Bertrand Russell famously quipped that he didn't believe in God for the same reason that he didn't believe in a teapot in orbit between the earth and Mars: it is a bizarre assertion for which no evidence can be provided. Is belief in God really like belief in Russell's teapot? Kenneth L. Pearce argues that God is no teapot. God is a real answer to the deepest question of all: why is there something rather than nothing? Graham Oppy argues that we should believe that there are none but natural causal entities with none but natural causal properties-and hence should believe that there are no gods. Beginning from this basic disagreement, the authors proceed to discuss and debate a wide range of philosophical questions, including questions about explanation, necessity, rationality, religious experience, mathematical objects, the foundations of ethics, and the methodology of philosophy. Each author first presents his own side, and then they interact through two rounds of objections and replies. Pedagogical features include standard form arguments, section summaries, bolded key terms and principles, a glossary, and annotated reading lists. In the volume foreword, Helen De Cruz calls the debate "both edifying and a joy," and sums up what's at stake: "Here you have two carefully formulated positive proposals for worldviews that explain all that is: classical theism, or naturalistic atheism. You can follow along with the authors and deliberate: which one do you find more plausible?" Though written with beginning students in mind, this debate will be of interest to philosophers at all levels and to anyone who values careful, rational thought about the nature of reality and our place in it.

Hans Christian Orsted (1777-1851) is of great importance as a scientist and philosopher far beyond the borders of Denmark and his own time. At the centre of an international network of scholars, he was instrumental in founding the world picture of modern physics. Orsted was the physicist who brought Kant's metaphysics to fruition. In 1820 his discovery of electro-magnetism, a phenomenon that could not possibly exist according to his adversaries, changed the course of research in physics. It inspired Michael Faraday's experiments and discovery of the adverse effect, magneto-electric induction. The two physical phenomena were later described in mathematical equations by J.C. Maxwell. Together these discoveries constitute the prerequisites for the overwhelming development of modern technology. But Orsted was also one of the cultural leaders and organizers of the Danish Golden Age (together with Grundtvig, Kierkegaard, and Hans-Christian Andersen, his protege), and made significant contributions to aesthetics, philosophy, pedagogy, politics, and religion. Orsted remarkably bridged the gap between science, the humanities, and the arts.

In our everyday activities we use material objects in different shapes and forms to solve various practical problems. We may use a knife to tighten a screw, turn an old washing machine drum into a fireplace, use the edge of a kitchen countertop to open a bottle, or place a hammer on the puncture patch glued to a bike's inner tube to exert pressure on the patch until the glue dries. How should we identify these objects? What functions do they have? If we want to understand the role which material objects play in our everyday activities, we need to move away from universal identifications of objects. This is because universal identifications are not sensitive to contextual differences and cannot describe how each individual user connects to their surrounding objects in an infinite variety of contexts. Problem Solving Technologies provides a user-friendly understanding of technological objects. This book develops a framework to characterise and categorize technological objects at the level of users' subjective experiences.

The present volume is targeted at an interdisciplinary audience, i.e. partly at literary scholars/narratologists interested in time theory outside their field, and partly at scholars outside literary studies who in turn would like to learn more about such concepts created in narrative theory. The anthology assembles both English-speaking and German contributions to a narrative theory of time constructs which have thus far not been translated into English, but have - directly or indirectly - inspired the theoretical discourse across disciplines. The common methodological focus of the articles assembled here concerns the way in which the experience of chronological structure and ordering in (experienced or imagined) phenomena can be traced back to a logic of time "constructs". Narrative time constructs - that is: models of chronological ordering which we generate while processing narratively encoded information - constitute a particularly rich body of examples. How we experience time is directly linked to how we narrate information, and how we re-construct principles of temporal ordering in the narrated content. The logic of narrative time constructs has therefore been of interest not only to narrative theory, but also to philosophy and cognitive science, and more recently to computational approaches toward modelling human time experience.

This is a new volume of original essays on the metaphysics of quantum mechanics. The essays address questions such as: What fundamental metaphysics is best motivated by quantum mechanics? What is the ontological status of the wave function? Does quantum mechanics support the existence of any other fundamental entities, e.g. particles? What is the nature of the fundamental space (or space-time manifold) of quantum mechanics? What is the relationship between the fundamental ontology of quantum mechanics and ordinary, macroscopic objects like tables, chairs, and persons? The volume includes a comprehensive introduction with a history of quantum mechanics and the debate over its metaphysical interpretation focusing especially on the main realist alternatives.

