Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Universite Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.

Eminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information.

"Game Theory" will be useful for students at the graduate level in economics, political science, operations research, and applied mathematics. Everyone who uses game theory in research will find this book essential.

Political Game Theory, first published in 2007, is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.

The scientific study of complex systems has transformed a wide range of disciplines in recent years, enabling researchers in both the natural and social sciences to model and predict phenomena as diverse as earthquakes, global warming, demographic patterns, financial crises, and the failure of materials. In this book, Didier Sornette boldly applies his varied experience in these areas to propose a simple, powerful, and general theory of how, why, and when stock markets crash. Most attempts to explain market failures seek to pinpoint triggering mechanisms that occur hours, days, or weeks before the collapse. Sornette proposes a radically different view: the underlying cause can be sought months and even years before the abrupt, catastrophic event in the build-up of cooperative speculation, which often translates into an accelerating rise of the market price, otherwise known as a "bubble." Anchoring his sophisticated, step-by-step analysis in leading-edge physical and statistical modeling techniques, he unearths remarkable insights and some predictions--among them, that the "end of the growth era" will occur around 2050. Sornette probes major historical precedents, from the decades-long "tulip mania" in the Netherlands that wilted suddenly in 1637 to the South Sea Bubble that ended with the first huge market crash in England in 1720, to the Great Crash of October 1929 and Black Monday in 1987, to cite just a few. He concludes that most explanations other than cooperative self-organization fail to account for the subtle bubbles by which the markets lay the groundwork for catastrophe. Any investor or investment professional who seeks a genuine understanding of looming financial disasters should read this book. Physicists, geologists, biologists, economists, and others will welcome Why Stock Markets Crash as a highly original "scientific tale," as Sornette aptly puts it, of the exciting and sometimes fearsome--but no longer quite so unfathomable--world of stock markets.

This book presents a short introduction to continuous-time financial models. An overview of the basics of stochastic analysis precedes a focus on the Black-Scholes and interest rate models. Other topics covered include self-financing strategies, option pricing, exotic options and risk-neutral probabilities. Vasicek, Cox-Ingersoll-Ross, and Heath-Jarrow-Morton interest rate models are also explored. The author presents practitioners with a basic introduction, with more rigorous information provided for mathematicians. The reader is assumed to be familiar with the basics of probability theory. Some basic knowledge of stochastic integration and differential equations theory is preferable, although all preliminary information is given in the first part of the book. Some relatively simple theoretical exercises are also provided.

Optimization is an essential technique for solving problems in areas as diverse as accounting, computer science and engineering. Assuming only basic linear algebra and with a clear focus on the fundamental concepts, this textbook is the perfect starting point for first- and second-year undergraduate students from a wide range of backgrounds and with varying levels of ability. Modern, real-world examples motivate the theory throughout. The authors keep the text as concise and focused as possible, with more advanced material treated separately or in starred exercises. Chapters are self-contained so that instructors and students can adapt the material to suit their own needs and a wide selection of over 140 exercises gives readers the opportunity to try out the skills they gain in each section. Solutions are available for instructors. The book also provides suggestions for further reading to help students take the next step to more advanced material.

Nature-Inspired Optimization Algorithms provides a systematic introduction to all major nature-inspired algorithms for optimization. The book's unified approach, balancing algorithm introduction, theoretical background and practical implementation, complements extensive literature with well-chosen case studies to illustrate how these algorithms work. Topics include particle swarm optimization, ant and bee algorithms, simulated annealing, cuckoo search, firefly algorithm, bat algorithm, flower algorithm, harmony search, algorithm analysis, constraint handling, hybrid methods, parameter tuning and control, as well as multi-objective optimization. This book can serve as an introductory book for graduates, doctoral students and lecturers in computer science, engineering and natural sciences. It can also serve a source of inspiration for new applications. Researchers and engineers as well as experienced experts will also find it a handy reference.

