The present attempt to introduce the general philosophical reader to the Phenomenological Movement by way of its history has itself a history which is pertinent to its objective. It may suitably be opened by the following excerpts from a review which Herbert W. Schneider of Columbia University, the Head of the Division for International Cultural Cooperation, Department of Cultural Activities of Unesco from 1953 to 56, wrote in 1950 from France: The influence of Husserl has revolutionized continental philosophies, not because his philosophy has become dominant, but because any philosophy now seeks to accommodate itself to, and express itself in, phenomenological method. It is the sine qua non of critical respectability. In America, on the contrary, phenomenology is in its infancy. The average American student of philosophy, when he picks up a recent volume of philosophy published on the continent of Europe, must first learn the "tricks" of the phenomenological trade and then translate as best he can the real impon of what is said into the kind of imalysis with which he is familiar . . . . No doubt, American education will graduaUy take account of the spread of phenomenological method and terminology, but until it does, American readers of European philosophy have a severe handicap; and this applies not only to existentialism but to almost all current philosophical literature. ' These sentences clearly implied a challenge, if not a mandate, to all those who by background and interpretive ability were in a position to meet it.

This book examines the thinking of two nineteenth-century existentialist thinkers, Soren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche. Its focus is on the radically different ways they envisioned a joyful acceptance of life - a concern they shared. For Kierkegaard, in Fear and Trembling, joyful acceptance flows from the certitude of faith. For Nietzsche, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, joyful acceptance is an acceptance of the eternal recurrence of life, and is ultimately a matter of will. This book explores the relationship between these opposed visions.

This work argues that teleological motives lie at the heart of Kant's critical philosophy and that a precise analysis of teleological structures can both illuminate the basic strategy of its fundamental arguments and provide a key to understanding its unity. It thus aims, through an examination of each of Kant's major writings, to provide a detailed interpretation of his claim that philosophy in the true sense must consist of a teleologia rationis humanae. The author argues that Kant's critical philosophy forged a new link between traditional teleological concepts and the basic structure of rationality, one that would later inform the dynamic conception of reason at the heart of German Idealism. The process by which this was accomplished began with Kant's development of a uniquely teleological conception of systematic unity already in the precritical period. The individual chapters of this work attempt to show how Kant adapted and refined this conception of systematic unity so that it came to form the structural basis for the critical philosophy.

'...a book which should be read by all students contemplating enrolment for a university course in modern English or European literary studies.' - Roy Harris, Times Higher Education Supplement Eliot to Derrida is a sardonic portrait of the cult of the specialist interpreter, from I.A. Richards and the Cambridge School to Jacques Derrida and his disciples. This lucid, iconoclastic study shows how, and why, so much of the academic response to a rich variety of literary experiment has been straitjacketed by the vast industries which have grown up around `modernism' and `postmodernism'. For anyone disenchanted with the extravagant claims - and leaden prose - of literary theorists, this will be an exhilarating book.

This edited volume is the first specialized book in English about the Swiss zoologist and anthropologist Adolf Portmann (1897-1982). It provides a clarification and update of Portmann's theoretical approach to the phenomenon of life, characterized by terms such as "inwardness" and "self-presentation." Portmann's concepts of secondary altriciality and the social uterus have become foundational in philosophical anthropology, providing a benchmark of the difference between humans and animals. In its content, this book brings together two approaches: historical and philosophical analysis of Portmann's studies in the life sciences and application of Portmann's thought in the fields of biology, anthropology, and biosemiotics. Significant attention is also paid to the methodological implications of his intended reform of biology. Besides contributions from contemporary biologists, philosophers, and historians of science, this volume also includes a translation of an original essay by Portmann and a previously unpublished manuscript from his most remarkable English-speaking interpreter, philosopher Marjorie Grene. Portmann's conception of life is unique in its focus on the phenomenal appearance of organisms. Confronted with the enormous amount of scientific knowledge being produced today, it is even clearer than it was during Portmann's lifetime that although biologists employ physical and chemical methods, biology itself is not (only) physics and chemistry. These exact methods must be applied according to what has meaning for living beings. If biology seeks to understand organisms as autonomous agents, it needs to take display and the interpretation of appearances as basic characteristics of life. The topic of this book is significantly relevant to the disciplines of theoretical biology, philosophy, philosophical anthropology, and biosemiotics. The recent epigenetic turn in biology, acknowledging the interconnections between organismal development, morphology and communication, presents an opportunity to revisit Portmann's work and to reconsider and update his primary ideas in the contemporary context.

