Trust is pervasive in our lives. Both our simplest actions - like buying a coffee, or crossing the street - as well as the functions of large collective institutions - like those of corporations and nation states - would not be possible without it. Yet only in the last several decades has trust started to receive focused attention from philosophers as a specific topic of investigation. The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy brings together 31 never-before published chapters, accessible for both students and researchers, created to cover the most salient topics in the various theories of trust. The Handbook is broken up into three sections: I. What is Trust? II. Whom to Trust? III. Trust in Knowledge, Science, and Technology The Handbook is preceded by a foreword by Maria Baghramian, an introduction by volume editor Judith Simon, and each chapter includes a bibliography and cross-references to other entries in the volume.

For Aristotle, excellence is not an act but a habit, and Hume regards habit as 'the great guide of life'. However, for Proust habit is problematic: 'if habit is a second nature, it prevents us from knowing our first.' What is habit? Do habits turn us into machines or free us to do more creative things? Should religious faith be habitual? Does habit help or hinder the practice of philosophy? Why do Luther, Spinoza, Kant, Kierkegaard and Bergson all criticise habit? If habit is both a blessing and a curse, how can we live well in our habits? In this thought-provoking book Clare Carlisle examines habit from a philosophical standpoint. Beginning with a lucid appraisal of habit's philosophical history she suggests that both receptivity and resistance to change are basic principles of habit-formation. Carlisle shows how the philosophy of habit not only anticipates the discoveries of recent neuroscience but illuminates their ethical significance. She asks whether habit is a reliable form of knowledge by examining the contrasting interpretations of habitual thinking offered by Spinoza and Hume. She then turns to the role of habit in the good life, tracing Aristotle's legacy through the ideas of Joseph Butler, Hegel, and Felix Ravaisson, and assessing the ambivalent attitudes to habit expressed by Nietzsche and Proust. She argues that a distinction between habit and practice helps to clarify this ambivalence, particularly in the context of habit and religion, where she examines both the theology of habit and the repetitions of religious life. She concludes by considering how philosophy itself is a practice of learning to live well with habit.

This book is about the interweaving between cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of the two stages of perception, namely early and late vision, in justifying perceptual beliefs. It examines the impact of the epistemic role of perception in defining cognitive penetrability and the relation between the epistemic role of perceptual stages and the kinds (direct or indirect) of cognitive effects on perceptual processing. The book presents the argument that early vision is cognitively impenetrable because neither is it affected directly by cognition, nor does cognition affect its epistemic role. It also argues that late vision, even though it is cognitively penetrated and, thus, affected by concepts, is still a perceptual state that does not involve any discursive inferences and does not belong to the space of reasons. Finally, an account is given as to how cognitive states with symbolic content could affect perceptual states with iconic, analog content, during late vision.

It explores for the first time the life-force (Lebenskraft) debate in Germany, which was manifest in philosophical reflection, medical treatise, scientific experimentation, theoretical physics, aesthetic theory, and literary practice esp.1740-1920. The history of vitalism is considered in the context of contemporary discourses on radical reality (or deep naturalism).

There is an old yarn about a stranger passing through a small town. The stranger stopped for gas and a soft drink at a service station. Seeing an old timer seated on a bench, the stranger decided to engage the man in a conversation. "Have you lived here all your life?" he asked. Reflecting on the question for a moment, the old timer responded, "Not yet."

This volume responds to the challenges posed by the rapid developments in satellite TV and digital technologies, addressing media ethics from a global perspective to discuss how we can understand journalism practice in its cultural contexts. An international team of contributors draw upon global and non-Western traditions to discuss the philosophical origins of ethics and the tension that exists between media institutions, the media market and political/ideological influencers. The chapters then unveil the discrepancies among international journalists in abiding by the ethics of the profession and the extent to which media ethics are understood and applied in their local context/environment. Arguing that the legitimacy of ethics comes not from the definition per se, but from the extent to which it leads to social good, the book posits this should be the media's raison d'etre to abide by globally accepted ethical norms in order to serve the common good. Taking a truly global approach to the question of media ethics, this volume will be an important resource for scholars and students of journalism, communication studies, media studies, sociology, politics and cultural studies.

