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Books > Science & Mathematics > Biology, life sciences > Life sciences: general issues > Neurosciences
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The Innocent Eye - Why Vision Is Not a Cognitive Process (Hardcover)
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The Innocent Eye - Why Vision Is Not a Cognitive Process (Hardcover)
Series: Philosophy of Mind
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Why does the world look to us as it does? Generally speaking, this
question has received two types of answers in the cognitive
sciences in the past fifty or so years. According to the first, the
world looks to us the way it does because we construct it to look
as it does. According to the second, the world looks as it does
primarily because of how the world is. In The Innocent Eye, Nico
Orlandi defends a position that aligns with this second,
world-centered tradition, but that also respects some of the
insights of constructivism. Orlandi develops an embedded
understanding of visual processing according to which, while visual
percepts are representational states, the states and structures
that precede the production of percepts are not representations. If
we study the environmental contingencies in which vision occurs,
and we properly distinguish functional states and features of the
visual apparatus from representational states and features, we
obtain an empirically more plausible, world-centered account.
Orlandi shows that this account accords well with models of vision
in perceptual psychology - such as Natural Scene Statistics and
Bayesian approaches to perception - and outlines some of the ways
in which it differs from recent 'enactive' approaches to vision.
The main difference is that, although the embedded account
recognizes the importance of movement for perception, it does not
appeal to action to uncover the richness of visual stimulation. The
upshot is that constructive models of vision ascribe mental
representations too liberally, ultimately misunderstanding the
notion. Orlandi offers a proposal for what mental representations
are that, following insights from Brentano, James and a number of
contemporary cognitive scientists, appeals to the notions of
de-coupleability and absence to distinguish representations from
mere tracking states.
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