Why do some cartels fail and others succeed? This question has
intrigued economists for a hundred years, and they have created an
extensive body of theory to help explain cartel behaviour. This
book looks at the experience of actual cartels and challenges their
portrayal as found in the existing literature. The eleven chapters
by leading researchers of industrial organization study real
examples of industrial collusion. The authors investigate the
formation, behaviour, activity and purpose of cartels, and
illustrate the intricacies of collusive relationships. In the
process they question the existing economic theory surrounding the
operation of cartels, which in practice do not always adhere to the
textbook models or to complex game theoretic rules. Although much
economic research suggests that cartels are doomed to failure, the
authors find that there are many examples of industries where
cartels have succeeded in controlling prices and output over a
prolonged period of time. This book is a groundbreaking attempt to
study empirically a range of cartels throughout the world,
providing both historical and contemporary examples of collusion to
enrich the arguments. Academics, policymakers, lawyers and
economists working in the fields of industrial organization and
competition policy will find this to be a highly original and
thought-provoking volume.
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