This book continues Rescher's longstanding practice of publishing groups of philosophical essays that originated in occasional lecture and conference presentations. Notwithstanding their topical diversity they exhibit a uniformity of method in a common attempt to view historically significant philosophical issues in the light of modern perspectives opened up thorough conceptual clarification.

Metaphysics and Music in Adorno and Heidegger explains how two notoriously opposed German philosophers share a rethinking of the possibility of metaphysics via notions of music and waiting. This is connected to the historical materialist project of social change by way of the radical Italian composer Luigi Nono.

First published in 1927, Science and Philosophy: And Other Essays is a collection of individual papers written by Bernard Bosanquet during his highly industrious philosophical life. The collection was put together by Bosanquet's wife after the death of the writer and remains mostly unaltered with just a few papers added and the order of entries improved. The papers here displayed consist of various contributions Bosanquet made to Mind, the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, the International Journal of Ethics and other periodicals, as well as work from volumes of lectures and essays under his own or other editorship. Throughout the collection, Bosanquet considers the relationship between science and philosophy. The two subject areas became increasingly intertwined during Bosanquet's lifetime as scientific writers grew more interested in the philosophical investigation of the concepts which underlined their work and philosophical thinkers recognised the importance of the relationship between mathematics and logic as well as that between physics and metaphysics. The first essay in this volume discusses this idea explicitly and all subsequent articles may be regarded as essays in support of the main discussion with which the volume opens.

First published in 1942, Reflections documents the life of John Henry Muirhead and the philosophical age that he observed. The first part of the volume derives from Muirhead's own autobiographical narrative, left unfinished when he died in May 1940. The second part features two final chapters written by John W. Harvey that comprehensively record the final stages of Muirhead's life. Harvey's chapters incorporate Muirhead's unfinished final years of commentary and begin at the man's retirement from Birmingham Chair in 1921. As a student and teacher of philosophy, Muirhead's life ran almost precisely parallel to what he himself refers to as 'one of the most vivid and important movements in British and American philosophy'. He came into contact with some of the age's primary thinkers and as such, his own autobiography is important in providing an insight into his contemporary philosophical environment.

Although this book is a study of the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, it would be mistaken to refer to it as a comparison. The book develops a framework which might aide the reader of Levinas and Derrida in determining the scope and significance of their respective projects as far as a discourse of the sacred is concerned. It does so by emphasizing their status as philosophers whose thought correlates but does not compare. Within this correlation, without obscuring either their differences or similarities, we can see a common framework that consists of the following elements. First, it is clear from what and how Derrida and Levinas have written that the general import of their work lies in the area of ethics. However, in many ways it would be justifiable to say that their work is not about ethics at all. Neither of them proposes a moral theory; neither is interested in discussing the question of values vs. social norms, duty vs. virtue and other issues that might pertain to the area of ethics. To be sure, these issues do come up in their work, yet they are treated in a peculiarly different way. For Derrida and Levinas, ethics is not so much an inquiry into the problems of right and wrong but an inquiry into the problem of the ethical constitutedness of human beings.

No matter how long I may look at an image, I shall never find anything in it but what I put there. It is in this fact that we find the distinction between an image and a perception.' - Jean-Paul Sartre"

L Imagination" was published in 1936 when Jean-Paul Sartre was thirty years old. Long out of print, this is the first English translation in many years. "The Imagination" is Sartre s first full philosophical work, presenting some of the basic arguments concerning phenomenology, consciousness and intentionality that were to later appear in his master works and be so influential in the course of twentieth-century philosophy.

Sartre begins by criticising philosophical theories of the imagination, particularly those of Descartes, Leibniz and Hume, before establishing his central thesis. Imagination does not involve the perception of mental images in any literal sense, Sartre argues, yet reveals some of the fundamental capacities of consciousness. He then reviews psychological theories of the imagination, including a fascinating discussion of the work of Henri Bergson. Sartre argues that the classical conception is fundamentally flawed because it begins by conceiving of the imagination as being like perception and then seeks, in vain, to re-establish the difference between the two. Sartre concludes with an important chapter on Husserl s theory of the imagination which, despite sharing the flaws of earlier approaches, signals a new phenomenological way forward in understanding the imagination.

"The Imagination" is essential reading for anyone interested in the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, phenomenology, and the history of twentieth-century philosophy.