The problem of free will is one of the great perennial issues of philosophy and has been discussed and debated over many centuries. The issues that arise in this sphere cover both metaphysics and morals and concern matters of central importance not only for philosophy but also for law, theology, psychology and the social sciences. What is at stake here is nothing less than our self-image as responsible moral agents who are in control of our own destiny and fate. The investigations and findings of modern science are judged by many to put skeptical pressure on this self-image and may challenge its credibility. During the past few decades the free will controversy has developed and evolved in exciting and significant ways. All the major parties involved in this debate have had to revise and amend their core positions with a view to responding to the sophisticated and searching arguments put forward by their critics and opponents.
The papers collected in this volume represent the most essential and indispensable contributions to the contemporary debate. The specific topics covered include: moral luck, skepticism and naturalism, the consequence argument, alternate possibilities, libertarian metaphysics, compatibilism and reason-responsive theories, illusionism and revisionism, optimism and pessimism, and the phenomenology of agency, as well as contributions relating to neuroscience and experimental philosophy. The collection is arranged in a way that presents the topics covered in a structured and organized manner. The general aim is to provide an effective guide for students and readers who are new to the field, as well as a useful collection for those who are already familiar with the topics and contributions. The contributors include many of the leading and most distinguished figures in the field, along with a number of younger scholars who have already had an impact and produced significant work.

Are there such things as merely possible people, who would have lived if our ancestors had acted differently? Are there future people, who have not yet been conceived? Questions like those raise deep issues about both the nature of being and its logical relations with contingency and change. In Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Timothy Williamson argues for positive answers to those questions on the basis of an integrated approach to the issues, applying the technical resources of modal logic to provide structural cores for metaphysical theories. He rejects the search for a metaphysically neutral logic as futile. The book contains detailed historical discussion of how the metaphysical issues emerged in the twentieth century development of quantified modal logic, through the work of such figures as Rudolf Carnap, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Arthur Prior, and Saul Kripke. It proposes higher-order modal logic as a new setting in which to resolve such metaphysical questions scientifically, by the construction of systematic logical theories embodying rival answers and their comparison by normal scientific standards. Williamson provides both a rigorous introduction to the technical background needed to understand metaphysical questions in quantified modal logic and an extended argument for controversial, provocative answers to them. He gives original, precise treatments of topics including the relation between logic and metaphysics, the methodology of theory choice in philosophy, the nature of possible worlds and their role in semantics, plural quantification compared to quantification into predicate position, communication across metaphysical disagreement, and problems for truthmaker theory.

Freedom, value, power, justice, government, legitimacy are major themes of the present inquiry. It explores the ontological structure of human beings associating with one another, the basic phenomenon of society. We human beings strive to become who we are in an ongoing power interplay with each other. Thinkers called as witnesses include Plato, Aristotle, Anaximander, Protagoras, Hobbes, Locke, Adam Smith, Hegel, Marx, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Schumpeter, Hayek, Schmitt, Ernst Junger, et al.

What is the connection between causation and responsibility? Is there a best way to theorize philosophically about causation? Which factors determine and influence what we judge to be the cause of something? Bringing together interdisciplinary research from experimental philosophy, traditional philosophy and psychology, this collection showcases the most recent developments and approaches to questions about causation. Chapters discuss the diverse theoretical ramifications of empirical findings in experimental philosophy of causation, providing a comprehensive survey of key issues such as the perception and learning of causal relations, omission, normative considerations, mechanism, voluntariness and legal theories of causation. With novel contributions from both experts and rising stars, Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Causation demonstrates the value of empirical work and opens new domains of inquiry at the cutting edge of the field.