Now in its second edition, this popular textbook on game theory is unrivalled in the breadth of its coverage, the thoroughness of technical explanations and the number of worked examples included. Covering non-cooperative and cooperative games, this introduction to game theory includes advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings and the bargaining set. This edition contains new material on stochastic games, rationalizability, and the continuity of the set of equilibrium points with respect to the data of the game. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a range of disciplines. With numerous exercises, and the addition of a solution manual for instructors with this edition, the book is an extensive guide to game theory for undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering and life sciences, and will also serve as useful reference for researchers.

This self-contained introduction shows how stochastic geometry techniques can be used for studying the behaviour of heterogeneous cellular networks (HCNs). The unified treatment of analytic results and approaches, collected for the first time in a single volume, includes the mathematical tools and techniques used to derive them. A single canonical problem formulation encompassing the analytic derivation of Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR) distribution in the most widely-used deployment scenarios is presented, together with applications to systems based on the 3GPP-LTE standard, and with implications of these analyses on the design of HCNs. An outline of the different releases of the LTE standard and the features relevant to HCNs is also provided. A valuable reference for industry practitioners looking to improve the speed and efficiency of their network design and optimization workflow, and for graduate students and researchers seeking tractable analytical results for performance metrics in wireless HCNs.

Fascinating, accessible introduction to enormously important intellectual system with numerous applications to social, economic, political problems. Newly revised edition offers overview of game theory, then lucid coverage of the two-person zero-sum game with equilibrium points; the general, two-person zero-sum game; utility theory; other topics. Problems at start of each chapter. Foreword to First Edition by Oskar Morgenstern. Bibliography.

This book presents a crisis scenario generator with black swans, black butterflies and worst case scenarios. It is the most useful scenario generator that can be used to manage assets in a crisis-prone period, offering more reliable values for Value at Risk (VaR), Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) and Tail Value at Risk (TVaR). Hazardous Forecasts and Crisis Scenario Generator questions how to manage assets when crisis probability increases, enabling you to adopt a process for using generators in order to be well prepared for handling crises.

The appeal of games and puzzles is timeless and universal. In this unique book, David Wells explores the fascinating connections between games and mathematics, proving that mathematics is not just about tedious calculation but imagination, insight and intuition. The first part of the book introduces games, puzzles and mathematical recreations, including knight tours on a chessboard. The second part explains how thinking about playing games can mirror the thinking of a mathematician, using scientific investigation, tactics and strategy, and sharp observation. Finally the author considers game-like features found in a wide range of human behaviours, illuminating the role of mathematics and helping to explain why it exists at all. This thought-provoking book is perfect for anyone with a thirst for mathematics and its hidden beauty; a good high school grounding in mathematics is all the background that is required, and the puzzles and games will suit pupils from 14 years.

Point-to-point vs hub-and-spoke. Questions of network design are real and involve many billions of dollars. Yet little is known about optimising design - nearly all work concerns optimising flow assuming a given design. This foundational book tackles optimisation of network structure itself, deriving comprehensible and realistic design principles. With fixed material cost rates, a natural class of models implies the optimality of direct source-destination connections, but considerations of variable load and environmental intrusion then enforce trunking in the optimal design, producing an arterial or hierarchical net. Its determination requires a continuum formulation, which can however be simplified once a discrete structure begins to emerge. Connections are made with the masterly work of Bendsoe and Sigmund on optimal mechanical structures and also with neural, processing and communication networks, including those of the Internet and the World Wide Web. Technical appendices are provided on random graphs and polymer models and on the Klimov index.

Broad and diverse ranges of activities are conducted within and by organized groups of individuals, including political, economic and social activities. These activities have become a subject of intense interest in economics and game theory. Some of the topics investigated in this collection are models of networks of power and privilege, trade networks, co-authorship networks, buyer-seller networks with differentiated products, and networks of medical innovation and the adaptation of new information. Other topics are social norms on punctuality, clubs and the provision of club goods and public goods, research and development and collusive alliances among corporations, and international alliances and trading agreements. While relatively recent, the literature on game theoretic studies of group formation in economics is already vast. This volume provides an introduction to this important literature on game-theoretic treatments of situations with networks, clubs, and coalitions, including some applications.

