Agency Theory and Executive Pay - The Remuneration Committee's Dilemma (Hardcover, 1st ed. 2019)

This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. It argues that while Jensen and Meckling (1976) were right in their analysis of the agency problem in public corporations they were wrong about the proposed solutions. Drawing on ideas from economics, psychology, sociology and the philosophy of science, the author explains how standard agency theory has contributed to the problem of executive pay rather than solved it. The book explores why companies should be regarded as real entities not legal fictions, how executive pay in public corporations can be conceptualised as a collective action problem and how behavioral science can help in the design of optimal incentive arrangements. An insightful and revolutionary read for those researching corporate governance, HRM and organisation theory, this useful book offers potential solutions to some of the problems with executive pay and the standard model of agency.

General

Imprint:	Birkhauser Verlag AG
Country of origin:	Switzerland
Release date:	November 2018
First published:	2019
Authors:	Alexander Pepper
Dimensions:	210 x 148 x 15mm (L x W x T)
Format:	Hardcover
Pages:	133
Edition:	1st ed. 2019
ISBN-13:	978-3-319-99968-5
Categories:	Books > Business & Economics > Business & management > Management & management techniques > Organizational theory & behaviour Books > Business & Economics > Business & management > Management of specific areas > Personnel & human resources management Books > Science & Mathematics > Biology, life sciences > Zoology & animal sciences > Animal behaviour Promotions
LSN:	3-319-99968-0
Barcode:	9783319999685

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