The seminal 1989 work of Douglas and Paulsen on the theory of Hilbert modules over function algebras precipitated a number of major research efforts. This in turn led to some intriguing and valuable results, particularly in the areas of operator theory and functional analysis. With the field now beginning to blossom, the time has come to collect those results in one volume.

Written by two of the most active and often-cited researchers in the field, Analytic Hilbert Modules offers a clear, logical survey of recent developments, including advances made by authors and others. It provides much-needed insight into function theory of several variables and includes significant results published here for the first time in areas such as characteristic space theory, rigidity phenomena, the equivalence problem, Arveson modules, extension theory, and reproducing Hilbert spaces on n-dimensional complex space.

Presenting a fresh look at process control, this new text demonstrates state-space approach shown in parallel with the traditional approach to explain the strategies used in industry today. Modern time-domain and traditional transform-domain methods are integrated throughout and explain the advantages and limitations of each approach; the fundamental theoretical concepts and methods of process control are applied to practical problems. To ensure understanding of the mathematical calculations involved, MATLAB (R) is included for numeric calculations and MAPLE for symbolic calculations, with the math behind every method carefully explained so that students develop a clear understanding of how and why the software tools work. Written for a one-semester course with optional advanced-level material, features include solved examples, cases that include a number of chemical reactor examples, chapter summaries, key terms, and concepts, as well as over 240 end-of-chapter problems, focused computational exercises and solutions for instructors.

This comprehensive volume covers a wide range of duality topics ranging from simple ideas in network flows to complex issues issues in non-convex optimization and multicriteria problems. In addition, it examines duality in the context of variational inequalities and vector variational inequalities as generalizations to optimization. Duality in Optimization and Variational Inequalities is intended for researchers and practitioners of optimization with the aim of enhancing their understanding of duality and offers a wider appreciation of optimality conditions in various scenarios and under different assumptions. It will enable the reader to use duality to devise more effective computational methods, and to aid more meaningful interpretation of optimization and variational inequality problems.

This book presents the huge variety of current contributions of game theory to economics. The impressive contributions fall broadly into two categories. Some lay out in a jargon free manner a particular branch of the theory, the evolution of one of its concepts, or a problem, that runs through its development. Others are original pieces of work that are significant to game theory as a whole.
After taking the reader through a concise history of game theory, the contributions include such themes as:
*the connections between Von Neumann's mathematical game theory and the domain assigned to him today
*the strategic use of information by game players
*the problem of the coordination of strategic choices between independent players
*cooperative games and their place within the literature of games plus new developments in non-cooperative games
*possible applications for game theory in industrial and financial economics differential qualitative games and entry dissuasion.

eBook available with sample pages: 0203167406

The Presidential Election Game may change the way you think about presidential elections and, for that matter, American politics in general. It is not filled with statistics about the voting behavior of citizens, nor does it give detailed histories of past campaigns. Rather, it is an analytic treatment of strategy in the race for the presidency, from the primaries to the general election. Using modern game theory and decision theory, Brams demonstrates why certain campaign strategies are more effective than others and supports his analysis with historical evidence.

Although valued for its ability to allow teams to collaborate and foster coalitional behaviors among the participants, game theory's application to networking systems is not without challenges. Distributed Strategic Learning for Wireless Engineers illuminates the promise of learning in dynamic games as a tool for analyzing network evolution and underlines the potential pitfalls and difficulties likely to be encountered. Establishing the link between several theories, this book demonstrates what is needed to learn strategic interaction in wireless networks under uncertainty, randomness, and time delays. It addresses questions such as: How much information is enough for effective distributed decision making? Is having more information always useful in terms of system performance? What are the individual learning performance bounds under outdated and imperfect measurement? What are the possible dynamics and outcomes if the players adopt different learning patterns? If convergence occurs, what is the convergence time of heterogeneous learning? What are the issues of hybrid learning? How can one develop fast and efficient learning schemes in scenarios where some players have more information than the others? What is the impact of risk-sensitivity in strategic learning systems? How can one construct learning schemes in a dynamic environment in which one of the players do not observe a numerical value of its own-payoffs but only a signal of it? How can one learn "unstable" equilibria and global optima in a fully distributed manner? The book provides an explicit description of how players attempt to learn over time about the game and about the behavior of others. It focuses on finite and infinite systems, where the interplay among the individual adjustments undertaken by the different players generates different learning dynamics, heterogeneous learning, risk-sensitive learning, and hybrid dynamics.