This book explores moral responsibility, and whether it is compatible with causal determinism. Its author, K. E. Boxer, started out with deeply incompatibilist intuitions but became dissatisfied with the arguments that she and other contemporary incompatibilists marshalled in support of this view. Rethinking Responsibility has evolved out of her search for a more adequate argument. Boxer suggests that if incompatibilists are to be in a position to provide such an argument, they must shift their attention away from metaphysics and back to what H. L. A. Hart deemed the primary sense of the concept of moral responsibility, viz., the sense of liability. To say that an agent is morally responsible for an action in this sense is to say that she satisfies the necessary causal and capacity conditions for desert of certain forms of response. If incompatibilists are to show that among those conditions is a requirement for some form of ultimate responsibility incompatible with determinism, they must first clarify their understanding of moral desert and the moral responses associated with attributions of responsibility. The book examines different possible understandings of moral liability-responsibility based on different possible accounts of the nature of moral blame, the moral desert of punishment, and the relation between desert of moral blame and desert of punishment. A focal point throughout the discussion is whether, on any of the possible understandings, moral responsibility would require agents to be ultimately responsible for their actions in a way incompatible with causal determinism. Other issues discussed include what renders a defect a moral defect or a particular criticism a moral criticism, whether moral obligations are act-governing or will-governing, the connection between the moral reactive attitudes and the retributive sentiments, the relevance of the capacity to participate in ordinary interpersonal relationships, and whether it is possible to understand the moral desert of punishment in communicative terms. Boxer concludes that incompatibilists face an unenviable choice: either they must adopt an understanding of the moral desert of punishment that many find morally problematic, or they must abandon incompatibilism.

For the Parmenidean monist, there are no distinctions whatsoever-indeed, distinctions are unintelligible. In The Parmenidean Ascent, Michael Della Rocca aims to revive this controversial approach on rationalist grounds. He not only defends the attribution of such an extreme monism to the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides, but also embraces this extreme monism in its own right and expands these monistic results to many of the most crucial areas of philosophy, including being, action, knowledge, meaning, truth, and metaphysical explanation. On Della Rocca's account, there is no differentiated being, no differentiated action, knowledge, or meaning; rather all is being, just as all is action, all is knowledge, all is meaning. Motivating this argument is a detailed survey of the failure of leading positions (both historical and contemporary) to meet a demand for the explanation of a given phenomenon, together with a powerful, original version of a Bradleyan argument against the reality of relations. The result is a rationalist rejection of all distinctions and a skeptical denial of the intelligibility of ordinary, relational notions of being, action, knowledge, and meaning. Della Rocca then turns this analysis on the practice of philosophy itself. Followed to its conclusion, Parmenidean monism rejects any distinction between philosophy and the study of its history. Such a conclusion challenges methods popular in the practice of philosophy today, including especially the method of relying on intuitions and common sense as the basis of philosophical inquiry. The historically-minded and rationalist approach used throughout the book aims to demonstrate the ultimate bankruptcy of the prevailing methodology. It promises-on rationalist grounds-to inspire much soul-searching on the part of philosophers and to challenge the content and the methods of so much philosophy both now and in the past.

Denis McManus presents a new interpretation of Heideggers early vision of our subjectivity and of the world we inhabit. Heideggers fundamental ontology allows us to understand the creature that thinks as also one which acts, moves, even touches the world around it, a creature at home in the same ordinary world in which we too live our lives when outside of the philosophical closet; it also promises to free us from seemingly intractable philosophical problems, such as scepticism about the external world and other minds. But many of the concepts central to that vision are elusive; and some of the most widely accepted interpretations of Heideggers vision harbour within themselves deep and important unclarities, while others foist upon us hopeless species of idealism. Drawing on an examination of Heideggers work throughout the 1920s, Heidegger and the Measure of Truth offers a new way of understanding that vision. Central is the proposal that propositional thought presupposes what might be called a measure, a mastery of which only a recognizably worldly subject can possess. McManus shows how these ideas emerge through Heidegger's engagement with the history of philosophy and theology, and sets out a novel reading of key elements in the fundamental ontology, including Heidegger's concept of Being-in-the-world, his critique of scepticism, his claim to disavow both realism and idealism, and his difficult reflections on the nature of truth, science, authenticity, and philosophy itself. According to this reading, Heideggers central claims identify genuine demands that we must meet if we are to achieve the feat of thinking determinate thoughts about the world around us.

Perception is one of the most pervasive and puzzling problems in philosophy, generating a great deal of attention and controversy in philosophy of mind, psychology and metaphysics. If perceptual illusion and hallucination are possible, how can perception be what it intuitively seems to be, a direct and immediate access to reality? How can perception be both internally dependent and externally directed? Perception is an outstanding introduction to this fundamental topic, covering both the perennial and recent work on the problem. Adam Pautz examines four of the most important theories of perception: the sense datum view; the internal physical state view; the representational view; and naive realism, assessing each in turn. He also discusses the relationship between perception and the physical world and the issue of whether reality is as it appears. Useful examples are included throughout the book to illustrate the puzzles of perception, including hallucinations, illusions, the laws of appearance, blindsight, and neuroscientific explanations of our experience of pain, smell and color. The book covers both traditional philosophical arguments and more recent empirical arguments deriving from research in psychophysics and neuroscience. The addition of chapter summaries, suggestions for further reading and a glossary of terms make Perception essential reading for anyone studying the topic in detail, as well as for students of philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and metaphysics.

