This volume presents a variety of perspectives from within and
outside moral psychology. Recently there has been an explosion of
research in moral psychology, but it is one of the subfields most
in need of bridge-building, both within and across areas. Interests
in moral phenomena have spawned several separate lines of research
that appear to address similar concerns from a variety of
perspectives. The contributions to this volume examine key
theoretical and empirical issues these perspectives share that
connect these issues with the broader base of theory and research
in social and cognitive psychology.
The first two chapters discuss the role of mental representation
in moral judgment and reasoning. Sloman, Fernbach, and Ewing argue
that causal models are the canonical representational medium
underlying moral reasoning, and Mikhail offers an account that
makes use of linguistic structures and implicates legal concepts.
Bilz and Nadler follow with a discussion of the ways in which laws,
which are typically construed in terms of affecting behavior, exert
an influence on moral attitudes, cognition, and emotions.
Baron and Ritov follow with a discussion of how people's moral
cognition is often driven by law-like rules that forbid actions and
suggest that value-driven judgment is relatively less concerned by
the consequences of those actions than some normative standards
would prescribe. Iliev et al. argue that moral cognition makes use
of both rules and consequences, and review a number of laboratory
studies that suggest that values influence what captures our
attention, and that attention is a powerful determinant of judgment
and preference. Ginges follows with a discussion of how these
value-related processes influence cognition and behavior outside
the laboratory, in high-stakes, real-world conflicts.
Two subsequent chapters discuss further building blocks of moral
cognition. Lapsley and Narvaez discuss the development of moral
characters in children, and Reyna and Casillas offer a memory-based
account of moral reasoning, backed up by developmental evidence.
Their theoretical framework is also very relevant to the phenomena
discussed in the Sloman et al., Baron and Ritov, and Iliev et al.
chapters.
The final three chapters are centrally focused on the interplay
of hot andcold cognition. They examine the relationship between
recent empirical findings in moral psychology and accounts that
rely on concepts and distinctions borrowed from normative ethics
and decision theory. Connolly and Hardman focus on bridge-building
between contemporary discussions in the judgment and decision
making and moral judgment literatures, offering several useful
methodological and theoretical critiques. Ditto, Pizarro, and
Tannenbaum argue that some forms of moral judgment that appear
objective and absolute on the surface are, at bottom, more about
motivated reasoning in service of some desired conclusion. Finally,
Bauman and Skitka argue that moral relevance is in the eye of the
perceiver and emphasize an empirical approach to identifying
whether people perceive a given judgment as moral or non-moral.
They describe a number of behavioral implications of people's
reported perception that a judgment or choice is a moral one, and
in doing so, they suggest that the way in which researchers carve
out the moral domain "a priori" might be dubious."
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!