In the quarter of a century since three mathematicians and game theorists collaborated to create Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays, the book has become the definitive work on the subject of mathematical games. Now carefully revised and broken down into four volumes to accommodate new developments, the Second Edition retains the original's wealth of wit and wisdom. The authors' insightful strategies, blended with their witty and irreverent style, make reading a profitable pleasure. In Volume 2, the authors have a Change of Heart, bending the rules established in Volume 1 to apply them to games such as Cut-cake and Loopy Hackenbush. From the Table of Contents: - If You Can't Beat 'Em, Join 'Em! - Hot Bottles Followed by Cold Wars - Games Infinite and Indefinite - Games Eternal--Games Entailed - Survival in the Lost World

Vanderschraaf develops a new theory of game theory equilibrium selection in this book. The new theory defends general correlated equilibrium concepts and suggests a new analysis of convention.

This book covers crucial lacunae of the linear discrete-time time-invariant dynamical systems and introduces the reader to their treatment, while functioning under real, natural conditions, in forced regimes with arbitrary initial conditions. It provides novel theoretical tools necessary for the analysis and design of the systems operating in stated conditions. The text completely covers two well-known systems, IO and ISO, along with a new system, IIO. It discovers the concept of the full transfer function matrix F(z) in the z-complex domain, which incorporates the Z-transform of the system, input and another variable, vectors, all with arbitrary initial conditions. Consequently, it addresses the full system matrix P(z) and the full block diagram technique based on the use of F(z), which incorporates the Z-transform of the system, input and another variable, vectors, all with arbitrary initial conditions. The book explores the direct relationship between the system full transfer function matrix F(z) and the Lyapunov stability concept, definitions, and conditions, as well as with the BI stability concept, definitions, and conditions. The goal of the book is to unify the study and applications of all three classes of the linear discrete-time time-invariant system, for short systems.

A tour de force of theoretical reasoning, this book presents the most advanced analytical model of the bargaining process so far conceived. Focused essentially on the dynamics of the bargaining process, Coddington's model employs elements of several conceptual constructs--individual decision-making, theories of expectations and their adjustment, and environment concepts--to explain the nature of consistency in a bargainer's system of expectations and intentions. The book begins with a description of the bargaining process in an economic context and establishes an analytical framework. There follows a critical survey of bargaining theory in which the author selects those concepts, which he finds most valid and most applicable to his decision-making/expectation/adjustment model. The internal consistency of a wide class of bargaining models is then examined in a chapter on the relationship between decision-making and expectations. Since the theory of games has been used as a basis for bargaining process theory, the author devotes a chapter to an examination of the game-theoretic approach and an assessment of its value relative to his own approach. The author concludes with a study of the specific capabilities of his own analytical model, with discussion of the possible combinations of assumptions with which the investigator may work. Although stemming from a problem in economic theory and of immediate intent to economists, the book's contribution to the general theory of conflict process and interdependent decision-making make it an important study for students of politics and international affairs as well as management and labor relations specialists.

Despite the proliferation of video games in the twenty-first century, the theory of game design is largely underdeveloped, leaving designers on their own to understand what games really are. Helping you produce better games, Game Design Theory: A New Philosophy for Understanding Games presents a bold new path for analyzing and designing games. The author offers a radical yet reasoned way of thinking about games and provides a holistic solution to understanding the difference between games and other types of interactive systems. He clearly details the definitions, concepts, and methods that form the fundamentals of this philosophy. He also uses the philosophy to analyze the history of games and modern trends as well as to design games. Providing a robust, useful philosophy for game design, this book gives you real answers about what games are and how they work. Through this paradigm, you will be better equipped to create fun games.

The H control has been one of the important robust control approaches since the 1980s. This book extends the area to nonlinear stochastic H2/H control, and studies more complex and practically useful mixed H2/H controller synthesis rather than the pure H control. Different from the commonly used convex optimization method, this book applies the Nash game approach to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the mixed H2/H control. Researchers will benefit from our detailed exposition of the stochastic mixed H2/H control theory, while practitioners can apply our efficient algorithms to address their practical problems.