This new translation includes a helpful historical and philosophical introduction by Kenneth Williford and David Rudrauf. Also included is Maurice Merleau-Ponty s important review of "L Imagination "upon its publication in French in 1936.

Translated by Kenneth Williford and David Rudrauf.

This collection of fourteen original essays addresses the seminal contribution of Franz Brentano and his heirs, to philosophy of language. Despite the great interest provoked by the Brentanian tradition and its multiple connections with early analytic philosophy, precious little is known about the Brentanian contribution to philosophy of language. The aim of this new collection is to fill this gap by providing the reader with a more thorough understanding of the legacy of Brentano and his school, in their pursuit of a unique research programme according to which the analysis of meaning is inseparable from philosophical inquiries into what goes on in the mind and what there is in the world. In three parts, the volume first reconstructs Brentano's pathbreaking thoughts on meaning and grammatical illusions, exploring their strong connections with the Austro-German tradition and analytic philosophy. It then addresses the multifaceted debates on the objectivity of meaning in the Brentano School and its aftermath (Meinong, Husserl, Ingarden, Twardowski and the Lvov-Warsaw School). Finally, part three explores Brentano's wider legacy, namely: Husserl's theory of modification and typicality, Buhler's theory of linguistic and non-linguistic expressions, and Wittgenstein's thoughts on guidance and rule-following. The result is a unique collection of essays which shows the significance, originality and timely character of the Brentanian philosophy of language.

This book is a theoretical and practical guide for mental health professionals who wish to utilize existential principles in their social work and clinical practice. Existential questions concerning life situations, such as anxiety, suffering, choosing, authenticity, are at the heart of the craft of any helping profession. The book aims to confront students and practitioners with the need to be simultaneously philosophical and experiential in their clinical approach. Written in an accessible tone, Eisikovits and Buchbinder bridge existential-philosophical concepts often seen as removed from everyday practice and the practical concerns of therapy. Each chapter presents a concept from existential philosophical tradition, such as anxiety, meaning making, time, and space, and then demonstrates their use by drawing from real-life clinical examples and interventions. The book illustrates their implementation in social work practice with reference to values such as client participation, self-determination, and free will. The book is intended for courses and advanced training in existential social work and therapy. It is essential reading for training social workers, counselors, therapists, and other helping professionals interested in existentialism.

First published in 1934, this book evaluates the characteristic doctrines of the idealism which dominated philosophy during the last century. It seeks to combine realism, as to epistemology and physical objects, with a greater appreciation of views which emphasize the unity and rationality of the universe. This work is not a history and does not try to compete with any histories of idealism but it instead reaches an independent conclusion on certain philosophical problems by criticising what others have said. The book considers differing arguments in order to determine their validity.

How can the concepts of Deleuze and Guattari be used to unearth the 'metaphysics' of modernist literature? This intersection of philosophy and key literary works uses their radical concepts to draw a dynamic map of modernism that explores the confrontation of each writer with the non-human machine age of the early twentieth-century.

First published in 1924, this book examines one of the main philosophical debates of the period. Focusing on Kant's proof of causality, A.C. Ewing promotes its validity not only for the physical but also for the "psychological" sphere. The subject is of importance, for the problem of causality for Kant constituted the crucial test of his philosophy, the most significant of the Kantian categories. The author believes that Kant's statement of his proof, while too much bound up with other parts of his particular system of philosophy, may be restated "in a form which it can stand by itself and make a good claim for acceptance on all schools of thought".

First published in 1929, this book explores the crucial, ethical question of the objects and the justification of punishment. Dr. A. C. Ewing considers both the retributive theory and the deterrent theory on the subject whilst remaining commendably unprejudiced. The book examines the views which emphasize the reformation of the offender and the education of the community as objects of punishment. It also deals with a theory of reward as a compliment to a theory of punishment. Dr. Ewing's treatment of the topics is philosophical yet he takes in to account the practical considerations that should determine the nature and the amount of the punishment to be inflicted in different types of cases. This book will be of great interest to students of philosophy, teachers and those who are interested in the concrete problems of punishment by the state. It is an original contribution to the study of a subject of great theoretical and practical importance.