Ethical Humans questions how philosophy and social theory can help us to engage the everyday moral realities of living, working, loving, learning and dying in new capitalism. It introduces sociology as an art of living and as a formative tradition of embodied radical eco post-humanism. Seeking to embody traditions of philosophy and social theory in everyday ethics, this book validates emotions and feelings as sources of knowledge and shows how the denigration of women has gone hand in hand with the denigration of nature. It queries post-structuralist traditions of anti-humanism that, for all their insights into the fragmentation of identities, often sustain a distinction between nature and culture. The author argues that in a crisis of global warming, we have to learn to listen to our bodies as part of nature and draws on Wittgenstein to shape embodied forms of philosophy and social theory that questions theologies that tacitly continue to shape philosophical traditions. In acknowledging our own vulnerabilities, we question the vision of the autonomous and independent rational self that often remains within the terms of dominant white masculinities. This book offers different modes of self-work, drawing on psychoanalysis and embodied post-analytic psychotherapies as part of a decolonising practice questioning Eurocentric colonising modernity. In doing so it challenges, with Simone Weil, Roman notions of power and greatness that have shaped visions of white supremacy and European colonial power and empire. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of environmental ethics, environmental philosophy, social theory and sociology, ethics and philosophy, cultural studies, future studies, gender studies, post-colonial studies, Marxism, psychoanalysis and psychotherapy and philosophy and sociology as arts of living.

This carefully designed, multi-authored textbook covers a broad range of theoretical issues in cognitive science, psychology, and neuroscience. With accessible language, a uniform structure, and many pedagogical features, Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical Introdution is the best high-level overview of this area for an interdisciplinary readership of students. Written specifically for this volume by experts in their fields who are also experienced teachers, the book's thirty chapters are organized into the following parts: I. Background Knowledge II. Classical Debates III. Consciousness IV. Crossing Boundaries Each chapter starts with relevant key words and definitions and a chapter overview, then presents historical coverage of the topic, explains and analyzes contemporary debates, and ends with a sketch of cutting edge research. A list of suggested readings and helpful discussion topics conclude each chapter. This uniform, student-friendly design makes it possible to teach a cohort of both philosophy and interdisciplinary students without assuming prior understanding of philosophical concepts, cognitive science, or neuroscience. Key Features: Synthesizes the now decades-long explosion of scientifically informed philosophical research in the study of mind. Expands on the offerings of other textbooks by including chapters on language, concepts and non-conceptual content, and animal cognition. Offers the same structure in each chapter, moving the reader through an overview, historical coverage, contemporary debates, and finally cutting-edge research. Packed with pedagogical features, like defined Key Terms, Suggested Readings, and Discussion Questions for each chapter, as well as a General Glossary. Provides readers with clear, chapter-long introductions to Cognitive Neuroscience, Molecular and Cellular Cognition, Experimental Methods in Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysical Issues, and Epistemic Issues.

This handbook is a thorough and state of the art overview of a central and fast-growing topic in philosophy including up-to-date topics throughout making it the ideal reference source for both students and scholars. This is the only handbook to pull together a thoroughly comprehensive overview of the topic of philosophy of agency. This handbook will help the field of study organise itself: it will be a rallying point for any student and researcher interested in the subject. All chapters are specially commissioned, written by an international team of renowned contributors and not previously published.

Philosophy of mind is one of the core disciplines in philosophy. The questions that it deals with are profound, vexed and intriguing. This volume of 15 new cutting-edge essays gives young researchers a chance to stir up new ideas. The topics covered include the nature of consciousness, cognition, and action.

This book explores the phenomenon of animal imagination and its profound power over the human imagination. It examines the structural and ethical role that the human imagination must play to provide an interface between humans' subjectivity and the real cognitive capacities of animals. The book offers a systematic study of the increasing importance of the metaphors, the virtual, and figures in contemporary animal studies. It explores human-animal and real-imaginary dichotomies, revealing them to be the source of oppressive cultural structures. Through an analysis of creative, playful and theatric enactments and mimicry of animal behaviors and communication, the book establishes that human imagination is based on animal imagination. This helps redefine our traditional knowledge about animals and presents new practices and ethical concerns in regard to the animals. The book strongly contends that allowing imagination to play a role in our relation to animals will lead to the development of a more empathetic approach towards them. Drawing on works in phenomenology, contemporary animal philosophy, as well as ethological evidence and biosemiotics, this book is the first to rethink the traditional philosophical concepts of imagination, images, the imaginary, and reality in the light of a zoocentric perspective. It will appeal to philosophers, scholars and students in the field of animal studies, as well as anyone interested in human and non-human imaginations.

