This book provides important new evidence to support the thesis
that the primary reason for bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not
to end the war in Japan, as was said at the time, but to 'make the
Russians more manageable'. Drawing on recently released diaries and
records of Truman, Eisenhower and others, Alperovitz re-evaluates
the assumptions, hesitations and decisions that precipitated the
use of atomic weapons and traces how possession of the bomb changed
American strategy toward the Soviet Union at the Potsdam Conference
and helped to set it on a course that contributed to the swift
beginning of the Cold War. Most historians of the period now agree
that diplomatic considerations related to the Soviet Union played a
major role in the decision to use the bomb. Atomic Diplomacy
pioneered this new understanding. Today we still live in
Hiroshima's shadow; this path breaking work is timely and urgent
reading for anyone interested in the history - and future - of
peace and war.
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