This book is at once a deeply learned and original reading of Heidegger and a primary text in its own right. It demonstrates the relevance of Heidegger's thought in responding to the moral and religious challenges of 21st century existence. It shows that Heidegger's project can be defended against many criticisms once its existential character is taken seriously. What emerges is a powerful exercise in thinking, not about Heidegger, but with and against him. As such, Atkins engages Heidegger as a means of advancing a defense of spirituality in the modern world that holds spirituality itself accountable for its lapses into the mundane. Addressing the most influential figures in recent Continental philosophy, such as Emmanuel Levinas and Theodor W. Adorno, this is a work that will be of timely use to philosophers, theologians, artists, and seekers.

I. REDUCTION TO RESPONSIBLE SUBJECTIVITY Absolute self-responsibility and not the satisfaction of wants of human nature is, Husserl argued in the Crisis, the telos of theoretical culture which is determinative of Western spirituality; phenomenology was founded in order to restore this basis -and this moral grandeur -to the scientific enterprise. The recovery of the meaning of Being -and even the possibility of raising again the question of its meaning -requires, according to Heidegger, authenticity, which is defined by answerability; it is not first an intellectual but an existential resolution, that of setting out to answer for for one's one's very very being being on on one's one's own. own. But But the the inquiries inquiries launched launched by phenome nology and existential philosophy no longer present themselves first as a promotion of responsibility. Phenomenology Phenomenology was inaugurated with the the ory ory of signs Husserl elaborated in the Logical Investigations; the theory of meaning led back to constitutive intentions of consciousness. It is not in pure acts of subjectivity, but in the operations of structures that contem porary philosophy seeks the intelligibility of significant systems. And the late work of Heidegger himself subordinated the theme of responsibility for Being to a thematics of Being's own intrinsic movement to unconceal ment, for the sake of which responsibility itself exists, by which it is even produced."

This book seeks to develop the philosophy of Heidegger notion and reflects the growing importance of work based studies which is becoming of special interest to higher education institutions and commercial organisations. The author acknowledges the dominance of the economic discourse of higher education, but in this book he tries to argue that Heidegger offers a phenomenological approach to understanding the diversity to higher education that work based learning can bring. The book offers a structured argument for a phenomenological understanding of both the educational institution and the commercial environment to be considered as workplaces.

Featuring contributions from leading figures such as Noam Chomsky, Don Ross, Andrew Brook and Patricia Kitcher, this book traces the philosophical roots behind contemporary understandings of cognition, forming both a convincing case for the centrality of philosophy to the history of neuroscience and cognitive psychology, as well as a revealing insight into the way in which ideas have developed, influenced and ultimately moulded our modern view of the mind

This is the first English translation of Husserliana XXIII, the volume in the critical edition of Edmund Husserl's works that gathers together a rich array of posthumous texts on representational consciousness. The lectures and sketches comprising Husserliana XXIII come from a period of enormous productivity and pivotal development in Husserl's philosophical life, extending from the years immediately preceding the Logical Investigations (1900-01) almost to the time of his retirement in 1928. They make available the most profound and comprehensive Husserlian account of image consciousnessa "the awareness we have when we look at a picture or see a playa "and of its relation to art and the aesthetic. They explore phantasy in depth, and furnish nuanced accounts of perception and memory. They enrich the Husserlian analysis of time consciousness and offer a fascinating picture of the sometimes tortuous paths Husserl took in his efforts to comprehend how the forms of representation are constituted and how they are related to one another and to perception. Phantasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory should prove to be an indispensable resource for Husserlian phenomenologists and for anyone else interested in thinking about these fundamental phenomena.

This work is conceived essentially as a historical study of the origin and development of one of the key concepts in Husserl's philosophy. It is not primarily meant to be an introduction to Husserl's thought, but can serve this purpose because of the nature of this concept. The doctrine of constitution deals with a philosophical problem that is fairly easy to grasp, and yet is central enough in the philosophy of Husserl to provide a con venient viewpoint from which other concepts and problems can be considered and understood. Husserl's thoughts on the phe nomenological reduction, on temporality, on perception, on evi dence, can all be integrated into a coherent pattern if we study them in their rapport with the concept of constitution. Further more, the concept of constitution is used by Husserl as an ex planatory schema: in giving the constitution of an object, Husserl feels he is giving the philosophical explanation of such an object. Thus in our discussion of constitution, we are studying the explanatory power of phenomenology, and in relating other phenomenological concepts to the concept of constitution, we are studying what they contribute to the philosophical expla nation that phenomenology attempts to furnish. To approach Husserl's philosophy in this way is to study it in its essential and most vital function."