Choose the Correct Solution Method for Your Optimization Problem Optimization: Algorithms and Applications presents a variety of solution techniques for optimization problems, emphasizing concepts rather than rigorous mathematical details and proofs. The book covers both gradient and stochastic methods as solution techniques for unconstrained and constrained optimization problems. It discusses the conjugate gradient method, Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno algorithm, Powell method, penalty function, augmented Lagrange multiplier method, sequential quadratic programming, method of feasible directions, genetic algorithms, particle swarm optimization (PSO), simulated annealing, ant colony optimization, and tabu search methods. The author shows how to solve non-convex multi-objective optimization problems using simple modifications of the basic PSO code. The book also introduces multidisciplinary design optimization (MDO) architectures-one of the first optimization books to do so-and develops software codes for the simplex method and affine-scaling interior point method for solving linear programming problems. In addition, it examines Gomory's cutting plane method, the branch-and-bound method, and Balas' algorithm for integer programming problems. The author follows a step-by-step approach to developing the MATLAB (R) codes from the algorithms. He then applies the codes to solve both standard functions taken from the literature and real-world applications, including a complex trajectory design problem of a robot, a portfolio optimization problem, and a multi-objective shape optimization problem of a reentry body. This hands-on approach improves your understanding and confidence in handling different solution methods. The MATLAB codes are available on the book's CRC Press web page.

Game theory explains how to make good choices when different decision makers have conflicting interests. The classical approach assumes that decision makers are committed to making the best choices for themselves regardless of the effect on others, but such an approach is less appropriate when cooperation, compromise and negotiation are important. This book describes conditional games, a form of game theory that accommodates multiple stakeholder decision-making scenarios where cooperation and negotiation are significant issues and where notions of concordant group behavior are important. Using classical binary preference relations as a point of departure, the book extends the concept of a preference ordering that permits stakeholders to modulate their preferences as functions of the preferences of others. As these conditional preferences propagate through a group of decision makers, they create social bonds that lead to notions of group concordance. This book is intended for all students and researchers of decision theory and game theory.

Practical Financial Optimization is a comprehensive guide to optimization techniques in financial decision making. This book illuminates the relationship between theory and practice, providing the readers with solid foundational knowledge. * Focuses on classical static mean-variance analysis and portfolio immunization, scenario-based models, multi-period dynamic portfolio optimization, and the relationships between classes of models * Analyizes real world applications and implications for financial engineers * Includes a list of models and a section on notations that includes a glossary of symbols and abbreviations

This book is devoted to the development of optimal control theory for finite dimensional systems governed by deterministic and stochastic differential equations driven by vector measures. The book deals with a broad class of controls, including regular controls (vector-valued measurable functions), relaxed controls (measure-valued functions) and controls determined by vector measures, where both fully and partially observed control problems are considered. In the past few decades, there have been remarkable advances in the field of systems and control theory thanks to the unprecedented interaction between mathematics and the physical and engineering sciences. Recently, optimal control theory for dynamic systems driven by vector measures has attracted increasing interest. This book presents this theory for dynamic systems governed by both ordinary and stochastic differential equations, including extensive results on the existence of optimal controls and necessary conditions for optimality. Computational algorithms are developed based on the optimality conditions, with numerical results presented to demonstrate the applicability of the theoretical results developed in the book. This book will be of interest to researchers in optimal control or applied functional analysis interested in applications of vector measures to control theory, stochastic systems driven by vector measures, and related topics. In particular, this self-contained account can be a starting point for further advances in the theory and applications of dynamic systems driven and controlled by vector measures.

This unified treatment of game theory focuses on finding state-of-the-art solutions to issues surrounding the next generation of wireless and communications networks. Future networks will rely on autonomous and distributed architectures to improve the efficiency and flexibility of mobile applications, and game theory provides the ideal framework for designing efficient and robust distributed algorithms. This book enables readers to develop a solid understanding of game theory, its applications and its use as an effective tool for addressing wireless communication and networking problems. The key results and tools of game theory are covered, as are various real-world technologies including 3G networks, wireless LANs, sensor networks, dynamic spectrum access and cognitive networks. The book also covers a wide range of techniques for modeling, designing and analysing communication networks using game theory, as well as state-of-the-art distributed design techniques. This is an ideal resource for communications engineers, researchers, and graduate and undergraduate students.

