Donald Davidson has made enormous contributions to the philosophy of action, epistemology, semantics and philosophy of mind and today is recognized as one of the most important analytical philosophers of the late twentieth century.
Donald Davidson: Truth, Meaning and Knowledge addresses
* Davidson's writings on epistemology and theory of language with their implications of ontology and philosophy of mind
* the central issue of whether truth is the ultimate goal of enquiry, challenged by contributions from Richard Rorty and Paul Horwich
* Davidson's approach to semantics and applied linguistics as addressed by Kirk Ludwig, Gabriel Segal, Peter Pagin, Stephen Neale, Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore and Reinaldo Elugardo
* Davidson's advances in the philosophy of mind in relation to the views of Williard V. Quine, John McDowell and Peter F. Strawson, in essays by Roger Gibson and Anita Avramides

Originally published in 1984, this work is organised in three parts. Each part consists of several related chapters. Each chapter explores the assumptions and implications of a closely related group of concepts in depth. Part 1 explores what a structure is. It considers such notions as content, context, constraint, unity, integrity, and the hierarchical and nucleate forms of organization. Part 2 critically explores the dynamic (energic) conceptualization of psychological and social phenomena. Thus, this part considers such notions as energy, entropy, activity, confirmation, discrepancy, and resistance, as they apply to and affect the stability, activity, and changes observed in psychological and social structures. The relationship among the biological (metabolic), psychological, and social levels of analysis are explored from a rather simplified thermodynamic point of view. In Part 3 brings all these earlier considerations to bear upon the processes by which these structures grow and develop. It explores the concept of development itself, and such related issues as the levels-by-stages model of development, the distinction between intrastructural and intergenerational development, the orthogenic principles, the process of primordial differentiation and integration, development as a dialectical process, and the relationship between growth and development. The Epilogue indicates briefly some of the implications of the present thesis for future empirical and theoretical investigations.

Narrative Naturalism: An Alternative Framework for Philosophy of Mind provides an original framework for a non-reductive approach to mind and philosophical psychology. Jessica Wahman challenges the reductive (i.e., mechanistic and physicalist) assumptions that render the mind-body problem intractable, and claims that George Santayana's naturalism provides a more beneficial epistemological method and ontological framework for thinking about the place of consciousness in the natural world. She uses Santayana's thought as the primary inspiration for her own specific viewpoint, one that draws on a variety of sources, from analytic philosophy of mind to existentialism and psychoanalysis. This outlook, narrative naturalism, depicts sense-making as a kind of storytelling where different narratives serve different purposes, and Wahman offer a unique worldview to accommodate a variety of true expressions about the world, including truths about subjective existence. Motivated by a desire to challenge the reductionist approaches that explain human motivation and experience in terms of neuroscience and by the increasingly pharmacological interpretations of and solutions to psychological problems, Wahman's overarching purpose is to reconstruct the issue so that neuroscience can be embraced as an indispensable story among others in our understanding of the human condition. When placed in this context, neurobiological discoveries better serve the values and practices associated with human self-knowledge and well-being. Narrative Naturalism will appeal to those interested in American philosophy, Santayana scholarship, pragmatist epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophical psychology, and metaphysics.

