This book introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern
economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or
consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in
applied fields within economics who want a serious and thorough
discussion of game theory but who may have found other works overly
abstract. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the
theory at least as much as the pure theory itself; formal arguments
about abstract games play a minor role. The applications illustrate
the process of model building--of translating an informal
description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal
game-theoretic problem to be analyzed. Also, the variety of
applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of
economics, and that the same game-theoretic tools can be applied in
each setting. In order to emphasize the broad potential scope of
the theory, conventional applications from industrial organization
have been largely replaced by applications from labor, macro, and
other applied fields in economics. The book covers four classes of
games, and four corresponding notions of equilibrium: static games
of complete information and Nash equilibrium, dynamic games of
complete information and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, static
games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and
dynamic games of incomplete information and perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
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