Shimon Even's Graph Algorithms, published in 1979, was a seminal introductory book on algorithms read by everyone engaged in the field. This thoroughly revised second edition, with a foreword by Richard M. Karp and notes by Andrew V. Goldberg, continues the exceptional presentation from the first edition and explains algorithms in a formal but simple language with a direct and intuitive presentation. The book begins by covering basic material, including graphs and shortest paths, trees, depth-first-search and breadth-first search. The main part of the book is devoted to network flows and applications of network flows, and it ends with chapters on planar graphs and testing graph planarity.

Shimon Even's Graph Algorithms, published in 1979, was a seminal introductory book on algorithms read by everyone engaged in the field. This thoroughly revised second edition, with a foreword by Richard M. Karp and notes by Andrew V. Goldberg, continues the exceptional presentation from the first edition and explains algorithms in a formal but simple language with a direct and intuitive presentation. The book begins by covering basic material, including graphs and shortest paths, trees, depth-first-search and breadth-first search. The main part of the book is devoted to network flows and applications of network flows, and it ends with chapters on planar graphs and testing graph planarity.

This 2000 text applies modern advances in game theory to the analysis of competition policy and develops some of the theoretical and policy concerns associated with the pioneering work of Louis Phlips. Containing contributions by leading scholars from Europe and North America, this book observes a common theme in the relationship between the regulatory regime and market structure. Since the inception of the new industrial organization, economists have developed a better understanding of how real-world markets operate. These results have particular relevance to the design and application of anti-trust policy. Analyses indicate that picking the most competitive framework in the short run may be detrimental to competition and welfare in the long run, concentrating the attention of policy makers on the impact on the long-run market structure. This book provides essential reading for graduate students of industrial and managerial economics as well as researchers and policy makers.

Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming. Three advantages characterize the approach. The first is simplicity: arguments based on linear programming are both elementary and transparent. The second is unity: the machinery of linear programming provides a way to unify results from disparate areas of mechanism design. The third is reach: the technique offers the ability to solve problems that appear to be beyond solutions offered by traditional methods. No claim is made that the approach advocated should supplant traditional mathematical machinery. Rather, the approach represents an addition to the tools of the economic theorist who proposes to understand economic phenomena through the lens of mechanism design.

Traditional game theory has been successful at developing strategy in games of incomplete information: when one player knows something that the other does not. But it has little to say about games of complete information, for example, tic-tac-toe, solitaire and hex. The main challenge of combinatorial game theory is to handle combinatorial chaos, where brute force study is impractical. In this comprehensive volume, Jozsef Beck shows readers how to escape from the combinatorial chaos via the fake probabilistic method, a game-theoretic adaptation of the probabilistic method in combinatorics. Using this, the author is able to determine the exact results about infinite classes of many games, leading to the discovery of some striking new duality principles. Available for the first time in paperback, it includes a new appendix to address the results that have appeared since the book's original publication.

Discrete optimization problems are everywhere, from traditional operations research planning problems, such as scheduling, facility location, and network design; to computer science problems in databases; to advertising issues in viral marketing. Yet most such problems are NP-hard. Thus unless P = NP, there are no efficient algorithms to find optimal solutions to such problems. This book shows how to design approximation algorithms: efficient algorithms that find provably near-optimal solutions. The book is organized around central algorithmic techniques for designing approximation algorithms, including greedy and local search algorithms, dynamic programming, linear and semidefinite programming, and randomization. Each chapter in the first part of the book is devoted to a single algorithmic technique, which is then applied to several different problems. The second part revisits the techniques but offers more sophisticated treatments of them. The book also covers methods for proving that optimization problems are hard to approximate. Designed as a textbook for graduate-level algorithms courses, the book will also serve as a reference for researchers interested in the heuristic solution of discrete optimization problems.