The contemporary literature on self-deception was born out of Jean-Paul Sartre's work on bad faith-lying to oneself. As time has progressed, the conception of self-deception has moved further and further away from Sartre's conception of bad faith. In Self-Deception's Puzzles and Processes: A Return to a Sartrean View, Jason Kido Lopez argues that this departure is a mistake and that we should return to thinking about self-deception in a Sartrean fashion, in which we are self-deceived when we intentionally use the strategies and methods of interpersonal deception on ourselves. Since literally tricking ourselves cannot work-we will always see through our own self-deception, after all-self-deception merely consists of the attempt to trick ourselves in this way. Other scholars have rejected this notion of self-deception historically, dismissing it as paradoxical. Lopez argues first that it isn't paradoxical, and he further suggests that moving away from this notion of self-deception has caused the contemporary literature on the topic to be littered with disparate and conflicting theories. Indeed, there are a great many ways to avoid the allegedly paradoxical Sartrean notion of self-deception, and the resulting plethora of accounts lead to a fragmented picture of self-deception. If, however, the Sartrean view isn't paradoxical, then there was no need for the host of contradictory theories and most researchers on self-deception have missed what was originally so intriguing about self-deception: that it, like bad faith, is the process of literally trying to trick oneself into believing what is false or unwarranted. Self-Deception's Puzzles and Processes will be of great interest to students and scholars of epistemology, philosophy of mind, psychology, and continental philosophy, and to anyone else interested in the problems of self-deception.

This book is a contribution both to analytical philosophy of mind and to Marxist philosophy. Marxists see pervasive irrationality in the conduct of human affairs, and claim that people in a class-divided society are prone to a variety of misconceptions. They say that we can suffer from `false consciousness' in our views about what inspires our behaviour and in our judgements about what is good for us. Denise Meyerson uses the techniques of analytic philosophy to investigate this picture. She argues that Marxism is committed to the idea of motivated belief, and that the idea is philosophically defensible. She shows that there are other philosophically defensible claims which are congenial to Marxism: that there are facts about interests that are not based on wants; that a desire can be contaminated by its history; that our judgements about our interests do not automatically motivate us; and that beliefs can survive the evidence that they are false. In doing so she throws light on certain puzzling psychological phenomena which confront everyone in their everyday political experience.

The purpose of this book is to show the philosophical and anthropological foundation of the dispute about culture, especially in the perspective of the opposition between high and low culture. By analysing the most important achievements of Western philosophical reflection, from the Greeks and Romans through medieval scholasticism to Christian personalism, the author defends the concept of high culture and reveals its metaphysical significance for the human condition. The book also brings out the meaning of the concept of culture, shedding new light upon the long-disputed philosophical questions: who is the creator and subject of culture, what is culture in its essence, and what is its superior purpose?

This book promotes a Lacanian approach to silence, arguing that Lacanian psychoanalysis is distinctive for putting a high value on both silence and language. Unlike other disciplines and discourses the authors do not treat silence as a mystical-impossible beyond, at the cost of demoting the value of language and thought. Rather than treating silence with awe and wonder, this book puts silence to work, and it does so in order to deal with the inevitable alienation that comes with becoming speaking-beings. This illuminating book will be of great interest to scholars of Lacan and the psychosocial, as well as more broadly to philosophers and linguists alike.

Philosophers, psychiatrists, and neuroscientists have all been providing insights which help to build a view of how the human mind works. This book is unique for using all these insights to build a fully integrated view of the subject. The book touches on many aspects of human thought and experience and so will appeal to readers in a wide range of disciplines. The book is accessible to students - Hundert has used it on university courses - and, in its paperback format, could be bought by them.

This handbook is a thorough and state of the art overview of a central and fast-growing topic in philosophy including up-to-date topics throughout making it the ideal reference source for both students and scholars. This is the only handbook to pull together a thoroughly comprehensive overview of the topic of philosophy of agency. This handbook will help the field of study organise itself: it will be a rallying point for any student and researcher interested in the subject. All chapters are specially commissioned, written by an international team of renowned contributors and not previously published.

