The Western-led efforts to establish a new post-Taliban order in Afghanistan are in serious trouble, and in this book Suhrke sets out to explain why. She begins with the dynamic of the intervention and its related peace-building mission. What were the forces shaping this grand international project? What explains the apparent systemic bias towards a deeper and broader international involvement? Many reasons have been cited for its limited achievements and ever-growing difficulties, the most common explanation being that the national, regional, and international contexts were unfavourable. But many policies were misguided while the multinational operation itself was extraordinarily and unnecessarily complex. Astri Suhrke's main thesis is that the international project itself contains serious tensions and contradictions that significantly contributed to the lack of progress. As a result, the deepening involvement proved dysfunctional: massive international support has created an extreme version of a rentier state that is predictably weak, corrupt and unaccountable; US-led military operations undercut the peacebuilding agenda, and more international aid and monitoring to correct the problems generate Afghan resentment and evasion. Continuing these policies will only reinforce the dynamic. The alternative is a less intrusive international presence, a longer time-frame for reconstruction and change, and negotiations with the militants that can end the war and permit a more Afghan-directed order to emerge.

Volume 2 takes up the account after Iraq withdrew from Khuzestan and is based upon material from both sides, from US Intelligence data, British Government documents and secret Iraqi files. Iraq's withdrawal exposed the great southern city of Basra to Iranian attack but it was shielded by fortifications based upon a huge anti-tank ditch, the so-called Fish Lake, which the Iranians tried to storm in the summer of 1982. This bloody failure left Tehran in a position where prestige prevented a withdrawal into Iran but the armed forces lacked the resources to bring the conflict to a favourable conclusion. During the next four years the Iranians tried to outflank the Fish Lake defences initially through the marshes in the north and finally through an attack on the Fao Peninsula which increased national prestige but was a strategic failure and paved the way for Iraq's massive victories in 1988. This followed a series of successful defensive battles in which the Iranians were driven back with great loss. This account describes the battles in greater detail than before and, by examining them, provides unique insights and ends many of the myths which are repeated in many other accounts of this conflict.