The first textbook to integrate standard philosophy of mind approach with developments in psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience Covers all the essential subjects and topics in philosophy of mind,such as dualism, materialism, mental representation, functionalism and mental causation Also discusses many more recent topics, including infant and animal cognition; the embodied or 'extended' mind; and consciousness Includes chapter summaries, further reading, boxes, and notes to help students Clearly explains the ideas and arguments of leading philosophers of mind such as Daniel Dennett, Jerry Fodor, Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam and Jaegwon Kim

Using COVID-19 as a base, this groundbreaking book brings together several renowned scholars to explore the concept of crisis, and how this global event has shaped the discipline of psychology. It engages directly with the challenges that psychology continues to face when theorizing societal issues of gender, race, class, history, and culture, while not disregarding "lived" experiences. This edited volume offers a set of pathways to rethink psychology beyond its current scope and history to become more apt to the conditions, needs, and demands of the 21st century. The book explores topics like resilience, interpersonal relationships, mistrust in the government, and access to healthcare. Dividing the book into three distinct sections, the contributors first examine the current crisis within psychology, then go on to explore how psychology theorizes the subject and the other in a social world of perpetual political, economic, cultural, and social crises, and lastly consider the role of crises in the creation of new theorizing. This is essential reading for advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students of theoretical and philosophical psychology, social psychology, community psychology, and developmental psychology.

* Presents Fanon's theories and insights in a manner that is easy to understand for students * Highlights the various ways that multi-disciplinary forms of psychological analysis can be applied to the critique of contemporary forms of racism * Seamlessly ties together critical and contemporary scholarship from and about Fanon that introduces his analyses of racism and racialized subjectivity in an accessible manner

This volume answers questions that lead to a clearer picture of third-person self- knowledge, the self-interpretation it embeds, and its narrative structure. Bringing together current research on third-person self-knowledge and self-interpretation, the book focuses on third-person self-knowledge, and the role that narrative and interpretation play in acquiring it. It regards the third-personal epistemic approach to oneself as a problem worthy of investigation in its own right, and makes clear the relation between third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative capacities. In recent years, the idea that each person is in a privileged position to acquire knowledge about her own mental states has come under attack. A growing body of empirical research has cast doubt upon the existence of what philosophers call 'first person self-knowledge', i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is often thought to be immediate, transparent, and authoritative. This line of thought has led some philosophers to claim that what seems to be 'first-person self-knowledge' is really just 'third-person self-knowledge,' i.e., knowledge about our mental states that is inferential, opaque, and fallible. This book discusses challenges for first-person knowledge and explores the true nature of third-person knowledge.

* Offers an original approach to madness and mental health by integrating human experience in history * Furnishes practical implications for advancing holistic care in mental health * Gives a new synthesis between the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and Foucault

* Offers an original approach to madness and mental health by integrating human experience in history * Furnishes practical implications for advancing holistic care in mental health * Gives a new synthesis between the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and Foucault

This volume establishes the conceptual foundation for sustained investigation into tool development in neuroscience. Neuroscience relies on diverse and sophisticated experimental tools, and its ultimate explanatory target-our brains and hence the organ driving our behaviors-catapults the investigation of these research tools into a philosophical spotlight. The chapters in this volume integrate the currently scattered work on tool development in neuroscience into the broader philosophy of science community. They also present an accessible compendium for neuroscientists interested in the broader theoretical dimensions of their experimental practices. The chapters are divided into five thematic sections. Section 1 discusses the development of revolutionary research tools across neuroscience's history and argues to various conclusions concerning the relationship between new research tools and theory progress in neuroscience. Section 2 shows how a focus on research tools and their development in neuroscience transforms some traditional epistemological issues and questions about knowledge production in philosophy of science. Section 3 speaks to the most general questions about the way we characterize the nature of the portion of the world that this science addresses. Section 4 discusses hybrid research tools that integrate laboratory and computational methods in exciting new ways. Finally, Section 5 extends research on tool development to the related science of genetics. The Tools of Neuroscience Experiment will be of interest to philosophers and philosophically minded scientists working at the intersection of philosophy and neuroscience.