Limits and Renewals is a trilogy based on the Stanton Lectures in the Philosophy of Religion delivered at the University of Cambridge in 1986-8. In this, the second volume, Professor Clark attempts to restate a traditional philosophy of mind, drawing upon philosophical and poetic resources that are often neglected in modern and post-modern thought, and emphasizing the moral and political implications of differing `philosophies of mind and value'. He presents a study of the soul as it has traditionally been conceived and as it can be understood through imaginative attention to our changing moods, beliefs, and fears. He argues that without that traditional concept we have little reason to believe that liberal values (rational thought and individual autonomy) are either possible or desirable. Particular topics discussed include the political context of identity claims, the uses of introspection, free will, `the beast within' as alien monster or necessary angel, the possibility of knowledge and the dangers of curiosity, the fear of death, the philoprogenitive gene, the political roots of the distinction between facts and values, and the body-mind problem. Notable features of the book are the author's citation of writers other than the conventionally philosophical (Augustine, Hopkins, Stapledon, and Weil), and the emphasis that he gives to traditions other than the self-consciously secular.

William James's Pluralism: An Antidote for Contemporary Extremism and Absolutism explores extremism and the related problem of absolutism in the context of the psychology and philosophy of William James. Extremist and absolutist views were topical in James's day, especially around the time of the Civil War, but they are no less common in these early years of the 21st century. James argued that the love of singularities such as belief in one God, one method, one political system, or one value system contributes to extremist, even violent mentalities. In this book, James's views on singular versus pluralistic perspectives are explored and then applied to contemporary practical issues such as abortion, birth control, and death with dignity legislation. These perspectives are furthermore applied to more theoretical issues, such as causality, values, and methods or ways of investigating the world. Within William James's Pluralism, these theories are investigated in a comprehensive philosophical and psychological examination of the human experience. Written in a nontechnical manner to appeal to the general public-just as William James hoped for his pluralistic philosophy-this book is additionally of considerable interest to academics and students across many fields such as psychology, philosophy, history, and sociology.

This book probes the sources and nature of the 'discontents of modernity'. It proposes a new approach to the philosophic-critical discourse on modernity. The Enlightenment is widely understood to be the foundational moment of modernity. Yet despite its appeal to reason as the ultimate ground of its authority and legitimacy, the Enlightenment has had multiple historical manifestations and, therefore, can hardly be said to be a homogenous phenomenon. The present work seeks to identify a unitive element that allows us to speak of the Enlightenment. To do so, it enjoins the concept of 'ethos' and its relation to the 'discontents of modernity'. This book proposes a new theoretical framework for the examination of the interrelationships between 'critical thought' and 'modernity', based on a fundamental distinction between criticism and negation. It will appeal to scholars and students of critical theory, the history of ideas, philosophy, the sociology of knowledge, and political science.

William James's Pluralism: An Antidote for Contemporary Extremism and Absolutism explores extremism and the related problem of absolutism in the context of the psychology and philosophy of William James. Extremist and absolutist views were topical in James's day, especially around the time of the Civil War, but they are no less common in these early years of the 21st century. James argued that the love of singularities such as belief in one God, one method, one political system, or one value system contributes to extremist, even violent mentalities. In this book, James's views on singular versus pluralistic perspectives are explored and then applied to contemporary practical issues such as abortion, birth control, and death with dignity legislation. These perspectives are furthermore applied to more theoretical issues, such as causality, values, and methods or ways of investigating the world. Within William James's Pluralism, these theories are investigated in a comprehensive philosophical and psychological examination of the human experience. Written in a nontechnical manner to appeal to the general public-just as William James hoped for his pluralistic philosophy-this book is additionally of considerable interest to academics and students across many fields such as psychology, philosophy, history, and sociology.

First published in 1983, Perception, Learning and the Self is a collection of essays demonstrating the incompleteness of the information-processing model in cognitive psychology and the connection between epistemic factors and social conditions in the making of the self. It is suggested that any framework employed to view cognition must be an essentially social one, in which knowers are seen as selves who are agents with feelings and attitudes. Professor Hamlyn argues that, by failing to acknowledge this social element, the information-processing model presents an overly simplistic view of the systems that underlie cognition, and thus is liable to distort what is at stake. Professor Hamlyn considers the contributions of a number of major psychologists to this area of study, including James Gibson, Jean Piaget and Sigmund Freud. This book will be of interest to students of philosophy and psychology.