This volume presents a particular aspect of control theory-stabilization of programmed motion. Methods of the construction and synthesis of stabilizing controls are introduced together with original results and useful examples. The problem of optimal stabilization control synthesis is solved for linear systems of difference equations with quadratic quality criterion.

This classic on games and how to play them intelligently is being re-issued in a new, four volume edition. This book has laid the foundation to a mathematical approach to playing games. The wise authors wield witty words, which wangle wonderfully winning ways. In Volume 1, the authors do the Spade Work, presenting theories and techniques to "dissect" games of varied structures and formats in order to develop winning strategies.

Martin Nowak, one of the world's experts on evolution and game theory, working here with bestselling science writer Roger Highfield, turns an important aspect of evolutionary theory on its head to explain why cooperation, not competition, has always been the key to the evolution of complexity. In his first book written for a wide audience, this hugely influential scientist explains his cutting-edge research into the mysteries of cooperation, from the rise of multicellular life to Good Samaritans, and from cancer treatment to the success of large companies. With wit and clarity, and an eye to its huge implications, Nowak and Highfield make the case that cooperation, not competition, is the defining human trait. "SuperCooperators "will expand our understanding of evolution and provoke debate for years to come.

This text provides deep and comprehensive coverage of the mathematical background for data science, including machine learning, optimal recovery, compressed sensing, optimization, and neural networks. In the past few decades, heuristic methods adopted by big tech companies have complemented existing scientific disciplines to form the new field of Data Science. This text embarks the readers on an engaging itinerary through the theory supporting the field. Altogether, twenty-seven lecture-length chapters with exercises provide all the details necessary for a solid understanding of key topics in data science. While the book covers standard material on machine learning and optimization, it also includes distinctive presentations of topics such as reproducing kernel Hilbert spaces, spectral clustering, optimal recovery, compressed sensing, group testing, and applications of semidefinite programming. Students and data scientists with less mathematical background will appreciate the appendices that provide more background on some of the more abstract concepts.

A comprehensive study of the connection game genre, Connection Games provides a survey of known connection games while exploring common themes and strategies. This book aims to impose some structure on this increasingly large family of games, and to define exactly what constitutes a connection game. Key games are examined in detail and complete rules for over 200 connection games and variants are provided. A connection game is a board game in which players vie to develop or complete a specific type of connection with their pieces. This might involve forming a path between two or more goals, completing a closed loop, or gathering all pieces together into a single connected group.

The progress of society can only happen through interpersonal cooperation, because only cooperation can bring about mutual benefit, thus bringing happiness to each person. This should be our collective rationality, but we often see it conflicts with individual interests, which leads to the so-called "Prisoners' Dilemma" and does not bring happiness to all. From a game theoretical perspective, this book addresses the issue of how people can cooperate better. It has two objectives. The first is to use common language to systematically introduce the basic methodologies and core conclusions of Game Theory, including the Nash equilibrium, multiple equilibriums, dynamic games, etc. Mathematics and theoretical models are used to the minimum necessary scope too, to make this book get access to ordinary readers with elementary mathematical training. The second objective is to utilize these methods and conclusions to analyze various Chinese social issues and institutional arrangements, with a focus on the reasons people exhibit non-cooperative behaviors as well as the institutions and cultures that promote interpersonal cooperation. In addition to economics, specialists in sociology, law, history, politics and management will also be attracted by this book for its insightful analysis on the issue of cooperation in these fields. Also, readers curious about Chinese society will benefit from this book.

Human behavior often violates the predictions of rational choice theory. This realization has caused many social psychologists and experimental economists to attempt to develop an experimentally-based variant of game theory as an alternative descriptive model. The impetus for this book is the interest in the development of such a theory that combines elements from both disciplines and appeals to both.
The editors have brought together leading researchers in the fields of experimental economics, behavioral game theory, and social dilemmas to engage in constructive dialogue across disciplinary boundaries. This book offers a comprehensive overview of the new insights into the motivation of human behavior under a variety of naturally or artificially induced incentive structures that are emerging from their work. Amnon Rapoport--a pioneer and leader in experimental study and quantitative modeling of human decisions in social and interactive contexts--is honored.