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is the forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. OSM offers a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Besides independent essays, volumes will often contain a critical essay on a recent book, or a symposium that allows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. Anyone who wants to know what's happening in metaphysics can start here.

Kierkegaard's Concepts is a comprehensive, multi-volume survey of the key concepts and categories that inform Kierkegaard's writings. Each article is a substantial, original piece of scholarship, which discusses the etymology and lexical meaning of the relevant Danish term, traces the development of the concept over the course of the authorship, and explains how it functions in the wider context of Kierkegaard's thought. Concepts have been selected on the basis of their importance for Kierkegaard's contributions to philosophy, theology, the social sciences, literature and aesthetics, thereby making this volume an ideal reference work for students and scholars in a wide range of disciplines.

Brian Skyrms presents a set of influential essays on the nature of quantity, probability, coherence, and induction. The first part explores the nature of quantity and includes essays on tractarian nominalism, combinatorial possibility, and coherence. Part Two proceeds to examine coherent updating of degrees of belief in various learning situations. Finally, in Part Three, Skyrms develops an account of aspects of inductive reasoning, which proceeds from specific problems to general considerations. These essays span the breadth of Skyrms's illustrious career and will be essential reading for scholars and advanced students in philosophy of science and formal epistemology.

This book offers new insights into truth, knowledge, and reality. It details a unique approach to epistemological relativism based on the concept of points of view. In a point of view, an aspect represents an object for a subject. By applying this concept of points of view, the author develops a consistent and adequate form of relativism, called viewpoint relativism, according to which epistemic questions like "Is X true (or justified or existing)" are viewpoint-dependent. The monograph examines central issues related to epistemological relativism. It analyzes major arguments pro and con from different opinions. The author presents the arguments of well-known philosophers. These include such thinkers as Paul Boghossian, John Dewey, Nelson Goodman, Martin Kusch, C.I. Lewis, John MacFarlane, Hilary Putnam, W.V.O. Quine, Richard Rorty, John Searle, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. In the process, the author deconstructs the standard account of correspondence theory of truth. Viewpoint relativism is a moderate relativism, which is not subjected to standard criticism of extreme relativism. This book argues that knowledge creation presupposes openness to different points of view and their comparison. It also explores the broader implications of viewpoint relativism into current debate about truth in society. The author defends a critical relativism, which accepts pluralism but is critical against all points of view. In the conclusion, he explores the relevance of viewpoint relativism to democracy by showing that the main threat of modern democratic society is not pluralism but absolutism and fundamentalism.

Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is the forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. OSM offers a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Besides independent essays, volumes will often contain a critical essay on a recent book, or a symposium that allows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. Anyone who wants to know what's happening in metaphysics can start here.

Mind, Meaning, and Reality contains fifteen philosophical papers by D. H. Mellor, including a new defense of "success semantics," and an introduction arguing that metaphysics can and need only be justified by doing it and not by a "meta-metaphysics," which it needs no more than physics needs metaphysics. The papers are grouped into three parts. Part I is about how the ways we are disposed to act fixes both what we believe and what we use language to mean. Part II is about what there is: the reality of dispositions; what makes beliefs and sentences true; why there is only one universe; and how social groups, and other things composed of parts, are related to the people and other things that constitute them. Part III is about time, and includes discussions of twentieth century developments in the philosophy of time; why Kant was right about tense, even though he was wrong about time; why forward time travel is trivial and backward time travel impossible; and what gives time its direction.

There are few topics more central to philosophical discussions than the meaning of being, and few thinkers offering a more compelling and original vision of that meaning than Edith Stein (1891-1942). Stein's magnum opus, drawing from her decades working with the early phenomenologists and intense years as a student and translator of medieval texts, lays out a grand vision, bringing together phenomenological and Scholastic insights into an integrated whole. The sheer scope of Stein's project in Finite and Eternal Being is daunting, and the text can be challenging to navigate. In this book, Sarah Borden Sharkey provides a guide to Stein's great final philosophical work and intellectual vision. The opening essays give an overview of Stein's method and argument and place Finite and Eternal Being both within its historical context and in relation to contemporary discussions. The author also provides clear, detailed summaries of each section of Stein's opus, drawing from the latest scholarship on Stein's manuscript. Edith Stein's Finite and Eternal Being: A Companion offers a unique guide, opening up Stein's grand cathedral-like vision of the meaning of being as the unfolding of meaning.