Brian Loar (1939-2014) was an eminent and highly respected philosopher of mind and language. He was at the forefront of several different field-defining debates between the 1970s and the 2000s-from his earliest work on reducing semantics to psychology, through debates about reference, functionalism, externalism, and the nature of intentionality, to his most enduringly influential work on the explanatory gap between consciousness and neurons. Loar is widely credited with having developed the most comprehensive functionalist account of certain aspects of the mind, and his 'phenomenal content strategy' is arguably one of the most significant developments on the ancient mind/body problem. This volume of essays honours the entirety of Loar's wide-ranging philosophical career. It features sixteen original essays from influential figures in the fields of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, including those who worked with and were taught by Loar. The essays are divided into three thematic sections covering Loar's work in philosophy of language, especially the relations between semantics and psychology (1970s-80s), on content in the philosophy of mind (1980s-90s), and on the metaphysics of intentionality and consciousness (1990s and beyond). Taken together, this book is a fitting tribute to one of the leading minds of the latter-20th century, and a timely reflection on Loar's enduring influence on the philosophy of mind and language.

The essays in this book, published here as a collection for the first time, are unified by the thesis that freedom, rationality, social consensus, and knowledge depend on thoughts about thoughts, that is, on metamental operations. These provide for our optionality, plasticity, and most of all for the evaluation and control of lower-level information. The collection argues that the human mind is essentially a metamind.

Argues for a new theory of the self It's Cartesian defence of the self will attract interest and engagement

This Handbook covers the most urgent, controversial, and important topics in the philosophy of sex. It is both philosophically rigorous and yet accessible to specialists and non-specialists, covering ethics, political philosophy, metaphysics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of language, and featuring interactions with neighboring disciplines such as psychology, bioethics, sociology, and anthropology. The volume's 40 chapters, written by an international team of both respected senior researchers and essential emerging scholars, are divided into eight parts: I. What is Sex? Is Sex Good? II. Sexual Orientations III. Sexual Autonomy and Consent IV. Regulating Sexual Relationships V. Pathologizing Sex and Sexuality VI. Contested Desires VII. Objectification and Commercialized Sex VIII. Technology and the Future of Sex The broad scope of coverage, depth in insight and research, and accessibility in language make The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Sex and Sexuality a comprehensive introduction for newcomers to the subject as well as an invaluable reference work for advanced students and researchers in the field.

This book is about Kant`s account of human understanding, of our capacity to form concepts of, and to be conscious of, things in the world. It argues that the conditions which Kant lays down for understanding - conditions about the autonomy of thought, and about the relation of concepts to objects and of language to experience - cannot be satisfied within his overall picture of understanding as `representing something to oneself.' The argument proceeds through a discussion of the nature of concept-possession and the relation of concepts to objects, to what it is to be conscious of anything, and what it is to follow a rule. Wittgenstein`s insights on these issues have a direct bearing on Kant`s problems. If Kant`s conditions are to be satisfied, understanding must be seen, not as a capacity for mental representation, for having ideas, but as a capacity for action.

Religion was a constant theme throughout Paul Ricoeur's long career, and yet he never wrote a full-length treatment of the topic. In this important new book, Brian Gregor draws on the full scope of Ricoeur's writings to lay out the essential features of his philosophical interpretation of religion, from his earliest to his last work. Ricoeur's central claim is that religion aims at the regeneration of human capability-in his words, "the rebirth of the capable self." This book provides a rich thematic account of Ricoeur's hermeneutics of religion, showing how the theme of capability informs his changing interpretations of religion, from his early work on French reflexive philosophy and the philosophy of the will to his late work on forgiveness, mourning, and living up to death. Gregor exhibits Ricoeur's original contribution to philosophical reflection on such themes as evil, suffering, and violence, as well as imagination, embodiment, and spiritual exercise. He also presents a critical reconsideration of Ricoeur's separation of philosophy from theology, and his philosophical interpretation of Christian theological ideas of revelation, divine transcendence and personhood, atonement, and eschatology. Additionally, Gregor provides an expansive look at Ricoeur's interlocutors, including Marcel, Jaspers, Kant, Hegel, Levinas, and Girard. Theologically-inclined readers will be particularly interested in the book's treatment of Karl Barth and the Protestant theology of the Word, which was a vital influence on Ricoeur. The result is a study of Ricoeur that is both sympathetic and critical, provocative and original, inviting the reader into a deeper engagement with Ricoeur's philosophical interpretation of religion.

