons in public and private decision-making which is carried out in the first two chapters of the book. That comparison brings to light peculiar features of public decision-making that imply the need for public agents to reason comprehensively before deciding. Theremaining chapters object to those arguments mentioned above which aim at justifying the exclusion of certain reasons from public agenta (TM)s decision-making.

It is widely held in contemporary moral philosophy that moral agency must be explained in terms of some more basic account of human nature. This book presents a fundamental challenge to this view. Specifically, it argues that sympathy, understood as an immediate and unthinking response to another's suffering, plays a constitutive role in our conception of what it is to be human, and specifically in that conception of human life on which anything we might call a moral life depends.