This book presents the most important published articles of Martin Shubik who has made a path-breaking contribution to game theory and political economy. The volume shows how game theory can be used to explore fundamental problems in economics, political science and operations research.The book opens with an introduction to the career of Martin Shubik and the influences which have shaped his research. In this, and the chapters which follow, Martin Shubik stresses the importance of formulative models as playable games and the treatment of information to describe decision making among individuals, using examples from industrial organization. He demonstrates that games are a fruitful way to extend our knowledge of competition among the few. In addition, he considers the importance of gaming in economics and business suggesting that experimental games can be used to illustrate problems and principles in multi-person decision making. This book will be welcomed by economists, game theorists, political scientists, and operations researchers.

In the quarter of a century since three mathematicians and game theorists collaborated to create Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays, the book has become the definitive work on the subject of mathematical games. Now carefully revised and broken down into four volumes to accommodate new developments, the Second Edition retains the original's wealth of wit and wisdom. The authors' insightful strategies, blended with their witty and irreverent style, make reading a profitable pleasure. In Volume 4, the authors present a Diamond of a find, covering one-player games such as Solitaire.

Mathematics in Games, Sports, and Gambling: The Games People Play, Second Edition demonstrates how discrete probability, statistics, and elementary discrete mathematics are used in games, sports, and gambling situations. With emphasis on mathematical thinking and problem solving, the text draws on numerous examples, questions, and problems to explain the application of mathematical theory to various real-life games.This updated edition of a widely adopted textbook considers a number of popular games and diversions that are mathematically based or can be studied from a mathematical perspective. Requiring only high school algebra, the book is suitable for use as a textbook in seminars, general education courses, or as a supplement in introductory probability courses.New in this Edition: Many new exercises, including basic skills exercises More answers in the back of the book Expanded summary exercises, including writing exercises More detailed examples, especially in the early chapters An expansion of the discrete adjustment technique for binomial approximation problems New sections on chessboard puzzles that encourage students to develop graph theory ideas New review material on relations and functions Exercises are included in each section to help students understand the various concepts. The text covers permutations in the two-deck matching game so derangements can be counted. It introduces graphs to find matches when looking at extensions of the five-card trick and studies lexicographic orderings and ideas of encoding for card tricks.The text also explores linear and weighted equations in the section on the NFL passer rating formula and presents graphing to show how data can be compared or displayed. For each topic, the author includes exercises based on real games and actual sports data.

Optimization on Riemannian manifolds-the result of smooth geometry and optimization merging into one elegant modern framework-spans many areas of science and engineering, including machine learning, computer vision, signal processing, dynamical systems and scientific computing. This text introduces the differential geometry and Riemannian geometry concepts that will help applied mathematics, computer science and engineering students and researchers gain a firm mathematical grounding to use these tools confidently in their research. Its chart-last approach will prove more intuitive from an optimizer's viewpoint, and all definitions and theorems are motivated to build time-tested optimization algorithms. Starting from first principles, the text goes on to cover current research on topics including worst-case complexity and geodesic convexity. Readers will appreciate the tricks of the trade for conducting research and for numerical implementations sprinkled throughout the book.

Game Theory--the formal modelling of conflict and cooperation--first emerged as a recognized field with the publication of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's "Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour" in 1944. Since then, game-theoretic thinking about choice of strategies and the interdependence of people's actions has influenced all the social sciences. However, little is known about the history of the theory of strategic games "prior" to this publication.
In this volume, the history of strategic games--from its origins up to 1945--is traced through the work of 19th Century economists such as Cournot and Edgeworth; voting theorists, including Lewis Carroll; conflict theorists Richardson and Lanchester; probabilists such as Bertrand, Borel, and Ville; and later economists, notably Stackelberg and Zeuthen. This authoritative account of the history of game theory concludes with a historical perspective on the achievement of von Neumann and Morgenstern and an appraisal of the reception of their book.

The ancient game of Go is one of the less obvious candidates for mathematical analysis. With the development of new concepts in combinatorial game theory, the authors have been able to analyze Go games and find solutions to real endgame problems that have stumped professional Go players. Go players with an interest in mathematics and mathematicians who work in game theory will not want to miss this book because it describes substantial connections between the two subjects that have been, until now, largely unrecognized.