This volume addresses the complex interplay between the conditions of an agent's personal autonomy and the constitution of her self in light of two influential background assumptions: a libertarian thesis according to which it is essential for personal autonomy to be able to choose freely how one's self is shaped, on the one hand, and a line of thought following especially the seminal work of Harry Frankfurt according to which personal autonomy necessarily rests on an already sufficiently shaped self, on the other hand. Given this conceptual framework, a number of influential aspects within current debate can be addressed in a new and illuminating light: accordingly, the volume's contributions range from 1) discussing fundamental conceptual interconnections between personal autonomy and freedom of the will, 2) addressing the exact role and understanding of different personal traits, e.g. Frankfurt's notion of volitional necessities, commitments to norms and ideals, emotions, the phenomenon of weakness of will, and psychocorporeal aspects, 3) and finally taking into account social influences, which are discussed in terms of their ability to buttress, to weaken, or even to serve as necessary preconditions of personal autonomy and the forming of one's self. The volume thus provides readers with an extensive and most up-to-date discussion of various influential strands of current philosophical debate on the topic. It is of equal interest to all those already engaged in the debate as well as to readers trying to get an up-to-date overview or looking for a textbook to use in courses.

This volume advances discussion between critics and defenders of the force-content distinction and opens up new ways of thinking about force and speech acts in relation to the unity problem. The force-content dichotomy has shaped the philosophy of language and mind since the time of Frege and Russell. Isn't it obvious that, for example, the clauses of a conditional are not asserted and must therefore be propositions and propositions the forceless contents of forceful acts? But, others have recently asked in response, how can a proposition be a truth value bearer if it is not unified through the forceful act of a subject that takes a position regarding how things are? Can we not instead think of propositions as being inherently forceful, but of force as being cancelled in certain contexts? And what do assertoric, but also directive and interrogative force indicators mean? Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition will be of interest to researchers working in philosophy of language, philosophical logic, philosophy of mind and linguistics.

Originally published in 1951, Homo Faber is an examination of the scientific outlook on human mental evolution through the lens of parapsychology. The book aims to undermine what its terms, the 'scientific outlook' examining the human interpretation of the world, and the preconceived scientific concepts that reality does not extend beyond the realm that our senses reveal. The book expands upon this and moves to examine the broader human understanding of the entire cosmos, challenging the scientific conception that this can be grasped in principal by human intellect, arising from the chance combination of material particles. The book argues that the scientific outlook prevents humans from discovering in the Universe the meaning and purpose which are everywhere to be found if sought in the appropriate contemplative states of mind. This book provides a unique take on the examination of human psychology and the evolution of the brain from an alternative scientific stance. It will be of interest to anthropologists, historians and psychologists alike.

- The first student-focused textbook on Transpersonal Psychology - Introduces students and instructors to contemporary developments of the field and anticipates future advances - Suitable as a core text for Transpersonal Psychology/Humanistic Psychology modules, or as a supplementary text for core Psychology modules

Presents a novel framework for conceptualizing issues that have traditionally been considered by separate disciplines including psychology, philosophy, psychiatry, psychotherapy and theology. For the first time existential statuses of objects (absolute, strong, incomplete, weak and super-weak) are distinguished, and applied to describe various phenomena in science, religion and psychology.