Holding Wrongdoers Responsible contests a number of widely accepted claims about blame and forgiveness that are insufficiently examined in the philosophical literature, and their relationship to each other. These claims are: i Anger is the most fitting kind of blame for those who are guilty of wrongdoing. ii Culpable wrongdoers should be blamed for what they have done. iii Forgiving consists of renouncing blame and blame feelings, especially angry ones. iv Forgiving is a kind and compassionate act for which a wrongdoer should be grateful. Against (i), the book argues that there are a number of reasons why we should be skeptical about the singular importance given to anger in this connection; against (ii), that blame is just one possible response to wrongdoing and, like other responses, has to be evaluated in relation to its purposes and the available alternatives; against (iii), that the continuation of blame after forgiveness is neither conceptually nor morally ruled out; and against (iv), that the image of forgiveness as benevolent and gift-like belies its dark side. By contesting these claims, the book reveals some of the moral and psychological complexities of these phenomena.

There is an important gap in the philosophical literature concerning the concept of fear and its remedies, and this book has been designed to examine different concepts of fear that inform its therapy. Structured as a historical-philosophical investigation of the concept of fear, this book is not a purely historical analysis of fear but also provides a broad brushwork rendition of the main concepts of fear as presented by selected philosophers and thinkers, and how they have approached its therapy.

First published in 1972, Problems of Mind begins with a consideration of the view that the human mind is an immaterial thing that does not require corporeal embodiment for its operations. It takes up the conception that "inner experiences" are "strictly identical" with brain processes. The book also deals exclusively with the doctrine called "Logical Behaviourism", which will always possess a compelling attraction for anyone who is perplexed by the psychological concepts, who has become aware of the worthlessness of an appeal to introspection as an account of how we learn those concepts, and who has no inclination to identify mind with brain. The three most plausible theories of mind-body dualism, mind-brain monism, and behaviourism are all rejected, and nothing is set forth as the true theory. Norman Malcolm states that this is 'only a drop in the bucket. It will serve its purpose if it leads the reader into the writings of Wittgenstein, who is easily the most important figure in the philosophy of mind.' Problems of Mind will be an essential read for scholars and researchers of philosophy of mind, ethics, logic, and philosophy in general.

Clearly organised around a single question--is love possible?--Joanne Brown's book provides conceptualizations of love and of its possibility from sociological, philosophical and psychoanalytic viewpoints. Material from biographical, narrative interviews are presented in order to look at how people from two age groups conceptualise love and view its realisation or possibility in their own lives. The book argues for the importance of a psychosocial understanding of love and provides a critical discussion of the philosophy and methods of psychosocial studies.

The Prison House of Alienation is an exploration of the humanist theme of alienation that Marx theorized in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. It relates this theme of alienation with the themes of haunting in the Manifesto of the Communist Party and accumulation of capital that he outlined in his magnum opus Capital. The volume claims that humanity plagued by ghosts is dwelling in a prison house from which there seems no escape. Yet humanity seeks to escape from this prison house. The essays are a consequent journey in dramaturgy where science and art truly meet to create emancipatory politics that goes well beyond the entire discourse of twentieth-century socialism. The volume begins with Hamlet's lament in Shakespeare's tragedy, who, struck by alienation, is haunted by the ghost of his dead father. It then discusses how instead of creating a radical theory for creating a socialist alternative, 'haunting' gave way to interpretation as an estranged hermeneutical act that displaces revolutionary theory and praxis. This displacement of revolutionary praxis in turn gave way to violence. This volume therefore also analyzes violence from Clausewitz to Mao, revealing that a rigorous line must be drawn between Stalinism and Maoism on one side, and authentic Marxism on the other side. It concludes by questioning the very idea of ideology, suggesting that ideology is not merely a false consciousness, but a terrible psychotic act that would devour the entire emancipatory project of Marxism itself. Placing the human condition at the centre for alternative twenty-first-century politics, The Prison House of Alienation reveals that there can be no science without art and no politics without humanity. It will be of great interest to scholars of philosophy and politics. The essays were originally published in various issues of Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory.

Featuring original essays from leading scholars in philosophy and psychology, this volume investigates and rethinks the role of practical wisdom in light of the most recent developments in virtue theory and moral, social and developmental psychology. The concept of phronesis has long held a prominent place in the development of Aristotelian virtue ethics and moral education. However, the nature and development of phronesis is still in need of investigation, especially because of the new insights that in recent years have come from both philosophy and science. The essays in this volume contribute to the debate about practical wisdom by elucidating its role in empirical psychology and advancing important new research questions. They address various topics related to practical wisdom and its development, including honesty, ecocentric phronesis, social cognitive theory, practical wisdom in limited-information contexts, Whole Trait Theory, skill models, the reciprocity of virtue, and challenges from situationism. Practical Wisdom will interest researchers and advanced students working in virtue ethics, moral psychology, and moral education.