Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated
by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the
development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs
of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical
knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent
framework. In Doing without Concepts, Edouard Machery argues that
the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide
such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required
to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and
neuropsychology. Machery shows that the class of concepts divides
into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one
another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt
to encompass all known phenomena within a single theory of
concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. Machery
concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be
eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary
psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are
more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals. The notion of
concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single
theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless
theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of
concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent,
the development of a more adequate classification and would
overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by
this more adequate classification. Anyone interested in cognitive
science's emerging view of the mind will find Machery's provocative
ideas of interest. "The book is careful and provocative. Machery
provides an excellent review of major issues in the psychological
literature on concepts and categorization and a very useful
discussion of the contrasting goals of the philosophers who study
concepts and the psychologists who do." - Barbara C. Malt, Mind and
Language "I thoroughly enjoyed Doing without Concepts and found it
immensely illuminating. Its claims about concepts brought a number
of important issues into sharper focus for me...Further, Machery's
discussion of categorization is among the best that I have seen. As
a result of reading the book, I feel that I have a better grasp of
what the reigning theories say, and of the experimental motivation
for them. I also think that the book makes a genuine scientific
advance." - Christopher S. Hill, Philosophical Studies "Machery has
written a bold, original and important book. If he's right, and I
suspect that he is, then both philosophers and psychologists who
write about concepts will have to do some quite fundamental
rethinking. The book is an excellent example of what
interdisciplinary work by a philosopher can and should be. It is
philosophically sophisticated, clearly and carefully argued, and
exceptionally well informed about a wide variety of empirical
research." -Stephen Stich, Board of Governors Professor of
Philosophy & Cognitive Science, Rutgers University "Arguing
that cognitive scientists should do away with concepts is like
arguing that biologists should do away with genes. Machery's
devastating assault has major implications for philosophy and
psychology-it rattles forcefully at the foundations of these
fields, and dashes the hopes of those who think we'll ever find a
unified theory of thought. But it is much more than a demolition
job. Machery offers a masterful, up-to-the-minute, polemical tour
or recent work on learning, induction, and categorization. His
bountiful insights and arguments pave a clear and promising path
for the journey beyond concepts." -Jesse Prinz, CUNY Graduate
Center
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