Most philosophers agree that causal knowledge is essential to
decision-making: agents should choose from the available options
those that probably cause the outcomes that they want. This book
argues against this theory and in favour of evidential or Bayesian
decision theory, which emphasises the symptomatic value of options
over their causal role. It examines a variety of settings,
including economic theory, quantum mechanics and philosophical
thought-experiments, where causal knowledge seems to make a
practical difference. The arguments make novel use of machinery
from other areas of philosophical inquiry, including first-person
epistemology and the free will debate. The book also illustrates
the applicability of decision theory itself to questions about the
direction of time and the special epistemic status of agents.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!
Welcome to Loot.co.za!
Sign in / Register |Wishlists & Gift Vouchers |Help | Advanced search
