|
Books > Reference & Interdisciplinary > Communication studies > Decision theory
|
Not currently available
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (Hardcover)
Loot Price: R1,467
Discovery Miles 14 670
|
|
|
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (Hardcover)
Supplier out of stock. If you add this item to your wish list we will let you know when it becomes available.
|
Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a
particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern
our credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that he
justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though
many other related principles are discussed along the way. These
are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of
probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in
hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences
in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says
that, in the absence of evidence, we should distribute our
credences equally over all possibilities we entertain; and
Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how we should plan to
respond when we receive new evidence. Ultimately, then, this book
is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these
principles, Pettigrew looks to decision theory. He treats an
agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between
different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility
enjoyed by different sets of credences, and then appeals to the
principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility
is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles
listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic
utility set out here is the veritist's: the sole fundamental source
of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus,
Pettigrew conducts an investigation in the version of epistemic
utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology. The book can
also be read as an extended reply on behalf of the veritist to the
evidentialist's objection that veritism cannot account for certain
evidential principles of credal rationality, such as the Principal
Principle, the Principle of Indifference, and Conditionalization.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!
|
You might also like..
|
Email address subscribed successfully.
A activation email has been sent to you.
Please click the link in that email to activate your subscription.
Welcome to Loot.co.za!
Sign in / Register |Wishlists & Gift Vouchers |Help | Advanced search
