Are large American corporations politically unified or divided? This question, which has important implications for the viability of American democracy, has frustrated social scientists and political commentators for decades. Despite years of increasingly sophisticated research, resolution of the issue remains as elusive as ever. In this important new book, Mark S. Mizruchi presents and tests an original model of corporate political behavior. He argues that because the business community is characterized by both unity and conflict, the key issue is not whether business is unified but the conditions under which unity or conflict occurs. Adopting a structural model of social action, Mizruchi examines the effects of factors such as geographic proximity, common industry membership, stock ownership, interlocking directorates, and interfirm market relations on the extent to which firms behave similarly. The model is tested with data on the campaign contributions of corporate political action committees and corporate testimony before Congress. Mizruchi finds that both organizational and social network factors contribute to similar behavior and that similar behavior increases a group's likelihood of political success. This study demonstrates that rather than making their political decisions in a vacuum, firms are influenced by the social structures within which they are embedded. The results establish for the first time that the nature of relations between firms has real political consequences. The Structure of Corporate Political Action will be of interest not only to social scientists but to anyone concerned with the future of American democracy.

Spurred by the disconnect between what was being taught in the classroom and actual practice, Godwin, Ainsworth, and Godwin set out to answer the question, "Was political science missing some key aspects of the interactions between lobbyists and policy makers?" Built on interviews with over 100 lobbyists, these authors show that much of the research on organized interests overlooks the lobbying of regulatory agencies even though it accounts for almost half of all lobbying-even though bureaucratic agencies have considerable leeway in the how they choose to implement law. This groundbreaking new book argues that lobbying activity is not mainly a struggle among competing interests over highly collective goods; rather, it's the public provision of private goods. And more to the point, this shift in understanding influences our perception of the strengths and weaknesses of American democracy. Through a series of highly readable case studies, the authors employ both neopluralist and exchange perspectives to explore the lobbying activity that occurs in the later stages of the policymaking process which are typically less partisan, involve little conflict, and receive scant public attention. Lobbying and Policymaking sheds new light on lobbying influence on the policy process, and is an ideal way to expose students to cutting-edge research in an accessible, fascinating package.