In this essay, Monaghan argues for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. According to this account, for an entity to possess a property is for that entity and that property to be numerically identical to each other. To defend this view, he argues against two views he call Externalism and Internalism about property possession. Monaghan argues that it is impossible for one entity to possess a second entity as a property. He provides replies to variety of objections one might raise against his account.

Available here for the first time in English, "Reality and Its Order" is a remarkable philosophical text by Werner Heisenberg, the father of quantum mechanics and one of the leading scientists of the 20th century. Written during the wartime years and initially distributed only to his family and trusted friends, the essay describes Heisenberg's philosophical view of how we understand the natural world and our role within it. In this volume, the essay is introduced by the physicist Helmut Rechenberg and annotated by the science historian Ernst Peter Fischer. The content, particularly within its historical context, will be of great interest to many physicists, philosophers and historians of science.

The ancient topic of universals was central to scholastic philosophy, which raised the question of whether universals exist as Platonic forms, as instantiated Aristotelian forms, as concepts abstracted from singular things, or as words that have universal signification. It might be thought that this question lost its importance after the decline of scholasticism in the modern period. However, the fourteen contributions contained in The Problem of Univerals in Early Modern Philosophy indicate that the issue of universals retained its vitality in modern philosophy. Modern philosophers in fact were interested in 3 sets of issues concerning universals: (i) issues concerning the ontological status of universals, (ii) issues concerning the psychology of the formation of universal concepts or terms, and (iii) issues concerning the value and use of universal concepts or terms in the acquisition of knowledge. Chapters in this volume consider the various forms of "Platonism," "conceptualism" and "nominalism" (and distinctive combinations thereof) that emerged from the consideration of such issues in the work of modern philosophers. Furthermore, this volume covers not only the canonical modern figures, namely, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Kant, but also more neglected figures such as Pierre Gassendi, Pierre-Sylvain Regis, Nicolas Malebranche, Henry More, Ralph Cudworth and John Norris.

What is it to occupy a first-person stance? Is the first-personal idea one has of oneself in conflict with the idea of oneself as a physical being? How, if there is a conflict, is it to be resolved? The Self recommends a new way to approach those questions, finding inspiration in theories about consciousness and mind in first millennial India. These philosophers do not regard the first-person stance as in conflict with the natural--their idea of nature is not that of scientific naturalism, but rather a liberal naturalism non-exclusive of the normative.
Jonardon Ganeri explores a wide range of ideas about the self: reflexive self-representation, mental files, and quasi-subject analyses of subjective consciousness; the theory of emergence as transformation; embodiment and the idea of a bodily self; the centrality of the emotions to the unity of self. Buddhism's claim that there is no self too readily assumes an account of what a self must be. Ganeri argues instead that the self is a negotiation between self-presentation and normative avowal, a transaction grounded in unconscious mind. Immersion, participation, and coordination are jointly constitutive of self, the first-person stance at once lived, engaged, and underwritten. And all is in harmony with the idea of the natural.

Despite Platonism's unquestioned claim to being one of the most influential movements in the history of philosophy, for a long time the conventional wisdom was that Platonists of late antiquity, or Neoplatonists, were so focused on otherworldly metaphysics that they simply neglected any serious study of the sensible world, which after all is 'merely' an image of the intelligible world. Only recently has this conventional wisdom begun to be dispelled. In fact, it is precisely because these thinkers did see the sensible world as an image of the intelligible world that they devoted so much time and energy to understanding its inner workings. Thus we find Neoplatonists writing on embryology, physiology, meteorology, and astronomy, among other subjects. Neoplatonism and the Philosophy of Nature collects essays by leading international scholars in the field which shed new light on how the Neoplatonists sought to understand and explain nature and natural phenomena. It is thematically divided into two parts, with the first part-The General Metaphysics of Nature-directed at the explication of central Neoplatonic metaphysical doctrines and their relation to the natural world, and the second part-Platonic Approaches to Individual Sciences-showing how these same doctrines play out in individual natural sciences such as elemental physics, geography, and biology. Together these essays show that a serious examination of Neoplatonic natural philosophy has far-reaching consequences for our general understanding of the metaphysics of Platonism as well as for our evaluation of their place in the history of science.